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This thesis investigates three empirical issues in M&As. First, we test the hypothesis 
that corporate payout has a significant effect on acquirers’ gains. We find that overall 
the level of corporate payout has a strong positive relationship to the abnormal returns 
gained by acquirers during both the announcement period and the post-acquisition 
period. In our sample, non-paying acquirers are small firms and outperform paying 
acquirers in the short run and with initial bids. Paying acquirers, on the other hand, 
are large firms and experience positive gains across all bids in an acquisition 
programme. In the long run, paying acquirers consistently outperform non-paying 
acquirers regardless the method that is used to estimate gains. Our study reveals that 
corporate payout enhances acquirers’ performance especially in the long run post-
acquisition period. Additionally, the gains accruing to non-paying acquirers are 
mainly from the market revaluation due to previous information asymmetry. Our 
results are consistent with previous evidence of corporate payout and robust across 
different deal and target characteristics. 
The second empirical issue of our investigation is from the supply side of acquisitions. 
We test how a director and shareholder factor, a corporate factor and a market factor 
influence owners’ decision to sell their firms and affect their gains from the sale. We 
find that a director’s years of service, percentage of ownership held by the largest 
shareholder and the corporate liquidity ratio all have a negative relationship to the 
likelihood of the sale of the firm. For the gains from the sale, factors such as the 
director’s job security and the industrial clustering significantly reduce the size of the 
premium received by the target. Our results suggest that personal consideration of 




the sale, and the acquisition activity is significantly affected by the market 
environment.  
The final empirical chapter of this thesis focuses on the involvement of private 
acquirers. We find that, on average, target shareholders receive lower premiums from 
private acquirers than from public acquirers. Reverse takeovers that are made by 
private acquirers generate the lowest premium for target shareholders. In addition, our 
results indicate that private acquirers may suffer less from winner’s curse and market 
pressure, and this enhances private acquirers’ control over the cost of the acquisition. 
Furthermore, compared to public acquirers, private acquirers are more likely to seek 
the cooperation from target managers, and this also explains why private acquirers on 
average are able to secure the deal at a lower possible price. Our findings imply that 
because private acquirers pay a smaller premium than ceteris paribus, we would 
expect takeovers by private acquirers to be more successful than takeovers by public 
acquirers. Therefore, the further question needs to be answered is why public 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Research into the market for corporate control during the past three decades has spent 
significant efforts in investigating whether mergers and acquisitions (M&As) create 
value for acquirers and targets, and how the value, if any, is created. A frequently 
asked question is that whether acquirers are better off from their acquisitions. Early 
studies, including Jensen and Ruback (1983), suggest that target firms gain a 
significant positive abnormal return while the acquirers’ stocks experience 
insignificant abnormal performance around the announcement. This early finding of 
the benefits of acquisition outcome challenged the original theoretical suggestion that 
the intention of acquisition is to pursue growth and realise excess profits. Academics 
carried out a wide range of studies in attempting to answer this question. Several 
factors, including the mode of payment (Wansley, et al., 1983; Travlos, 1987; 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Draper and Paudyal, 1999), the size of the target (Fuller, et 
al., 2002; Moeller, et al., 2004), diversification (Graham, et al., 2002; Ueng and Wells, 
2001), cross-border (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005), target listed status (Chang, 
1998; Ang and Kohers, 2001; Fuller, et al., 2002; Draper and Paudyal, 2006) have 
been identified to have a significant impact on the acquirers’ gains. In addition, 
research studies, including Jensen (1986) and Harford (1999), find that acquisitions 
might be driven by managerial incentives and such acquisitions are not necessarily in 
the shareholders’ interest. Market factors such as industrial restructuring also indicate 
merger activity and affect shareholders’ gains (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade, 
et al., 2001). 
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Further investigations are worthwhile to increase our understanding of acquisition 
activities. First of all, Jensen (1986) suggests that managers and shareholders may 
have conflicting interests over the firm’s cash. Managers may use the firm’s resources 
to pursue personal benefits at the cost of the shareholders. Studies, including Harford 
(1999) and Carroll and Griffith (2001), suggest that the managerial incentive to use 
corporate cash is a main cause of acquirers engaging in bad deals. If agency costs, as 
suggested in the literature, are the reason that acquirers fail to gain from acquisitions, 
it is worth asking why such agency issues are not well managed by the acquirers. 
Although there is no perfect monitoring mechanism available to shareholders, 
corporate payout policy has been recognized as having a significant effect in 
monitoring managerial behaviour and improving corporate performance (DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo, 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008). More importantly, Denis and 
Osobov (2008) suggest that cash distribution activities are more likely concentrated 
among mature firms. Firms that are at different stage of corporate life cycle are likely 
to have different performance from similar corporate activities due to various factors 
including information asymmetry. As acquisitions are a major corporate investment, 
how the corporate payout affects the acquisition performance is less well discussed.  
Secondly, the majority of research studies in M&A are carried out on the assumption 
that acquisitions are dominated by the acquirer. It is not hard to understand why the 
literature about acquisitions is preoccupied with the investigation of wealth effect 
accruing to shareholders of acquiring firms. The evidence suggests that target 
shareholders experience significant gains from acquisitions so that it is not difficult to 
see why target shareholders are not resistant to acquisitions. However, studies 
including Bargeron, et al. (2008) suggest that the ownership structure of the target 
affects the size of the premium paid by the acquirers. Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) 
find that the firm’s managers have different preferences towards the sale of their 
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firms and can be actively looking for buyers. In spite of the fact that investment 
bankers encourage firms to seek acquirers and may suggest a target exit strategy, the 
supply side of acquisitions is not well explored.  
Thirdly, conventional understanding of the acquisition outcome is mainly based on 
the deals made by listed acquirers. Concentration on listed acquirers is because the 
characteristics of listed firms are more observable. However, from the data available 
in the Thomson One Banker M&As database, over the past two decades in the UK, a 
third of the acquisitions of listed targets are made by private acquirers. Although the 
pros and cons of staying private are often discussed, the listing status of the acquirer 
and its impact on the acquisition outcome is less well investigated. Bargeron, et al. 
(2008) find that ownership structure can explain why private acquirers pay differently 
from public acquirers, their study only focuses on cash only deals. Further evidence 
relating to the engagement of private acquirers is required to enhance our 
understanding of overall acquisition activity. 
To fill the gaps in the existing literature, this thesis carries out three empirical studies 
each of which focuses on a specific issue relating to acquisitions. In the first empirical 
chapter, we investigate how corporate payout policy is related to acquisition outcome. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) suggest that an optimal payout ratio enables firm to 
have sufficient cash reserves to meet the investment requirement of potential value-
enhancing projects and at the same time reduces the agency cost. Denis and Osobov 
(2008) suggest that dividend payout is concentrated among mature firms and provide 
supporting evidence for the monitoring effect of corporate payout. As we expect 
corporate payout policy enhances corporate performance, the main hypothesis under 
test in the first empirical chapter is that high payout acquirers are better off compared 
to other acquirers.  
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In the second empirical chapter, we turn our focus to the target. Graebner and 
Eisenhardt (2004) point out that the traditional assumption that acquisitions are 
initiated and dominated by acquirers may be invalid as the managers of target firms 
may also be active in looking for buyers. Their results, however, are difficult to 
generalise as they focus on 12 entrepreneurial high-tech firms and the use of the 
interview may lead to a biased conclusion. Our analysis is based on a larger sample, 
and investigates how three types of factors, including a director and shareholder 
factor, a corporate factor and a market factor, affect the likelihood of sale and gains 
from the sale.  
Bargeron, et al. (2008) find that private acquirers pay less to the targets than public 
acquirers. To explain this underpayment by the private acquirers, Bargeron, et al. 
(2008) suggests that ownership structure in both acquiring and target firms has a 
dominant effect in determining the size of the premium paid by the acquirers. 
Bargeron, et al. (2008)’s study is empirically driven and focuses on cash only deals. It 
is still unclear whether acquisitions made by private acquirers have features that are 
distinguishable from acquisitions made by public acquirers. In the final empirical 
chapter, we test the hypothesis that private acquirers behave differently from public 
acquirers and the difference in the premium offered by private and public acquirers 
can be explained by deal, target and/or market characteristics.  
The reminder of this chapter is structured as follow: section 1.2 discusses the issue, 
testable hypothesis and main finding of each empirical study. Section 1.3 presents the 
structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Motivation, Objectives and Findings 
Research about M&As is an ongoing process. Studies of acquisitions over the past 
three decades have enriched our understanding of corporate activity in the market for 
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corporate control. Yet, new issues are being identified, and this thesis aims to 
contribute to the M&A literature by providing detailed analyses of some less well 
explored areas. 
1.2.1 Corporate Payout and Gains from Acquisitions 
After Jensen (1986), many research studies have argued that managerial incentive is 
the main cause of acquirers engaging in value-destroying acquisitions. The 
conventional belief has become that the firm’s cash is the centre of the agency-
shareholder conflict. Many studies, including Lang, et al. (1991), Harford (1999) and 
Carroll and Griffith (2001), provide empirical tests of the cash flow hypothesis. They 
typically find a negative relationship between the level of corporate cash and 
acquisition performance. However, findings of how corporate cash reserves affect 
acquisition gains remain controversial. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Gregory (2005) 
find that a cash surplus has a positive impact on acquirers’ stock performance on and 
after the acquisition announcement. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that 
accumulating cash is a rational behaviour according to their pecking order theory. 
The inconclusive findings of the effect of cash on operating performance suggests 
that, the agency cost related to holding corporate cash might not be as significant as 
has been suggested. Even if the agency cost of holding corporate cash is a main 
reason explaining why some acquirers fail to gain, the question remains that why do 
shareholders of the acquiring firms not control such costs? 
We suggest that the mixed finding relating to the corporate cash effect is caused by 
the different nature of acquirers. An acquirer at a different life cycle stage is likely to 
have different cash characteristics, so that the results generated from simply 
investigating corporate cash levels may be misleading. Corporate payout policy 
should have greater explanatory power for the size of gains by acquirers. An 
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advantage of testing the effect of corporate payout on acquirers’ gains is that 
corporate payout level can help to identify the corporate life cycle stage (Denis and 
Osobov, 2008). Because firms may have different characteristics and behave 
differently during different life cycle stages, investigating corporate payout policy can 
capture the life cycle effect on acquisition activity. Another advantage of examining 
corporate payout policy is its monitoring effect on managerial behaviour. Easterbrook 
(1984) and La Porta, et al. (2000), among others, find that corporate payout can 
effectively minimise agency costs and enhance the protection of shareholders’ wealth. 
We expect paying acquirers to perform better than non-paying acquirers and high 
paying acquirers to perform the best1.  
Using the sample of UK acquisitions from 1991 to 2009, we carry out both univariate 
and multivariate analysis of how an acquirer’s payout affects the acquirer’s gains. We 
find that the corporate payout level has a significant effect on the acquirers’ gains in 
both the short and long run. In the short run, non-paying acquirers outperform the 
paying acquirers. We find that this outperformance is caused by the market 
revaluation due to its previous information asymmetry as it only exists in the short 
run and with initial bids. For the subsequent bids and in the post-acquisition period, 
paying acquirers have a stable and better performance than the non-paying acquirers.  
Our results have several implications. First, our results are consistent with the 
suggestion that corporate payout policy enhances corporate performance especially in 
the long run. Secondly, the short run performance of non-paying acquirers suggests 
that non-paying acquirers are more likely have higher information asymmetry than 
paying acquirers, and the gains accruing to non-paying acquirers are mainly from 
                                                          
1
 Paying acquirer is an acquirer that distributes the cash to the shareholders through dividend and/or 
repurchases for two years prior the announcement of the acquisition. A non-paying acquirer is an 
acquirer without any cash distribution for two years prior the announcement.  
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market revaluation. Thirdly, using deal and firm characteristics, our study does not 
reveal any supporting evidence for the hypothesis of agency problem relating to the 
use of cash.  
1.2.2 Factors Affecting an Owner’s Decision to Sell 
The existing literature suggests that the target passively receives bids from an 
acquirer, and the size of the premium paid by an acquirer is driven by the acquirer’s 
characteristics. However, Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) argue that the conventional 
assumption that the acquisition is initiated and dominated by the acquirer can be 
misleading as the target may also play an active role in the acquisition process. In 
practice, managers/shareholders of the firm often seek advice from investment banks 
once the sale of the firm has been given serious consideration. There is, however, 
little evidence describing what factors affect the decision to sell and how these factors 
affect the gains from a sale to the shareholders and managers of a potential target. 
Graebner and Eisenhardt’s (2004) investigation focuses on 12 entrepreneurial high 
tech firms using interviews as their primary research method. The small sample 
makes their findings difficult to generalise. We investigate how decisions to sell and 
the gains from sale are determined. 
Our investigation is carried out using a sample of 306 UK target firms and 2,645 UK 
non-target firms within the period 2004 to 2010. We adopt both logistic analysis and 
multivariate regression analysis to investigate how the control variables affect both 
the likelihood of sale and the gains from the sale. Three types of factor are used in our 
tests: a director and shareholder factor is used to capture personal effects; a corporate 
factor is used to capture the effect of a firm’s financial status; and a market factor is 
employed to capture macroeconomic effects. Although we do not distinguish whether 
the target actively looking for buyers or passively receive bids, we find that the 
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director and shareholder factor has a dominant role in determining the likelihood of 
the sale. The degree to which the directors are entrenched in the firm together with a 
highly concentrated ownership structure explains why some firms are reluctant to sell. 
In analysing the gains from the sale, the job security of the main director of the target 
has a large and significant effect on the selling price. The corporate liquidity of the 
target, its market valuation and the extent of industrial clustering also affect the size 
of the premium received by the target.  
Although it is difficult to identify which side actually initiated the takeover, an 
important implication of our results is that the decision to sell the firm is largely 
driven by the wealth and its impact on the welfare of the decision makers. For the 
directors, as suggested by Jensen and Ruback (1983), the possibility of losing power, 
prestige and the value of organization-specific human capital after the takeover may 
cause the directors to act against the idea of selling the firm. However, if such 
concerns can be resolved, directors may be willing to cooperate with potential 
acquirers. This gives an acquirer advantages during the negotiation process. From the 
shareholders’ perspective, whether to sell their control mainly depends on their risk 
preference and expectations of wealth maximization. An individual who is a 
controlling shareholder is more likely to require cash as the mode of payment due to 
the certainty. A corporation that is the controlling shareholder is willing to share 
potential synergy by accepting payment through stock issue. Our results also show 
that the overall acquisition activity is largely affected by the level of market 
valuations and industrial restructuring.  
1.2.3 Acquisitions of Private Acquirers 
While the listing status of the target firm has been widely examined, the existing 
literature on acquisitions has focused on deals made by acquirers that are public firms. 
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For this reason the empirical evidence is unlikely to capture the whole picture of the 
market for corporate control as a significant proportion of acquisitions are made by 
private acquirers. Bargeron, et al. (2008) suggests that the shareholders of targets of 
acquisitions made by private acquirers receive less than shareholders of targets 
acquired by public firms. They also find that the ownership structure may explain the 
difference in the premium paid between private and public acquirers. However, their 
study focuses on cash only deals and does not find strong evidence to explain why 
targets do not wait for public acquirers to bid in order to sell the firm at a higher price. 
To enhance our knowledge of the takeover behaviour of private acquirers, we carry 
out an empirical analysis based on a sample of UK domestic acquisitions between 
2004 and 2010. The main hypothesis is whether private acquirers behave differently 
from public acquirers, and how deal and target characteristics may explain differences 
in the premium paid by acquirers.  
We find that overall private acquirers pay less of a premium to targets than public 
acquirers. Private acquirers may have a different purpose when engaged in takeovers. 
The reverse takeover, for instance, is a unique type of acquisition only made by 
private acquirers. We also find that private acquirers may suffer less from the 
winner’s curse and are more likely to walk away from bidding competitions. 
Moreover, seeking cooperation from the target is more commonly associated with 
private acquirers than public acquirers. Our findings reveal that private acquirers have 
better control over the costs of acquisitions and more flexible than public acquirers, 
and the average higher payment made by public acquirers is likely to be caused by 
contested takeovers and market pressure.  
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of this thesis is as follow: Chapter 2 provides brief review of the 
existing literature on acquisitions, paying specific attention to the three issues 
investigated in this thesis. Chapter 3 provides an empirical study of how corporate 
payout policy affects the acquirers’ gains. Chapter 4 focuses on the supply side of the 
acquisition and tests how the director and shareholder factor, the corporate factor and 
the market factor affect both the likelihood to sell and the gains from sale. Chapter 5 
investigates the effect of the acquirers’ listing status on the acquisition outcome. It 
examines whether private acquirers behave differently from public acquirers and what 
factors determine such differences. This thesis concludes in Chapter 6 where the main 
findings are summarized and future research directions are discussed. 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
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Chapter 2  Literature Review 
This chapter provides a review relating to different aspects of the M&A literature. 
Section 2.1 provides an overview of M&A literature focusing on the most commonly 
suggested causes and consequences of acquisitions, and key determinants of 
acquisition performance. Section 2.2 reviews the specific literature that focuses on the 
three investigated empirical issues of this thesis.  
2.1 Overview 
2.1.1 Early Findings 
Acquisition is an important corporate activity. The investigations carried out by early 
studies focused on the economic consequence of M&As since that taking over other 
competitors may enhance the acquirer’s monopoly power and cause imperfections in 
the market (Hudson, 1890; T. C, 1904). The control of economic resources, as 
suggested by Burns (1933), had been seen as the main motive of acquisitions. With 
the development of free markets and increasing competitiveness in the market, 
research studies during recent decades have suggested that the motive for acquisitions 
is not limited to the pursuit of market power, and acquisition activities have 
implications for various economic issues. For instance, Manne (1965) criticised the 
practical implication of early antitrust regulations and points out that the market for 
corporate control has advantages through the “lessening of wasteful bankruptcy 
proceedings, more efficient management of corporations, the protection afforded non-
controlling corporate investors, increased mobility of capital, and generally a more 
efficient allocation of resources.” (Manne, 1965, p119). Manne’s (1965) arguments 
and suggestions attracted great attention. A question raised by Manne (1965) is 
whether acquisitions motived by the pursuit of efficiency can be distinguished from 
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ones that are driven by the quest for monopoly profit, and whether possible 
advantages resulting from the existence of the market for corporate control supported 
by the empirical evidence of stock performance.   
Since Manne (1965), researchers have put significant effort into investigating whether 
acquisitions create value for acquiring and target shareholders. Manne (1965) 
suggested that the existence of the market for corporate control enables resources to 
be used in a way that enhances shareholders’ wealth and the immediate effect of 
acquisitions is most likely to be captured by change in acquirers’ and target stock 
prices. Hogarty (1970) investigated acquirers’ investment performance by comparing 
the annual stock price movement of the acquirers to the industrial benchmark. He 
found that an acquirer on average underperformed other competitors in the industry 
and acquirer’s stock performance is poorer than its performance measured by 
earnings per share (EPS). Thus, Hogarty (1970) concluded that mergers are 
associated with higher risk and the cause of high merger activity is the temptation of a 
few successful deals. Yet, Hogarty’s (1970) view that mergers in general failed to 
create value is not shared by many academics. Lintner (1971), for instance, argued 
that investors do not lose from acquisitions. Lintner (1971) suggests that acquirers are 
more likely to be motivated by the expected improvement in economies of scale and 
efficiency rather than the gains from monopolization, and can also benefit from cost 
savings and enhanced EPS even when synergies are not expected2. Mandelker (1974) 
also provides supporting evidence that acquisition is a value-enhancing corporate 
activity. His study found that the return gained by acquiring shareholders on 
acquisitions is similar to the return generated from other investment projects with 
                                                          
2
 The bootstrapping effect occurs when high P/E acquirer takes over a low P/E target to boost EPS 
without any synergy created. This also questions Hogarty (1970)’s conclusion that mergers are risky 
investment because the acquirer’s EPS performance is better than their stock price performance. 
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similar risk3. On the other hand, target shareholders gain an average abnormal return 
of 14 per cent in the months preceding the acquisition. Mandelker (1974) study 
suggests that the market for corporate control is perfectly competitive and the 
potential value of target’s resources can be realised by acquisitions as the 
performance of the target prior to the acquisition is below shareholders’ expectation. 
Additionally, Mandelker (1974) argues that because the market for corporate control 
enhances the efficiency of assets allocation, any effort to limit acquisition activity 
may lead to an inefficient economy. Similar conclusions were arrived at by Ellert’s 
(1976) study in which the investigation focused on 205 defendant firms of antitrust 
complaints.  Ellert’s (1976) evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
acquisitions are motivated by pursuing monopolistic power and the pre-acquisition 
abnormal stock performance of the target indicates the poor management of target 
assets.  
2.1.2 Gains to M&A Activity 
The debate as to whether M&As are motivated by the expected gains from enhanced 
monopolistic power or the improvement in the efficiency of economic resources 
allocation dominates the research studies before 1980s. The key finding from these 
early studies is that the target stock performance is improved by acquisition, and that 
the development of the market for corporate control is driven by the potential value of 
poorly managed targets’ assets. However, Jensen and Ruback (1983) point out that 
many previous M&A studies used the effective date of the deal as the event date of 
the investigation. According to Fama (1970) efficient market theory, the market is 
                                                          
3
 Langetieg (1978) find that acquirer’s post-merger abnormal return is insignificantly different from 
zero and argue that enhancing shareholders’ wealth is unlikely to be the main motive of acquisition. 
However, Lintner (1971) suggest that the normal return earned by acquirers on acquisition is because 
of the acquisition effect is already incorporated into stock price during the announcement period and 
no abnormal performance should be expected on effective day.  
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
14 
 
able to incorporate relevant information into stock prices once the information is 
available. Because the information relating to acquisition is first available to the 
market on the announcement date, and announcement occurs on a date prior to the 
effective date, any acquisition effect is unlikely to be captured or distinguished when 
testing stock performance on the effective date, as the stock price has been already 
adjusted before effective date (Jensen and Ruback, 1983)4 5.  
The announcement effect of acquisition has been widely examined since late 1970s. 
Jarrell and Bradley (1980) investigate the effect of federal and state regulations on 
cash acquisitions and find that target shareholders gain significant abnormal returns 
during the period 40 days before announcement to 20 days after. They suggest that 
the abnormal return earned by the target is due to the high premium paid by the 
acquirer as the acquirer is forced to disclose specific information on the deal. Such 
forced disclosure effectively reduces the acquirer’s informational advantage and 
results in a significant underperformance compared to the target. Bradley (1980) tests 
stock performance for both the acquiring and target firms for a period of 40 days 
surrounding the announcement date. The results of Bradley’s (1980) study show that 
successful acquiring firms using a tender offer gain on average a 4.4 per cent 
abnormal return whilst targets outperform with an abnormal return of over 30 per cent. 
These findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that competition for the targets 
assets enhances the target operating performance. Additional studies, including 
Asquith and Kim (1982), Asquith, et al. (1983) and Eckbo (1983), all find that the 
value of target firms’ increase by a large magnitude during the announcement period, 
and the abnormal performance of an acquirer’s stock is small if not zero. Jensen and 
                                                          
4
 It would be more accurate to say that announcement occurs no later than effective date as many deals, 
especially deals that involve private firms, have announcement and effective date on the same day. 
However, the deals of private targets were not considered among early studies and listing status effect 
is discussed in latter part of current section.  
5
 The announcement effect is also mentioned yet not investigated in Lintner (1971). 
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Ruback (1983) summarize the evidence “corporate takeovers generate positive gains, 
that target firm shareholders benefit, and that bidding firm shareholder do not lose” 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983, p47). The empirical evidence provided by the early 
literature also suggests that the gains from acquisitions are created by improvements 
in economic efficiency. This makes the creation of market power argument less 
convincing.  
Nevertheless, additional question still need to be answered. Bradley (1980) suggests 
that acquirers are unlikely to gain from the appreciation of target value. Critics on the 
distribution of wealth effects during the announcement period argue that target 
shareholders gain at the cost of acquiring shareholders. Although it may be argued 
that estimates using short event windows would underestimate the shareholders’ 
wealth effect of acquisitions as the market will gradually incorporate all the 
information of acquisition into stock price, Asquith, et al. (1983) and Andrade, et al. 
(2001), among others, find that acquirers experience loss in the long run. Thus, the 
issue of whether acquiring shareholders gain from acquisitions, and why the gain 
varies across different acquisition have been widely discussed in the M&A literature.  
2.1.2.1 Managerial Incentive 
One suggestion as to why acquirers fail to gain is derived from Berle and Means’ 
(1932) theory of the separation of ownership and control. The theory suggests that 
because the controlling group (managers/directors) of a modern corporation is 
separated from the owners (shareholders), the decisions may not serve the best 
interests of owners (Berle and Means, 1932). However, early studies focus more on 
managerial incentives from the point of view of the target. For instance, Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) suggest that, the significant gains to targets from successful 
acquisitions and the insignificant abnormal performance of the shares of the 
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unsuccessful acquisitions may indicate that target shareholders’ wealth is not 
enhanced if the managers of targets create obstacles to successful deals. However, 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) also point out that management opposition to a takeover 
bid may lead to a higher takeover premium. This makes the managerial effect on 
target shareholders’ wealth an empirical issue.  
The managerial factor may have a more pronounced effect on acquirers. Jensen (1986) 
suggests that the firm’s cash surplus represents the main conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders, and that acquisition is the primary method for a manager 
to spend the firm’s free cash flow to achieve personal objectives6. Although the issue 
of whether corporate cash reflects agency costs is controversial, research studies 
suggest various explanations as to why managers are motived to engage in certain 
type of acquisition which may not be favoured by shareholders. Roll (1986) argues 
that the high abnormal return to the shares of targets is driven by the premium paid by 
the acquiring firm and that such a premium does not necessarily fully reflect the 
potential synergy. He suggests that because acquiring managers can be subjective 
during the target valuation process, part of the takeover premium might be caused by 
valuation error and hubris. In other words, managers of acquiring firms may 
overestimate their ability to identify value-enhancing targets, and the overconfidence 
induces managers to pay a premium even if synergy is not expected by the market. 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) test the overconfidence argument using a UK sample. 
They find that overconfident managers fail to provide abnormal returns at the level of 
other rational managers. Their study suggests that self-attribution of early success 
causes the overconfident managers to engage in subsequent deals and eventually 
destroys value for acquiring shareholders. Thus, self-belief may drive managers to 
                                                          
6
 Detailed discussion of agency cost of corporate cash is in section 2.2.1. 
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unconsciously engage in non-value-enhancing acquisitions which harm shareholder 
wealth. 
Another well recognized managerial incentive for acquisition is the diversification of 
personal risk. Mann and Sicherman (1991) and Malmendier and Tate (2005), among 
others, suggest that managers in large corporations face significant risks as a result of 
their undiversified personal portfolios.  In order to overcome such risk, managers may 
seek to diversify their personal risks using physical assets under the firm’s control. 
Reducing risk through corporate diversification generates addition costs to 
shareholders since shareholders can more easily diversify risk by adjusting their 
portfolio to achieve their desired risk and return ratio (Hogarty, 1970). Morck, et al. 
(1990) also find evidence that unrelated acquisitions are eventually punished by the 
market. Ueng and Wells (2001) construct an incentive ratio which is the ratio between 
managerial compensation and ownership. They find that managers with a low 
incentive ratio carry out more diversified acquisitions, and the diversification 
produces a less negative effect when the incentive ratio is high. Aggarwal and 
Samwick (2003) argue that managers diversify the firm to increase their personal 
benefits rather than to reduce their exposure to risk, and a strong relationship between 
diversification and agency factor is captured by their model.  
Managers are also motived to expand the firm through acquisitions as growing the 
firm has a direct effect on the managers’ welfare and wealth. An increase in firm’s 
size can lead to the prestige of managing a larger corporation and managers’ 
compensation is positively affected by additional investment (Stulz, 1990; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; Hope and Thomas, 2008). Managerial incentives to pursue growth in 
order to enhance their personal benefit may lead to overinvestment and push the firm 
to grow beyond its optimal size. Excessive expansion may cause managers to invest 
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in non-positive net present value (NPV) projects. The effect of such agency driven 
expansion is that shareholders’ wealth cannot be maximized. If managers have large 
free cash flow in hands and there is no positive NPV project available, managers are 
ought to reward shareholders by distributing corporate cash to shareholders through 
the corporate payout. Investing corporate cash in non-value-enhancing projects with 
shareholders foregoing the benefit from receiving corporate cash will reduce a firm’s 
value and shareholders’ expected return (Jensen, 1986).  
Although shareholders can be more involved in the monitoring process and/or replace 
managers by implementing their rights once significant agency cost is identified, such 
an approach can be costly to shareholders7.  Shleifer and Vishny (1989) suggest that 
managers can protect their own interests and enhance job security by entrenching 
themselves within the firm. Specifically, managers are motived to acquire manager-
specific business lines that the manager has special knowledge in and/or is more 
confident to manage. Manager-specific targets enhance managers’ comparative 
advantage and show better performance even though such targets may not be value-
maximizing for the firm. Thus, entrenched managers may intentionally pursue 
corporate strategies that serve their best interests rather than the best interest of the 
shareholders. Because the targets are manager-specific, it is difficult and costly for 
shareholders to replace them. Hope and Thomas’ (2008) result is also consistent with 
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1989) suggestion. Hope and Thomas (2008) find that 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders can cause managers to 
pursue excessive growth, and nondisclosure of geographic earnings weaken in the 
                                                          
7
 Jensen (1986) suggests that debt financing would increase the financial obligations and prevent 
managers from wasting corporate cash. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) and Denis and Osobov (2008), 
among others, also argue that optimal payout policy can effectively reduce the cash available to 
managers because of the negative market reaction to dividend cut. Nevertheless, the current section 
focuses on motivations of managers to engage in personal-benefit seeking acquisitions. 
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monitoring effect and encourage managers to expand into foreign markets at 
significant costs to the shareholders.  
2.1.2.2 Mode of Payment 
Travlos (1987) argues that the share performance of acquirers’ during the 
announcement period is mixed as empirical evidence suggests that some acquirers 
perform better than others. He suggests that, using Myers and Majluf’s (1984) 
pecking order theory, different financing methods send different signals to the market, 
and the market reacts differently according to the information received. Thus, the 
payment mode of acquisitions should have a direct effect on the acquirers’ stock 
performance on the acquisition announcement, and is able to help us understand 
managers’ motivations for acquisitions. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), 
managers use cash to finance investments when they believe a firm’s stock is 
undervalued and issue shares if they believe the firm is overvalued. Therefore, the 
market reacts positively to cash financing and negatively to stock financing. Travlos 
(1987) find that the average abnormal return for acquirers of stock deals is 
significantly negative due to the market perception of overvalued stock, and acquirers 
using cash gain normal returns due to zero NPV transaction in the competitive market 
for corporate control. Various studies provide supporting evidence for the effect of 
method of payment on acquiring gains. For instance, Draper and Paudyal (1999) 
investigate UK acquirers’ and targets’ stock performance during the announcement 
period and find that the mode of payment has a significant impact on shareholders’ 
gains. Their results show that negative abnormal returns are experienced by acquirers 
of firms bought with stock while the stock of acquirers in cash deals does not have 
significant abnormal performance. Draper and Paudyal (1999) findings are consistent 
with pecking order theory and the competitive market for corporate control argument. 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
20 
 
Although payment mode is identified having a significant effect on acquirers’ gains, 
the evidence on the causes of such an effect is inconclusive. Amihud, et al. (1990) 
argue that the choice of financing method of acquisitions is determined by the pattern 
of managerial ownership. Managers who are owners of the firm prefer using cash to 
finance the deal as issuing stocks dilutes the control of current shareholders. This 
suggestion indicates that managerial ownership aligns the managerial objective with 
shareholders’ objective and reduces the potential cost of agency conflict. In such a 
case, shareholding managers are likely to use a financing method that maximizes their 
wealth as well as retaining their control, and this behaviour will trigger a positive 
market reaction on stock price. The evidence provided by Amihud, et al. (1990) 
shows that stock deals of acquirers with low managerial ownership are associated 
with significant negative stock movement while the stock performance of acquirers 
with high managerial ownership is similar between stock deals and cash deals. A 
similar result is also found by Martin (1996). 
An additional theory to explain why acquirers choose a certain type of payment mode 
is provided by Hansen (1987). Hansen (1987) suggests that the mode of payment is 
determined in the negotiation process and the choice of payment reflects the risk 
concern by acquirers. If the acquirer believes that the target has proprietary 
information on its firm’s value, the acquirer can offer stock to avoid adverse selection. 
Thus, using stock to finance an acquisition is related to the consideration of risk 
rather than valuation. However, Hansen’s (1987) study does not provide any 
indication as to announcement effect. If the choice of payment mode is determined by 
information asymmetry between acquirers and targets, we may expect a similar 
abnormal performance of acquirers of stock deals and cash deals as the mode of 
payment is not affected by the valuation and has no implication for the quality of 
deals. The risk transfer argument of stock payment by Hansen (1987) and similar 
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stock performance between cash acquirers and stock acquirers are provided by Fuller, 
et al. (2002). They find that for the deals involving of private targets which are likely 
to have higher information asymmetry than public targets, acquirers experience 
positive market reactions for both stock and cash offers8.  
2.1.2.3 Diversification 
The effect of corporate diversification (or “conglomerate”) on shareholders’ wealth 
has been long investigated. Early papers including Lintner (1971) suggest that firms 
may seek expansion through corporate diversification and such activity does not 
necessary harm shareholders’ wealth. Mandelker (1974) suggest that conglomerates 
may create additional debt capacity through acquisitions, whilst Lang and Stulz (1994) 
find that firms with low growth opportunities are more likely to engage in corporate 
diversification. The main criticism of corporate diversification relates to managerial 
incentives. Managers are motivated to use the firm’s cash to acquire unrelated 
business activities in order to increase their compensation, diversify the risk of human 
capital and entrench themselves in the firm.  
Supporting evidence for the hypothesis that diversification destroys acquiring 
shareholders’ wealth is provided by many studies. Morck, et al. (1990) find that 
acquirers of focused acquisitions gain 4 per cent more than from diversified deals. 
Chen and Ho (2000) investigate corporate diversification using a sample of Singapore 
firms and find that acquirers suffer a significant loss from diversified deals especially 
when the level of managerial ownership is low. This confirms that value-destroying 
diversified deals are caused by agency problems. Draper and Paudyal (2006) find that, 
when the target is a listed firm, diversification has a significant negative relationship 
to the acquirer’s announcement abnormal returns.  
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 Empirical evidence of target listed status is reviewed in section 2.1.2.4.  
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Gomes and Livdan (2004) develop an optimal diversification model and suggest that 
corporate diversification is a natural consequence of corporate growth and 
engagement in corporate diversification is to maximize the firm’s value. The 
suggestion that diversification enhances the firm’s value is not new. Matsusaka (1993) 
investigates the acquisition announcement effect after the conglomerate merger wave 
of 1960s in U.S. He found that for a sample of acquisitions in manufacturing industry 
during the period of 1968, 1971 and 1974, the average abnormal dollar return realised 
by acquirers of diversified acquisitions is around 17.5. He suggests that the market 
rewards diversifications especially when the acquirer retains the jobs for managers of 
the targets as managerial synergy can be expected. In addition, Matsusaka (1993) 
argues that, amongst diversified acquisitions, the reason some acquirers gain while 
others lose is because of the timing of acquisitions. In other words, early acquirers are 
likely to capture potential gains and late movers are simply followers that expect to 
achieve similar gains but without thorough analysis of specific deals. Further 
evidence is also found by Santalo and Becerra’s (2008) study, in which they find that 
acquirers gain from diversifications if an acquirer is operating in the industry that has 
a few specialized competitors or small market share. 
Thus, the inconclusive evidence suggests that corporate diversification (diversifying 
acquisitions) can either enhance or destroy shareholder wealth. Characteristics of the 
deal, acquirer and target can have an effect on outcomes of diversified acquisition. 
This makes diversification an empirical issue. 
2.1.2.4 Target Listing Status 
The effect of target listing status on acquirers’ gains has been recognized by research 
studies since the 1990s. It is important to include acquisitions of private targets in 
investigations because the number of such acquisitions is too large to be ignored. Ang 
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and Kohers (2001) find that from 1984 to 1996, in the U.S., over 70 per cent of 
acquisitions involve private targets. Draper and Paudyal (2006) find that 88 per cent 
of UK acquisitions over the period of the 1980s and 1990s are acquiring private firms. 
Research into acquisitions of private targets can enhance our understanding of the 
market for corporate control. Chang (1998) investigates the return differential 
between acquirers of private targets and acquirers of public targets based on a sample 
of 281 private acquisitions and 255 public acquisitions in the 1980s. He suggests that 
using stock to acquire private firms should have a similar effect as the private 
placement of equity, and finds that acquirers gain the most when the target is a private 
firm and the deal is financed by stock9. The concentrated ownership of private targets 
creates a large blockholder that enhances the monitoring effects of the acquiring firm 
in the post-acquisition period (Chang, 1998). In addition, Ang and Kohers (2001) also 
find that acquirers of private targets outperform their counterparts who take over 
public targets. They suggest that concentrated ownership, low agency cost, and less 
public pressure are three main features which distinguish private targets from public 
targets, and such features are also major attributes for the acquirers’ gains. Fuller, et 
al.’s (2002) study confirms the announcement effect of acquisitions of private targets, 
and finds that target listing status has a dominant effect on the mode of payment. 
Draper and Paudyal (2006) provide UK evidence for the impact of target listing status 
on acquirers’ gains. However, they argue that the reason acquirers gain from taking 
over private targets could also be due to the illiquidity of private firms’ assets. The 
illiquidity of private firms reduces their bargaining power so that owners of private 
targets may be willing to accept a lower price to overcome liquidity issues. The 
positive gains for acquirers of private targets and the suggestion of illiquidity is also 
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 Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) find that firms gain positive abnormal when issue an 
announcement of private equity placement and such positive abnormal return is caused by monitoring 
effect of concentrated ownership. 
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consistent with the information asymmetry argument that private firms are less well-
known to the public and the weak competition of potential acquirers also lead to a 
lower takeover premium. Thus, acquiring private targets is an attractive corporate 
strategy enhancing acquiring shareholders’ wealth if the size of expected synergy is 
similar between private targets and comparable public targets.  
2.1.2.5 Other Factors 
Factors which have been identified as having a significant effect on acquirers’ gains 
during the announcement period are not limited to the factors above. Several other 
factors have also been frequently tested in the M&A literature. Asquith, et al. (1983) 
find that acquirers gain more when taking over bigger targets. Draper and Paudyal 
(2006) find a positive relationship between the ratio of the deal value to the acquirer’s 
market value and the acquirer’s abnormal return during the announcement period. 
There are several explanations as to why bigger targets enhance acquirers’ gains. Roll 
(1986) suggests that it requires more resources to integrate a business if the target is 
large corporation. This makes the market for larger targets less competitive. Draper 
and Paudyal (2006) point out that, even if the expected synergy can be realised, a 
smaller target is unlikely to have a huge impact on the acquirer’s value, and thus the 
abnormal performance from the acquiring firm’s stock is less observable.  
Another size effect is identified by Moeller, et al. (2004). They find that smaller 
acquirers on average have better performance than large acquirers. They point out 
that smaller acquirers make smaller acquisitions, and smaller acquirers are more 
likely to take over private targets. This is consistent with the findings on the effect of 
target listing status. Smaller acquirers are also less likely to be exposed to agency 
issues, so that overpayment is less likely to occur in acquisitions by smaller acquirers. 
However, the better performance of smaller acquirers is not necessarily a reflection of 
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expected synergy. Draper and Paudyal (2008) suggest that asymmetric information is 
more significant between small firms and the market. Thus, the abnormal return 
gained by smaller acquirers during early bids may include market revaluation. 
Research studies also find that the abnormal performance of acquirers’ stock varies 
when acquirers engage in an acquisition programme. Fuller, et al. (2002) suggest that 
it is common for an acquirer to engage in subsequent bids. They find that the choice 
of payment mode varies from deal to deal and argue that the value of the acquirer’s 
stock may not fully explain why acquirers choose one payment mode over another. 
Draper and Paudyal (2008) test the information asymmetry hypothesis which 
suggests that firms with high information asymmetry relative to the market may use 
acquisition announcements to reduce their information asymmetry and gain from the 
market revaluation. Their finding suggests that acquirers gain significant abnormal 
return with early bids and the observed gains diminish among subsequent bids. This 
supports their information asymmetry hypothesis. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) also 
find that self-attribution and overconfidence may cause managers to engage in 
multiple deals and such irrational behaviour is punished by the market.  
Andrade, et al. (2001), Martynova and Renneboog (2008) and Antoniou, et al. (2008), 
among others, find that acquisitions happen in waves. Andrade, et al. (2001) suggest 
that merger waves are triggered by industrial shocks and that each merger wave is 
concentrated in a different industry. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) also find that 
the market for corporate control is more active in a positive economic and political 
environment. They suggest that high valuations during the early stage of each merger 
wave generates higher returns for investors, but herding activities carried on by 
irrational followers during the later stages leads to followers experiencing losses from 
acquisitions. The market valuation effect is confirmed by Antoniou, et al. (2008). 
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Their results show that the market valuation and the investor sentiment is the source 
of merger momentum. They find that acquirers’ gain high abnormal return in the 
short run but such gain is reversed in the long run. This may indicate that optimistic 
investors set their expectations too high to be realised. 
2.1.4 Operating Performance 
Whilst much research focuses on the stock performance during the announcement 
period, studies including Healy, et al. (1992) and Devos, et al. (2009) find that the 
operating performance of acquiring firms improves after acquisitions. Healy, et al. 
(1992) investigate the operational gains from acquisitions based on the 50 largest 
acquisitions in the U.S. during the period of 1979 to 1984. They find that the 
operating cash flows of merged firms are improved in the post-merger period 
compared to their historical and industrial performance, and such improvements are 
due to the fact that the asset productivity has been increased after the merger. Heron 
and Lie (2002) also find that acquiring firm consistently have superior operating 
performance before and after acquisitions, and the post-acquisition operating 
performance significantly outperform firms that have similar operating performance 
in pre-acquisition period.  
One source of such enhanced operating performance is cost saving. Firms with 
overlapping business can effectively eliminate extra administration costs after 
acquisition. The horizontal merger is an efficient approach to increasing production 
by combining the management teams, existing plants and R&D resources, promotion 
of marketing, and enhancing the branding. In addition, for vertical mergers, acquirers 
closer to the consumer (downstream) can take over their upstream suppliers and 
reduce transactional costs from price bargaining, and enhance production efficiency. 
Vertical mergers can increase the market power by controlling different production 
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stages (Comanor, 1967). Fee and Thomas (2004) provide evidence on operating cash 
flow improvements for horizontal merger, and suggest that downstream merging 
firms experience a reduction in costs of goods sold after mergers compared to the pre-
merger period, and that these cost savings are generated from a decline in the 
operating cash flows of upstream suppliers. This finding is consistent with the notion 
that sources of economic gains are from increased buying power and this effect is 
more pronounced in relatively concentrated industries. Devos, et al. (2009) 
investigate the cash flows of acquiring, target and combined firms. They find that the 
average operating synergy is 8.83 per cent, and this figure is higher for focused deals 
than diversified deals. Devos, et al. (2009) confirm that operating synergies arise 
from cutbacks in investment costs and conclude that the market for corporate control 
enhances the efficiency of resource allocation. Additional studies, including Kim and 
Singal (1993) for the airline industry and Sapienza (2002) for the banking industry, 
arrive at the same conclusion.  
2.2 Literature Review for Three Empirical Issues 
2.2.1 Corporate Payout and Gains from Acquisitions 
The investigation of the effect of payout scale on acquirers’ gains is motived by 
inconclusive results of the effect of corporate cash. Jensen (1986) suggests that 
corporate cash represents the main conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders. Managers are motived to use up corporate cash to pursue their own 
personal interest at the expense of shareholders. Harford (1999) and Carroll and 
Griffith (2001), among others, confirm the suggestion that corporate cash is 
associated with agency costs. However, Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that, using 
pecking order theory and with the existence of market imperfections, internal funds 
are a dominant method of corporate financing when firms make investment decision. 
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Cash reserves may reflect asymmetric information and serve as a buffer stock which 
enables the firm to pursue any value-increasing investment opportunity. Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004) find that firms cautiously build up their cash surplus and the level of 
corporate cash reserve is positively related to potential investment opportunities. 
Gregory’s (2005) results empirically reject Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis 
and show that acquirers with a high level of cash reserve in pre-acquisition period 
generally perform better than other takeover counterparts. He also shows that this 
finding is significant in the long run. Moreover, a conventional finding in the M&A 
literature is that cash acquirers experience better stock performance during the 
announcement period. Loughran and Vijh (1997), Raghavendra Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) and Draper and Paudyal (1999) all arrive at this conclusion.  
The cash effect depends on whether corporate cash holdings reflect agency costs. If 
firms hold cash to pursue value-enhancing projects, then the market should display a 
positive reaction when firms spend cash. Otherwise, the market should punish cash 
spending by managers if no positive NPV project can be identified. Intention over the 
use of corporate cash may not be revealed until the announcement, and the mixed 
results generated by treating the corporate cash of different firms homogeneously can 
be misleading.  
An investigation of a corporate payout effect on acquirers’ gains has several 
advantages. First, corporate payout policy is seen as having a disciplinary role in 
monitoring agency behaviour. La Porta, et al. (2000) find that a firm’s dividend 
policy provides legal protection to shareholders’ wealth and stops managers from 
irrational investing. The disciplinary function of payout policy enables shareholders 
to force managers to disgorge cash by requiring a baseline payout ratio when no 
positive NPV projects can be identified. Secondly, Bhattacharya (1979) suggests that 
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corporate payouts function as a signal of the firm’s profitability and future cash flow 
stream since the signalling effect of corporate payout can reduce information 
asymmetry between the firm and the market. Thirdly, the corporate payout level 
reflects a firm’s life-cycle stage. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) and DeAngelo, et al. 
(2006) suggest that firms’ payouts are a response to the need to distribute free cash 
flow. They suggest that during the early life-cycle stage, because the fund that is 
required to capture future growth is higher than the fund generated, firms are unlikely 
to distribute any cash. However, as firms enter maturity with fewer growth 
opportunities and stable cash flows generated from existing projects, firms are likely 
to accumulate large cash reserves. In this case, shareholders are more likely to require 
cash distribution not only because the firm has the ability to pay, but also fewer 
growth opportunities and large cash reserves increase the possibility of agency issues. 
The life-cycle theory of corporate payout is confirmed by Denis and Osobov’s (2008) 
study, in which they find that corporate payout is more focused among mature firms.  
2.2.2 Factors Affecting an Owner’s Decision to Sell 
Early M&A studies indicated how managers/shareholders of target firms may 
influence acquisitions. Ghosh and Ruland (1998) suggest that the mode of payment 
can be influenced by target managers. If target managers value their influence in the 
merged firms or their ownership if managers are also shareholders, they would prefer 
stock payment over cash. In addition, Ghosh and Ruland (1998) find that managers 
are likely to retain their jobs if the acquisition is financed by stock. This suggests that 
there are managerial incentives for requesting certain type of payment.  
However, the majority of the M&A literature assume that acquisitions are initiated 
and dominated by acquiring firms. Little evidence is available on how target 
managers/shareholders may determine or affect the initiation of and gain from a deal. 
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Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) is the only study, to our knowledge, that investigates 
the seller’s side of the story. Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) criticise the common 
method of choosing the acquirer’s stock performance as the dependent variable to 
measure the success of acquisition since it implicitly indicates that targets are 
generally less important and reluctant. Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) “reframe 
acquisition as courtship, a lens emphasizing that acquisition is a process of mutual 
agreement between buyer and seller and encompasses timing and strategic and 
emotional factors, not just price”(Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004, p367). They argue 
that target managers can be actively looking for potential buyers, and investigate the 
issue of when and to whom firm’s managers sell the equity, by conducting interviews 
with the managers/directors of 12 high-tech entrepreneurial firms. The industries 
included in Graebner and Eisenhardt’s (2004) investigation includes networking 
hardware, infrastructure software and online commerce, with three target firms and 
one non-target firm selected for each industry. To assure the accuracy of the 
information provided by managers, the sample targets must be sold within 6 months 
prior to being data collection. They find that 4 of the 12 firms have a proactive 
attitude towards being acquired, while 3 out of 12 firms oppose the idea of sale. 
According to their results, the common activities shared by the 4 proactive firms 
include producing a list of potential buyers and actively engaging in talks when a 
potential buyer approaches them. This finding confirms their suggestion that 
acquisitions can be initiated by target managers. In addition, Graebner and Eisenhardt 
(2004) find that strategic hurdles and personal motives significantly affect a managers’ 
attitude towards sale. The risk associated with future growth, the need for additional 
funding and the need for additional resources to improve products and ramp up sales 
are common issues considered by the proactive firms. From the personal perspective, 
managers of the firms in the sample suggest that stress, fear of failure and 
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diversifying risk push them to the decision of sale. Furthermore, the interviews 
carried by Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) also reveal that complementarity and 
similarity to the potential acquirers, and the culture and personal fit between acquirers 
and targets are also important in determining the success of acquisitions.  
Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) shed light on M&A activity from the target side. 
However, there are several difficulties with their study. First of all, the sample size of 
12 firms and the specification of sample industries make their results difficult to 
generalise. Secondly, their study does not provide evidence that shows whether target 
managers’ expectations are met in post-acquisition period. For instance, Graebner and 
Eisenhardt (2004) find that sales ramp-up is an issue that motivate managers to sell, 
but whether sales improve after the acquisition is unclear. In other words, Graebner 
and Eisenhardt’s (2004) definition of “success” is not evidence based. Moreover, 
their results are based on interviews, and may generate biased conclusions. For 
example, when they investigate personal motives for selling firms, the interviewed 
managers suggest that stress and fear of failures are main factors that influence their 
decision. Only 2 out of 12 managers suggest that they are also motivated by potential 
financial gains. It is surprising that value maximization is not a top priority for the 
firm’s leaders particularly as they are entrepreneurial with concentrated ownership. 
Thus, further research is required to enhance our understanding of target’s side of the 
story.  
2.2.3 Acquisitions of Private Acquirers 
One criterion to classify firms is to use their listing status. The effect of target listing 
status on acquirers’ gain has been widely tested. The investigation of listing status on 
acquiring firms, however, has been highly focused on public firms. Bargeron, et al. 
(2008) point out that acquisitions made by private acquirers are often reported and 
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discussed in financial press, yet there is little evidence to show whether private 
acquirers behave differently from public acquirers. They investigate a sample of 
1,667 U.S. acquisitions made by private operating acquirers, private equity acquirers, 
and public operating acquirers from 1980 to 2005. They find that target shareholders 
receive less from private acquirers than public acquirers, and the difference in the 
premium paid is significant across different measure of gains. Based on the gains to 
the targets during the pre-acquisition period, they find that target shareholders receive 
35 per cent more from public acquirers than private acquirers from the announcement 
to completion, and the difference increases to 63 per cent when compared to the deals 
made by private equity acquirers. To investigate the difference, Bargeron, et al. (2008) 
find that managerial ownership plays an important role in determining the size of the 
premium paid by acquirers. For operating acquirers, an increase in the managerial 
ownership of public acquiring firms tends to diminish the difference in the premium 
paid by public acquirers and private acquirers. They also find that the high managerial 
and institutional ownership of target firms has a positive relationship to the premium 
paid by public acquirers, but not to the premium paid by private acquirers. Such a 
finding implies that private acquirers, including both private operating acquirers and 
private equity acquirers, are more likely to proceed with the acquisition if the 
cooperation of target managers can be assured.  
Yet, several shortfalls to Bargeron, et al.’s (2008) study can be identified. First of all, 
their sample only includes cash only deals. Because a significant fraction of overall 
acquisition activity is financed by stocks, the control over the payment mode results 
in a limited sample. Mode of payment has a significant effect on the gains accruing to 
both acquiring and target shareholders. The difference in the premium paid by public 
acquirers and private acquirers when the control on mode of payment is relaxed 
remains an open question. Secondly, the suggestion of the target managers’ 
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cooperation is made based on the finding that private acquirers are more likely to 
withdraw and that completed deals made by private acquirers are more likely to 
involve targets with lower managerial ownership. However, they did not find any 
direct evidence to confirm this suggestion. Furthermore, Bargeron, et al. (2008) fail to 
answer the question of why the targets of acquisitions made by private acquirers do 
not wait for an offer from public acquirers if a higher premium can be expected. They 
suggest that target characteristics which are not observed in their study may be able to 
answer such questions. Further study is required to enhance our understanding of how 
the involvement of private acquirers affects outcome of acquisitions.  
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Chapter 3  Corporate Payout and Gains from Acquisitions 
3.1 Introduction 
There has been an extensive debate as to whether mergers and acquisitions are value-
enhancing or value-destroying corporate activities. The literature on M&As has 
shown that acquirers do not make substantial gains from takeover bids in the short 
run and suffer a significant loss in the long run (Andrade, et al., 2001). Nevertheless, 
takeovers represent one of the most important and common events in the corporate 
sector. An important factor often taken into consideration when analysing corporate 
behaviour is the firm’s life cycle stage. Factors, including size of the firm, level of 
cash flows, information asymmetry and investment options, vary as the firm grows, 
and corporate payout policy, as suggested by Denis and Osobov (2008), is an 
important indicator of the corporate life cycle stage. An important effect of corporate 
payout policy is to enhance corporate performance by reducing potential agency costs. 
It is often argued that the managers of firms with free cash flow are tempted to 
acquire targets with a view to empire building, even if such decisions could be costly 
to their shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Hope and Thomas, 2008). If insignificant positive 
or significant negative abnormal returns that accrue to acquiring firms are caused by 
agency issues, we would expect corporate payout policy in the acquiring firms to 
effectively minimize agency effects and improve the gains to acquirers.  
This study carries out an investigation of the determinants of acquirers’ gains taking 
payout policy into consideration. It focuses on how corporate payout policy affects 
acquirers’ gains from acquisitions by taking the deal and firm characteristics into 
account. If corporate payout policy is able to improve corporate performance as we 
suggest, we would expect a better performance by acquirers that pay out cash to 
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shareholders (paying acquirers) compared to acquirers that do not pay out any cash to 
shareholders (non-paying acquirers) with high-paying acquirers gaining the most10. 
We find that paying acquirers underperform in the short run compared to the non-
paying acquirers and outperform the non-paying acquirers in the long run. We 
suggest that the payout effect in the short run is caused by information asymmetry 
between the market and non-paying acquirers as non-paying firms are more likely to 
have higher information asymmetry to the market. According to our results, non-
paying firms, on average, have a lower market to book ratio before the announcement 
date. In addition, our results on the analysis of multiple bids indicates that high 
abnormal returns for non-paying acquirers only exist for the initial bid and that 
paying acquirers gain more than non-paying acquirers during subsequent bids. These 
findings consist with the suggestion that the large average gain by non-paying 
acquirers is mainly driven by market revaluation and that paying acquirers engage 
more in value-enhancing deals. The long run investigation in the post-acquisition 
period also provides results which are consistent with our suggestion. The portfolio of 
the paying acquirers gains around 19 per cent more than the portfolio of the non-
paying acquirers. The difference is increased when we compare portfolios of high 
paying against to non-paying acquirers11. Our results are robust to the inclusion of 
control variables. 
Our findings suggest that corporate payout policy indicates the acquirer’s life cycle 
stage and enhances the acquirer’s gains especially in the long run. Paying acquirers 
                                                          
10
 Paying acquirers are acquirers distribute cash to shareholders over two years prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Non-paying acquirers are acquirers without any corporate payout over the two years 
prior to the announcement. High-paying and low-paying acquirers are acquirers with a high level and a 
low level of corporate payout, respectively. In the context of our study, the term “Paying” is equivalent 
to “with a non-zero payout ratio”, and “Non-paying” means “without any payout policy”. “High-
paying” and “Low-paying” indicates the level of acquirers’ payout ratios. We do not use the term 
“Dividend-paying acquirers” since both cash dividends and repurchases are considered. 
11
 The effect is significant when using equally weighted method. When using value weighted method, 
the relation between payout level and acquirers’ gains is less clear. 
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benefit from the monitoring effect of corporate payout, whilst non-paying acquirers 
are generally small undervalued firms and gain from the market revaluation when 
acquisitions are announced. This implies that synergy is not the only source of 
acquisition gains and the acquisition announcement reduces information asymmetry. 
The chapter is organized as following: Section 2 introduces the theoretical and 
empirical background based on the literature review. Section 3 outlines the main 
hypothesis under test. Section 4 describes the data and methodologies. Section 5 
contains the empirical results and discussion. The chapter is concluded in section 6. 
3.2 Hypotheses developed 
There are various suggestions in the literature as to how corporate payout policy 
affects corporate performance. La Porta, et al. (2000) find that a firm’s dividend 
policy provides legal protection to shareholders’ wealth and stops managers from 
making irrational investments. The disciplinary function of payout policy enables 
shareholders to force managers to disgorge cash by requiring a baseline payout ratio 
when value enhancing projects can be identified (Bhattacharyya, et al., 2008). 
Although different theories, including signalling theory (Bhattacharya, 1979), 
catering theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004) and clientele theory (Allen, et al., 2000), 
explain why firms are paying out, Denis and Osobov (2008) find that agency and life-
cycle theory have high explanatory power compared to other payout theories. They 
suggest that corporate payout is mainly by mature firms. As mature firms are more 
likely to accumulate cash, the agency issues can be more pronounced in such firms. 
Thus, the monitoring effect of corporate payout policy should be more significant for 
mature firms. A high payout ratio may imply that the firms are consistently 
performing well and successfully monitored by the market. Such features could also 
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indicate an ability to identify value-enhancing targets when engaging in acquisitions. 
Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Paying acquirers should outperform non-paying acquirers, and high 
paying acquirers should gain more than low paying acquirers.  
It is ambiguous whether such a suggestion is valid when comparing paying firms with 
non-paying firms. Denis and Osobov (2008) suggest that non-paying firms are young 
firms at the early stage of the corporate life-cycle. As the market may have less 
information about such firms, it may expect a larger market reaction in the stock price 
during announcement periods by non-paying acquirers to compensate previous 
asymmetric information. However, if the higher abnormal return for non-paying 
acquirers is dominated by market revaluation, such an effect should only exist in the 
short run and for early bids as a result of reduced information asymmetry12.  This is 
also confirmed by Draper and Paudyal’s (2008) study. They find that firms that have 
high information asymmetry to the market would use takeover bids to attract market 
attention and expect gains from both market revaluation and potential synergies. 
Their study, however, also points out that such abnormal performance should only 
confine among earlier bids and decline with the number of subsequent bids. Thus, 
when we consider subsequent bids and extend our investigation to the long run, the 
short term effect could disappear or even be reversed since as more information is 
revealed to the market, the market may correct any possible overreaction made in the 
short run. Raghavendra Rau and Vermaelen (1998) also suggest that value firms, 
which are in the mature stage and more likely to distribute large amounts of cash, 
would display less overconfidence as such firms are closely monitored by the market, 
                                                          
12
 Raghavendra Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest that glamour acquirer effect may only significant 
in the first deal. Because growing firms are favoured by the market, the managers in growing firms are 
more easily to encounter hubris issue which is suggested by Roll (1986) 
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and the managers in value firms are more cautious when they make investment 
decisions. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Non-paying acquirers gain from market revaluation in the short run 
and with initial bids, while paying acquirers outperform non-paying acquirers in the 
long run and display a more stable performance for subsequent bids.  
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
The investigation is based on UK domestic acquisitions from the beginning of 1991 
to the end of 2009. 55,054 deals are reported in the Thomson One Banker database 
within the required period. This study focuses on gains to acquiring firms, so that we 
use acquirers listed on the London Stock Exchange. The targets are either listed or 
unlisted firms, or unlisted subsidiaries. This leaves 9,075 deals. Further selection 
criteria include deal status (completed), deal value and acquirers' market value equal 
to or greater than £1 million13, percentage owned after transaction must be greater 
than 50 per cent of the target firm, and stock price data around the announcement is 
available on Datastream. These criteria remove an additional 1,888 deals. Deals were 
also removed when no information on the mode of payment was provided. 14 deals 
announced on UK bank holidays and 33 announcements made during weekends were 
also excluded since there is no trading activity during public holidays and weekends. 
The final sample includes 4,465 deals announced by 1,199 acquirers. 
As shown in Table 3.1, based on constant prices, the average size of an acquirer is 
£1,763.9 million with an average deal value of £120.9 million. The acquirer’s deal to 
market ratio is 0.2, indicating that on average the acquirer is 5 times larger than the 
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Table 3.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Deal Categories No. of Deals 
Market Value of Acquirers 
(in £ Million at 1999-2000 Prices) 
Deal Value 
(in £ Million at 1999-2000 Prices) 
Deal to Market Ratio 
5-day 
Gross Return 
  Total Mean Median Total Mean Median Total Mean Median  
All 4,465 7,876,026.6 1,763.9 258.1 539,969.5 120.9 11.3 853.5 0.191 0.052 1.486% 
Listed Targets 569 2,473,628.0 4,347.3 564.0 331,615.0 582.8 56.3 212.9 0.374 0.126 -0.332% 
Unlisted Targets 3,896 5,402,398.6 1,386.7 237.3 208,354.5 53.5 9.6 640.5 0.164 0.049 1.751% 
Cash Acquirers 2,164 5,418,947.4 2,504.1 409.0 179,978.6 83.2 12.2 220.3 0.102 0.034 1.437% 
Stock Acquirers 287 331,319.7 1,154.4 133.3 132,633.7 462.1 15.7 141.3 0.492 0.184 1.258% 
Mixed Acquirers 2,014 2,125,759.5 1,055.5 170.2 227,357.2 112.9 10.3 491.8 0.244 0.077 1.570% 
Focused Deals 3,015 5,389,761.2 1,787.6 262.6 398,773.5 132.3 11.9 575.7 0.191 0.054 1.459% 
Diversifying Deals 1,450 2,486,265.4 1,714.7 244.1 141,196.0 97.4 10.3 277.8 0.192 0.049 1.541% 
Domestic Targets 2,943 2,832,820.4 962.6 185.0 257,189.6 87.4 9.4 668.3 0.227 0.065 1.561% 
Foreign Targets 1,522 5,043,206.3 3,313.5 537.7 282,779.9 185.8 16.4 185.1 0.122 0.038 1.339% 
Note: Acquirers are UK domiciled public firms, traded on a UK stock exchange and making acquisition bids between the beginning of 1991 and the end of 2009. The deal must be 
completed and both the value of deal and the market value of the acquirer 30 before the announcement must be at least 1 million sterling pounds. The value has been controlled 
based on 1999-2000 average price. The acquirers included in the sample must have stock price data available from Datastream and required accounting data available in Thomson 
One Banker. Bids announced during the weekends and UK public holidays are excluded. Bids announced within 11 days by the same acquirers are also removed. Final sample 
includes 4,465 deals made by 1,199 unique acquirers. 
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target. The sample is dominated by acquisitions of private targets (87.26%), and the 
average market value of acquirers for private targets is £1,386.7 million compared to 
£4,347.3 million for acquirers of listed targets. Cash and a mixed consideration are 
favoured payment methods with only 287 deals in the sample financed using stock as 
payment. One third of deals in the sample are focused acquisitions (acquirer andtarget 
are in the same industry). The average size of acquirers of foreign targets (£3,313.5 
million) is more than 3 times the size of acquirers for domestic targets. On average 
across all takeovers, acquirers experience a 5-day gross return of 1.486 per cent14. 
Acquirers for private targets gain the most at 1.751 per cent while acquirers of listed 
targets have the biggest loss at -0.332 per cent.  
3.3.2 Methodology 
3.3.2.1 Short Term: Market-Adjusted Model 
For the short term event study, we adopt the market adjusted model (Brown and 
Warner, 1980).  
ARi = Ri – Rp 
Where ARi is the abnormal return for stock i; Ri is the log return for stock i, and Rp is 
the market return. The key feature of this market-adjusted model is the assumption of 
a 0 constant (α) and coefficient of Rp (β) equal to 1.  This study estimates cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR)15 for three conventional short term event windows of (-1, 1), 
(-2, 2), and (-5, 5)16.  
                                                          
14
 The 5-day gross return is calculated as    
    
    
  where RI-2 is return index 2 days before the 
announcement and RI+2 is return index 2 days after. 
15
 CARit = ∑     
 
    
16
 Brown and Warner (1985) suggest that daily data have higher explanatory power than other low-
frequency data. In addition, they point out the excess return is not only introduced on day 0. With 
extended event windows, the daily excess return is significantly different from 0 when each day has 
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3.3.2.2 Long Term: BHAR 
A standard long term abnormal returns measure is buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR). The method measures the “average multiyear return from a strategy of 
investing in all firms that complete an event and selling at the end of a pre-specified 
holding period versus a comparable strategy using otherwise similar non-event firms” 
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000, p296). The BHAR formula is presented as follow: 
BHARi = ∏        
 
     – ∏        
 
     
where BHAR are generated by holding the acquiring firm’s stock long, and taking a 
short position in the reference portfolio. The mean BHAR is computed using a 
weighted average of individual BHARs, 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ∑        
 
   
 
and w is calculated both equally-weighted and value-weighted. For the value-
weighted average BHAR, it is necessary to standardize the market value of each firm 
before calculating the weights, since otherwise the method associates heavier weights 
with more recent observations and relatively small weights on early observations 
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). 
The most important advantage of BHAR method is that it avoids rebalancing costs. 
Although most calculations of return are based on the assumption of no transaction 
costs, these costs are significant in practice and likely to offset the potential gains. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the same probability to be selected. In addition, Fuller, et al. (2002) implies that a 5 day event window 
is sufficient to capture the event effect if it is the first announcement. Thus, the short term investigation 
by this study focuses on 5-day excess return.  
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3.3.2.3 Long Run: Calendar Time Portfolio 
Another method used to investigate long term acquisition performance is a calendar 
time portfolio. Barber and Lyon (1997) find that the Fama-French 3 factors method 
used for measuring long term abnormal returns yields well-specified test statistics. In 
addition, Lyon, et al. (1999) suggest that, although we can assess whether sample 
firms gain abnormal returns over a particular horizon and reflect investors’ 
experience, cumulative abnormal return is more suitable for answering the question of 
whether sample firms persistently earn excess monthly returns. Using cumulative 
abnormal returns, Lyon, et al. (1999) suggest that the calendar time portfolio is most 
appropriate for estimating long term excess performance. 
Assuming the investigation period for the long run study is T years, then for each 
calendar month, the examined portfolio comprises firms that made an acquisition over 
the last T years. After the T-year holding period for a specific acquiring firm, the firm 
is dropped from the portfolio and recent acquirers are added into the portfolio. In 
other words, the calendar time portfolio is monthly rebalanced. 
The calendar time portfolio method conducted in this study is based on Carhart’s 
(1997) 4 factor model: 
Rpt – Rft = αi + βi(Rmt – Rft) + siSMBi + hiHMLi + uiUMDi  + εi 
where Rpt is portfolio return at time t; Rft is the return on UK three-month treasury bill 
middle rate at time t; (Rmt – Rft) is market premium based on FTSE ALL SHARE 
index; SMBi, HMLi, and UMDi are size, value, and momentum factor, respectively
17.  
βi, si, hi, and ui are coefficients estimated by OLS. αi is a constant term and tests the 
null hypothesis of mean monthly abnormal return equal to zero. The dependent 
                                                          
17
 The data of UK Fama French 3 factors and momentum factor are downloaded from the website of 
Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment of Exeter Business School. Further details of portfolio 
construction are discussed in Gregory, et al.’s (2009) study.  
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variable, Rpt is constructed using both the equally weighted and value weighted 
methods.  
3.3.2.4 Measure of Payout 
The payout measure uses both total payout (includes dividends and repurchases) and 
dividend payout (cash dividends) in order to capture the effect of both recurring and 
nonrecurring payout. Worldscope accounting data is collected from Thomson One 
Banker database to calculate the two payout ratios under investigation. Total Payout 
is an industrial adjusted total-payout-to-total-asset ratio (subtracting industrial median 
total-payout-to-total-asset ratio from firms' level) and Dividend Payout is an 
industrial adjusted cash-dividend-to-total-asset ratio18.  The constituent firms listed in 
the FBRIT, FAIM and DEADUK files in Datastream are collected to form the 
industrial portfolio, and the industries are classified according to Fama-French 12 
industries classification. We classify high paying acquirers and low paying acquirers 
using the level of the payout. If the acquirer’s payout level is within the fourth 
quartile of the sample, the acquirer is defined as a high paying acquirer; if the 
acquirer’s payout level is within the first quartile of the sample, the acquirer is 




Both univariate analysis and multivariate analysis are used. The univariate analysis is 
to compare the mean abnormal return across different sample groups with the 
significance of the difference tested using Student-t. The multivariate analysis is 
based on the formula: 
                                                          
18
 The corresponding Worldscope names and codes of accounting data are as follow: Total Asset (Total 
Asset - #02999), Cash Dividends (Cash Dividends Paid Total - #04551), Repurchases (Common Or 
Preferred Redeemed, Retired, Converted, Etc. - #04751). The industrial benchmark is using median 
figure of specific ratio for the examined year. 
19
 The payout ratio is sorted in ascending order 
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R = α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
where R is the dependent variable of buy and hold abnormal returns for the 5-day 
event window (3 years for the long run test). X is the set of independent variables. 
High payout is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the acquirer is classified as a 
high paying acquirer and 0 otherwise; Low payout is a dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 if the acquirer is classified as a low paying acquirer and 0 otherwise; Non 
payout is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer is a non-paying 
acquirer and 0 if the acquirer is a paying acquirer; and Payout ratio is a numerical 
variable of the payout level of the sample acquirer. Additional numerical variables 
includes cash (Cash flow is calculated as corporate cash flows normalized by book 
value of the firm20; Cash holding is calculated as the industrial adjusted cash and cash 
equivalent to sales ratio21), market to book ratio (industrial adjusted market to book 
ratio 30 days before the announcement) and market value (market value of the 
acquirer 30 days before the announcement with the value adjusted to the average 
1999-2000 price). Additional dummy variables include: Cash only (1 if the payment 
is cash, and 0 otherwise), Stock only (1 if the payment is stock, 0 otherwise), Listed 
status (1 if acquired firm is listed firms), Focused deal (1 if the deal is focused deal 
and 0 if the deal is diversified deal), Domicile (1 if the deal is domestic and 0 if the 
deal is cross border), Firm size (the market value of the acquirer 30 days before the 
announcement), and Deal to market ratio (1 if the deal to market value ratio is 
classified into first quartile of the sample and 0 otherwise. Frequent acquirer is the 
number of bids the acquirer announced in the previous three years. For the 
                                                          
20
 Lang et.al (1991)’s measure is calculated by Cash Flows divided by Total Asset (Total Asset - 
#02999). Cash Flows = EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, and Depreciation - #18198) - Cash 
Dividends (Cash Dividends Paid Total - #04551) 
21
 Cash holding = Cash (Cash - #02003) / Sales (Net Sales Or Revenues - #01001, #19101, #19102, 
#19103, #19104), adjusted based on industrial median. 
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multivariate analysis, Models 1 to 3 are estimated for the whole sample, while 
Models 4 and 5 focus on the non-paying and all-paying groups, respectively. 
3.4 Results and Discussion 
3.4.1 Short Run 
Payout and Acquirers’ Gains in the Short Run: The payout hypothesis suggests that 
firms that follow a high payout policy should outperform firms that follow a low 
payout policy during acquisition announcement periods. High payout indicates 
prudent managers, better corporate governance and the disciplinary effect of the 
market, and such firms should experience better corporate performance. Table 3.2 
displays acquirers’ gains in relation to payout ratio for event windows of 3, 5, and 11 
days surrounding the acquisition announcement. For all the payout measures, non-
paying acquirers gain an average abnormal return of over 2 per cent (statistically 
significant for all three event windows). For paying acquirers, the average abnormal 
return is 0.990, 1.188 and 1.505 per cent for 3-, 5- and 11-day event windows, 
respectively. The results show a significant inverse relation between the level of 
payout and the size of the acquirers’ abnormal returns. The higher the payout level, 
the lower the abnormal returns to the acquirers.  
The difference in average gain between non-paying acquirers and paying acquirers is 
over 1 per cent for 3- and 5-day event windows, and is insignificant at 0.548 per cent 
for the 11-day window. The difference in acquirers’ gains increases when comparing 
non-paying acquirers and high-paying acquirers for 3- and 5-day windows but 



































Table 3.2 Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
Panel A. Total Payout 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Announcement Windows All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
3 (-1, 1) days 1.237%*** 2.130%*** 1.230%*** 0.840%*** 0.990%***  1.139% <.0001 1.290% 0.001 0.239% 0.174 
5 (-2, 2) days 1.417%*** 2.246%*** 1.430%*** 1.078%*** 1.188%***  1.058% 0.0003 1.167% 0.010 0.243% 0.295 
11 (-5, 5) days 1.623%*** 2.053%*** 1.592%*** 1.498%*** 1.505%***  0.548% 0.133 0.555% 0.327 0.088% 0.816 
N 4,465 968 875 876 3,497        
 
Panel B. Dividend Payout 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Announcement Windows All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
3 (-1, 1) days 1.237%*** 2.130%*** 1.243%*** 0.667%*** 0.990%***  1.139% <.0001 1.463% 0.0002 0.577% 0.047 
5 (-2, 2) days 1.417%*** 2.246%*** 1.452%*** 0.887%*** 1.188%***  1.058% 0.0003 1.358% 0.003 0.564% 0.098 
11 (-5, 5) days 1.623%*** 2.053%*** 1.785%*** 1.182%*** 1.505%***  0.548% 0.133 0.871% 0.123 0.604% 0.135 
N 4,465 968 878 876 3,497        
Note: The table represents the statistics of cumulative abnormal return for 3, 5, and 11 days event window surrounding the announcements based on the level of acquirers' payout. 
The abnormal return is calculated based on market adjusted model, that           in which    is return of firm i and    is market return of FTSE All Share. The payout 
variables which are examined are: Total payout is industrial adjusted total payout to total asset ratio, Dividend payout is industrial adjusted cash dividends to total asset ratio. The 
industry of each acquirer is classified based on Fama-French 12 Industries Classification, and the industrial benchmarks are constructed based on the constitute firms of DEADUK, 




 quartile in terms of 
payout ratio in ascending order. If the acquirers did not distribute any cash as dividends or repurchases in past two years prior the announcement, then such acquirers are included 
in Non-Paying (NP) group. Both Low-Paying and High-Paying acquirers are also classified as All-Paying (AP) group for further investigation. T-test is used to test the null 
hypothesis of abnormal return is equal to zero as well as the null hypothesis of the Difference (Pr>|t|) in abnormal returns between two groups is equal to zero. Significance at 1%, 



































Figure 3.1 Payout vs. Abnormal return 
 
Note: The figure represents the size of economic value of cumulative abnormal return for 3, 5, and 11 days event window surrounding the announcements based on the level of 
acquirers' payout. The abnormal return is calculated based on market adjusted model, that           in which    is return of firm i and    is market return of FTSE All 
Share. The payout variable on which is based is adjusted total payout to total asset ratio (Total payout). The industry of each acquirer is classified based on Fama-French 12 
Industries Classification, and the industrial benchmarks are constructed based on the constitute firms of DEADUK, FBRIT and FAIM in Datastreams.  The sample of paying 




 quartile in terms of payout ratio in ascending order. If the acquirers did not pay out any 
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Although the gains by the non-paying acquirers may be explained by the market 
revaluation, the underperformance of the high paying acquirers compared to low 
paying acquirers raises the question of whether corporate payout exerts a monitoring 
effect and if such an effect can enhance investment performance (as suggested in the 
literature). Draper and Paudyal (2006), amongst others, suggest that deal 
characteristics have a significant impact on acquirers’ gains. We investigate whether 
the relationship between the acquirers’ payout level and the acquirers’ gains is 
affected by various deal characteristics. Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics of the 
acquirers’ gains based on the acquirers’ payout level and different deal variables. We 
find that, on average, paying acquirers hold less cash (0.061) than non-paying 
acquirers, and generate higher cash flow (0.128) compared to the non-paying 
acquirers (-0.004). In addition, non-paying acquirers are small acquirers. The average 
market capitalisation of non-paying acquirers is £391.7 million, only around one fifth 
of that of paying acquirers (£2,143.8 million) and one seventh of high paying 
acquirers (£2,887.7 million). These figures may indicate that non-paying acquirers are 
young firms as they reserve a higher proportion of cash to capture investment 
opportunities and are in the life-cycle stage that is not able to generate significant 
cash inflows. It may also explain why non-paying acquirers do not distribute any cash 
in the first place. The paying acquirers, on the other hand, have low cash reserves and 
high periodic cash flows, which could indicate mature firms. 
Table 3.3 also reveals that non-paying acquirers take over relatively bigger targets 
(0.399) than paying acquirers (0.134). Furthermore, several deal characteristics 
distinguish acquisitions by non-paying acquirers from paying acquirers. Non-paying 
acquirers are more likely to acquire unlisted targets (89.77%) than paying acquirers 
(86.56%), more often use mixed payment methods (56.61% for non-paying acquirers 
and 41.92% for paying acquirers), and engage in more domestic acquisitions (71.18%  




Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Acquirers’ Gains, Control Variables and 
Payout 
 Level of Payout 
 All NP LP HP AP 
3 (-1, 1) days 1.237%*** 2.130%*** 1.230%*** 0.840%*** 0.990%*** 
5 (-2, 2) days 1.417%*** 2.246%*** 1.430%*** 1.078%*** 1.188%*** 
11 (-5, 5) days 1.623%*** 2.053%*** 1.592%*** 1.498%*** 1.505%*** 
Cash flow      
Mean 0.099 -0.004 0.105 0.153 0.128 
Median 0.114 0.076 0.098 0.147 0.120 
Cash holding      
Mean 0.752 3.248 0.106 0.025 0.061 
Median -0.007 0.028 -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 
Market to book ratio      
Mean 2.070 1.582 2.062 2.798 2.205 
Median 1.244 0.944 0.956 1.814 1.303 
Cash only      
N 2,164 293 463 497 1,871 
% 48.47% 30.27% 52.91% 56.74% 53.50% 
Stock only      
N 287 127 53 32 160 
% 6.43% 13.12% 6.06% 3.65% 4.58% 
Mixed deal      
N 2,014 548 359 347 1,466 
% 45.11% 56.61% 41.03% 39.61% 41.92% 
Unlisted target      
N 3,896 869 746 752 3,027 
% 87.26% 89.77% 85.26% 85.84% 86.56% 
Listed targets      
N 569 99 129 124 470 
% 12.74% 10.23% 14.74% 14.16% 13.44% 
Domestic deal      
N 2,943 689 641 497 2,254 
% 65.91% 71.18% 73.26% 56.74% 64.46% 
Cross border deal      
N 1,522 279 234 379 1,243 
% 34.09% 28.82% 26.74% 43.26% 35.54% 
Focused deal      
N 3,015 667 601 574 2,348 
% 67.53% 68.90% 68.69% 65.53% 67.14% 
Diversified deal      
N 1,450 301 274 302 1,149 
% 32.47% 31.10% 31.31% 34.47% 32.86% 
Market value      
Mean 1,763.948 391.698 1,565.479 2,887.669 2,143.798 
Median 258.087 64.247 245.378 453.350 363.593 
Deal to market ratio      
Mean 0.191 0.399 0.183 0.106 0.134 
Median 0.052 0.126 0.055 0.033 0.042 
Toehold (Non)      
N 4,165 915 789 816 3,250 
% 93.36% 94.72% 90.27% 93.26% 92.99% 
Toehold (Median)      
N 146 36 38 30 110 
% 3.27% 3.73% 4.35% 3.43% 3.15% 
Toehold (High)      
N 150 15 47 29 135 
% 3.36% 1.55% 5.38% 3.31% 3.86% 
No. of bids      
Mean 2.728 2.429 3.490 3.525 2.728 
Median 2 2 2 2 2 
      
N 4,465 968 875 876 3,497 
Note: The table represents descriptive statistics of acquirers’ gains, deal characteristics, and level of 
payout. The abnormal return is calculated based on market adjusted model, that           in 




which    is return of firm i and    is market return of FTSE All Share. The payout variables which are 
examined include: Total payout is industrial adjusted total payout to total asset ratio. The cash 
variables are: Cash flow is calculated by Cash Flows divided by Total Asset; and Cash holding which 
is calculated as industrial adjusted cash and cash equivalent to sales ratio. Other deal characteristics 
include mode of payment, target listed status, focused and diversification, domicile, market value of 
acquirer, deal value to market value ratio, and toehold level. The sample of paying acquirers has been 




 quartile in terms of 
payout ratio in ascending order. If the acquirers did not pay out any cash as dividends or repurchases in 
past two years prior the announcement, then such acquirers are included in Non-Paying (NP) group. 
Both Low-Paying and High-Paying Acquirers are also classified as All-Paying (AP) group for further 
investigation. For numerical variables, including cash variables, market to book ratio, market value, 
deal to market value ratio, and number of bids, mean and median are reported for each payout group. 
Whilst for character variable, including mode of payment, target listed status, domicile, and focused 
and diversification, number of deals and the proportion of the deals in terms of each deal characteristic 
within each payout group are reported. Toehold variable is also reported in latter manner. T-test is used 
to test the null hypothesis of abnormal return is equal to zero. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is 
represented by ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’, respectively. 
 
 




for non-paying acquirers and 64.46% for paying acquirers). However, the statistics 
also raise an additional question: if the non-paying acquirers are young firms that are 
in the early stage of the business life cycle, we would expect to see a higher growth 
indicator assigned by the market. Yet, according to the market-to-book ratio, non-
paying acquirers actually have a lower average figure at 1.582 prior to the 
announcement, compared to 2.205 for paying acquirers. To answer these questions, as 
well as to test the validity of the payout effect, we test our hypothesis by controlling 
for both firm and deal characteristics in univariate and multivariate frameworks.  
Payout, Cash, and Acquirers’ Gains: Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis 
suggests that managers have an incentive to act in their personal interest and invest in 
suboptimal projects if they have large free cash flows available. Harford (1999) 
suggests that a large cash reserve has a negative impact on acquiring shareholders’ 
wealth. Thus, high cash acquirers should underperform. However, Myers and Majluf 
(1984) and Gregory (2005), among others, find that creating cash slack is a rational 
corporate behaviour as it avoids the cost of having insufficient funds once positive 
NPV projects are identified. If this is the case, high cash acquirers should gain more. 
In either case, the literature suggests that cash has a significant impact on acquirers’ 
gains. As a firms’ payout level is closely related to available cash, the effect of payout 
on acquirers’ gain could be driven by an acquirers’ cash level.  
Table 3.4 Panel A and B represent the average acquirers’ gains by cash and payout 
variable. For the overall sample, both cash variables indicate a positive relationship to 
acquirers’ abnormal return. This finding rejects Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow 
hypothesis and provides supportive evidence for Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Gregory’s (2005) suggestion. However, if we classify the sample by payout level, the 


































Table 3.4 Control variables, Payout and Acquirers’ Gains (Univariate) 
Panel A: Cash flow, Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Cash flow All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
Low 1.326%*** 1.922%*** 1.001%*** 0.956% 0.917%***  1.005% 0.109 0.966% 0.436 0.045% 0.949 
N 1,116 454 237 137 662        
Median 1.285%*** 1.998%*** 1.479%*** 0.835%*** 1.160%***  0.838% 0.035 1.163% 0.029 0.643% 0.175 
N 2,235 333 510 358 1,902        
High 1.773%*** 3.512%*** 2.032%*** 1.350%*** 1.436%***  2.077% 0.001 2.162% 0.007 0.682% 0.384 
N 1,114 181 128 381 933        
 
Panel B: Cash holding, Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Cash holding All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
Low 1.531%*** 2.397%*** 1.864%*** 1.235%*** 1.286%***  1.111% 0.057 1.162% 0.192 0.628% 0.401 
N 1,116 246 151 245 870        
Median 1.259%*** 2.747%*** 1.303%*** 0.841%*** 1.003%***  1.743% <.0001 1.906% 0.002 0.462% 0.269 
N 2,233 327 539 444 1,906        
High 1.619%*** 1.736%*** 1.447%*** 1.437%*** 1.555%***  0.181% 0.762 0.299% 0.758 0.011% 0.990 
N 1,116 395 185 187 721        
 
Panel C: Growing Opportunity, Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Market to book All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
Low 2.008%*** 3.134%*** 1.311%*** 1.056% 1.433%***  1.700% 0.009 2.078% 0.112 0.255% 0.767 
N 1,116 377 320 127 739        
Median 1.371%*** 1.863%*** 1.776%*** 1.034%*** 1.271%***  0.592% 0.129 0.828% 0.168 0.742% 0.102 
N 2,233 380 425 369 1,853        
High 0.918%*** 1.349%* 0.592% 1.128%*** 0.817%***  0.532% 0.335 0.221% 0.757 -0.536% 0.446 




































Table 3.4 cont. 
Panel D: Mode of payment, Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Model of Payment All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
Cash 1.402%*** 2.845%*** 1.360%*** 1.053%*** 1.176%***  1.670% <.0001 1.793% 0.001 0.307% 0.420 
N 2,164 293 463 497 1,871        
Stock 0.954% 0.940% 1.009% 1.374% 0.965%  -0.024% 0.988 -0.434% 0.896 -0.365% 0.850 
N 287 127 53 32 160        
Mixed 1.500%*** 2.228%*** 1.583%*** 1.088%*** 1.227%***  1.000% 0.019 1.140% 0.088 0.495% 0.421 
N 2,014 548 359 347 1,466        
 
Panel E: Listed target, Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Target Status All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
Unlisted 1.671%*** 2.724%*** 1.598%*** 1.279%*** 1.368%***  1.356% <.0001 1.445% 0.003 0.319% 0.382 
N 3,896 869 746 752 3,027        
Listed -0.320% -1.955% 0.458% -0.141% 0.024%  -1.980% 0.014 -1.814% 0.108 0.599% 0.484 
N 569 99 129 124 470        
 
Panel F: Focused deal, Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Relativeness All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
Focused 1.400%*** 2.246%*** 1.259%*** 1.302%*** 1.159%***  1.087% 0.001 0.944% 0.076 -0.043% 0.916 
N 3015 667 601 574 2348        
Diversified 1.453%*** 2.245%*** 1.806%*** 0.654%*** 1.246%***  1.000% 0.078 1.592% 0.060 1.152% 0.059 






































Table 3.4 cont. 
Panel G: Domicile, Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Domicile All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
Domestic 1.501%*** 2.165%*** 1.301%*** 1.401%*** 1.297%***  0.868% 0.016 0.765% 0.215 -0.099% 0.806 
N 2,943 689 641 497 2,254        
Cross Border 1.256%*** 2.444%*** 1.783%*** 0.656%*** 0.989%***  1.455% 0.003 1.788% 0.005 1.127% 0.072 
N 1,522 279 234 379 1,243        
 
Panel H: Firm size, Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Market Value All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
Low 2.645%*** 3.099%*** 2.550%*** 2.367%*** 2.223%***  0.876% 0.211 0.732% 0.601 0.183% 0.877 
N 1,116 538 207 106 578        
Median 1.224%*** 1.352%*** 1.240%*** 1.266%*** 1.198%***  0.154% 0.681 0.086% 0.871 -0.026% 0.950 
N 2,233 376 465 457 1,857        
High 0.575%*** -0.032% 0.725%c 0.368% 0.606%***  -0.638% 0.394 -0.400% 0.638 0.357% 0.496 
N 1,116 54 203 313 1,062        
 
Panel I: Deal to market ratio, Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Deal to market ratio All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
Low 0.472%*** -0.067% 0.574% 0.105% 0.524%  -0.591% 0.329 -0.172% 0.833 0.469% 0.392 
N 1,116 99 188 320 1,017        
Median 1.339%*** 1.747%*** 1.399%*** 1.509%*** 1.237%***  0.510% 0.129 0.238% 0.611 -0.110% 0.789 
N 2,232 444 462 435 1,788        
High 2.518%*** 3.305%*** 2.210%*** 2.104%*** 2.035%***  1.270% 0.081 1.202% 0.408 0.107% 0.924 





































Table 3.4 cont. 
Panel J: Toehold, Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Toehold All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
Non (0%) 1.514%*** 2.443%*** 1.519%*** 1.151%*** 1.252%***  1.191% <.0001 1.292% 0.006 0.368% 0.299 
N 4,165 915 789 816 3,250        
Low (0-50%) -0.241% -1.935% 0.881% -0.298% 0.313%  -2.248% 0.098 -1.637% 0.362 1.179% 0.385 
N 146 36 38 30 110        
High (50%+) 0.373% 0.221% 0.451% 0.572% 0.390%  -0.169% 0.923 -0.351% 0.861 -0.122% 0.941 
N 150 15 47 29 135        
 
Panel K.1: Multiple Bids (Cumulated), Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Multiple Bids All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
Bid=1 2.277%*** 3.685%*** 2.342%*** 1.321%*** 1.570%***  2.115% <.0001 2.364% 0.006 1.021% 0.117 
N 1,505 503 259 275 1,002        
Bid>=2 0.964%*** 0.686% 1.065%*** 0.802%*** 1.017%***  -0.331% 0.376 -0.115% 0.827 0.263% 0.515 
N 2,544 411 491 550 2,133        
Bid>=3 0.904%*** 0.477% 0.924%*** 0.848%** 0.967%***  -0.490% 0.319 -0.371% 0.584 0.076% 0.875 
N 1,744 223 333 382 1,521        
Bid>=4 0.842%*** -0.122% 0.906%*** 0.818%** 0.955%***  -1.077% 0.088 -0.940% 0.266 0.088% 0.880 
N 1,267 133 231 280 1,134        
Bid>=5 0.713%*** -0.031% 0.640% 0.789%* 0.785%***  -0.816% 0.265 -0.820% 0.351 -0.149% 0.827 







































Table 3.4 cont. 
Panel K.2: Multiple Bids (Single), Payout and Acquirers’ Gains 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Multiple Bids All NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
Bid=1 2.277%*** 3.685%*** 2.342%*** 1.321%*** 1.570%***  2.115% <.0001 2.364% 0.006 1.021% 0.117 
N 1,505 503 259 275 1,002        
Bid=2 1.093%*** 0.935% 1.362%*** 0.697% 1.141%***  -0.207% 0.728 0.238% 0.786 0.665% 0.367 
N 800 188 158 168 612        
Bid=3 1.069%*** 1.361% 0.965% 0.929% 1.002%***  0.359% 0.654 0.432% 0.712 0.036% 0.968 
N 477 90 102 102 387        
Bid=4 1.222%*** -0.277% 1.600%** 0.914% 1.491%***  -1.769% 0.160 -1.191% 0.554 0.686% 0.533 
N 322 49 64 65 273        
Bid>=5 0.713%*** -0.031% 0.640% 0.789%* 0.785%***  -0.816% 0.265 -0.820% 0.351 -0.149% 0.827 
N 945 84 167 215 861        
Note: The table represents the statistics of cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers five days (-2, 2) surrounding the announcement in relation to deal characteristics and payout 
variables. The abnormal return is measured by market-adjusted model, that           in which    is return of firm i and    is market return of FTSE All Share. The control 
variables include cash (Cash flow is calculated as corporate cash flows normalized by book value of the firm; Cash holding is calculated as industrial adjusted cash and cash 
equivalent to sales ratio), market to book ratio (industrial adjusted market to book ratio 30 days before the announcement) and market value (market value of the acquirer 30 days 
before the announcement, the value is adjusted to average of 1999-2000 price), Mode of payment, Listed status, Focused and diversified deal, Domicile, Firm size, Deal to market 
ratio, and Frequent acquirer. The payout variable which is examined is industrial adjusted total payout to total asset ratio (Total payout).  The industry of each acquirer is 
classified based on Fama-French 12 Industries Classification, and the industrial benchmarks are constructed based on the constitute firms of DEADUK, FBRIT and FAIM in 




 quartile in terms of payout ratio in 
ascending order. If the acquirers did not pay out any cash as dividends or repurchases in past two years prior the announcement, then such Acquirers are included in Non-Paying 
(NP) group. Both Low-Paying and High-Paying acquirers are also classified as All-Paying (AP) group for further investigation. T-test is used to test the null hypothesis of 
Abnormal return is equal to zero as well as the null hypothesis of the Difference (Pr>|t|) in abnormal returns between two groups is equal to zero. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 





































Table 3.5 Control variables, Payout  and Acquirers’ Gains (Multivariate, Short run) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Control Variables  5 day  5 day  5 day  5 day  5 day 
Constant  0.0117***  0.0121***  0.0126**  0.0315*  0.0060 
High payout  -0.0027        -0.0053 
Low payout   0.0028        0.0029 
Non payout  0.0109**  0.0121***  0.0075*     
Payout Ratio  0.0101        0.0555* 
Cash flow    0.0021  0.0043  0.0021  0.0368** 
Cash holding    0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0044 
Market to book ratio      0.0001  -0.0009***  0.0002 
Cash only      0.0046*  0.0129  0.0018 
Stock only      -0.0045  -0.0108  0.0042 
Listed status      -0.0215***  -0.0492***  -0.0152*** 
Focused      -0.0011  0.0004  -0.0022 
Domicile      0.0014  -0.0052  0.0032 
MV      -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001 
Deal to market ratio      0.0143***  0.02141**  0.0108** 
Frequent Acquirers      -0.0011***  -0.0052***  -0.0006** 
Toehold      0.0018  0.0046  0.0003 
           
R-Squared  0.35%  0.42%  1.86%  4.57%  1.59% 
Adj R-Sq.  0.23%  0.30%  1.41%  2.78%  0.93% 
F-Value  3.04  3.68  4.15  2.55  2.41 
N  3,515  3,515  3,515  816  2,699 
Note: The table represents results of multivariate analysis based on the formula of:   
R = α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
where R is dependent variable of cumulative abnormal returns for 5-day event window. X is set of independent variables. The test is based independent variables of cash (Cash 
flow is calculated as corporate cash flows normalized by book value of the firm; Cash holding is calculated as industrial adjusted cash and cash equivalent to sales ratio), market to 
book ratio (industrial adjusted market to book ratio 30 days before the announcement) and market value (market value of the acquirer 30 days before the announcement, the value 
is adjusted to average of 1999-2000 price). Additional dummy variables include: Cash only (1 if the payment is cash, and 0 otherwise), Stock only (1 if the payment is stock, 0 
otherwise), Listed status (1 if acquired firm is listed firms), Focused deal (1 if the deal is focused deal and 0 if the deal is diversified deal), Domicile (1 if the deal is domestic and 
0 if the deal is cross border), Firm size (the market value of the acquirer 30 days before the announcement), Deal to market ratio (1 if the deal to market value ratio is classified 
into first quartile of the sample and 0 otherwise. Frequent acquirer is the number of bids the acquirer announced in the past three years. Three payout variables are under the test. 


































the acquirer is classified as a low paying acquirer and 0 otherwise; Non payout is a dummy variable takes value of 1 if the acquirer is a non-paying acquirer and 0 if the acquirer is 
a paying acquirer; and Payout ratio is a numerical variable of the payout level of the sample acquirer. Model 1 to 3 estimated based on the overall sample, while Model 4 and 
Model 5 focus on non-paying and all-paying group, respectively. T-test is used to test the null hypothesis of the estimated coefficient for each independent variable is equal to zero. 
Heteroskedasticity has been controlled using White method. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is represented by ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’, respectively.  
 




on acquirers’ gains is confirmed to be valid across different cash levels. Non-paying 
acquirers consistently outperform paying acquirers. The multivariate analysis (Table 
3.5) provides a similar result. The coefficient on cash flow suggests a positive 
relationship between the acquirer’s cash flow level and the average abnormal return, 
and the cash holding variable has a small and insignificant effect on acquirers’ gains. 
This rejects the agency argument relating to corporate cash.  
High (low) payout has an insignificant negative (positive) coefficient in Models 1 and 
5, and the non-payout (Model 1 and 2) is estimated to have a significant positive 
impact on acquirers’ gains, confirming our findings of a short term payout effect22. 
Payout, Growing Opportunity, and Acquirers’ Gains: It is important to investigate 
acquirers’ growth opportunities since such a factor reflects the markets expectation as 
to the firms’ future investment activities as well as its past corporate performance. 
The growth factor should reflect the willingness and ability of firms to distribute 
surplus cash since high growth acquirers may have an incentive to accumulate cash 
by not paying dividends or paying less to shareholders in order to capture future 
investment opportunities. We expect non-paying acquirers with high growth 
opportunities to gain the most. Table 3.4 Panel C shows the joint effect of growth 
opportunities and payout level on acquirers’ gains. For the overall sample, the study 
finds an adverse effect from growth opportunities on acquirers’ abnormal return. On 
average, low growth acquirers gain a significant abnormal return (2.008 per cent) 
while high growth acquirers gain less (0.918 per cent). This finding is contrary to 
Lang, et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) who suggest that high q acquirers gain more 
                                                          
22
 The effect of the payout ratio may be driven by unobservable factors among median paying 
acquirers. This study focuses on the extreme effect of the acquirers’ payout and the discussions are 
concentrated on the effect of high payout, low payout, and non-payout variables.  




from acquisitions23. This adverse effect is more significant within non-paying and 
low-paying groups. For high paying acquirers, the average abnormal return is stable 
regardless of the level of the market to book ratio. The multivariate result suggests 
that the growth factor has a small positive but insignificant effect in Models 3 and 5, 
but a significant negative effect in Model 4. The finding implies that the growth 
factor only plays an important role among non-paying acquirers and is irrelevant to 
paying acquirers24. In addition, we suggest that a possible explanation for the negative 
effect of the market to book ratio among non-paying acquirers could be mis-valuation 
by the market and this mis-valuation may be due to a high level of information 
asymmetry of the non-paying acquirers prior to the announcement. If low market to 
book ratio is caused by a high level of information asymmetry, the acquisition 
announcement would trigger significant market reaction, and non-paying acquirers 
with low market to book ratio would experience higher abnormal returns. The result 
of the payout effect is consistent as we expect. For each level of market to book ratio, 
non-paying acquirers consistently outperform paying acquirers. The difference is 
1.700 per cent for the acquirers with low market to book ratio and over 0.5 per cent 
for the acquirers with high market to book ratio, although the difference is statistically 
insignificant between the median and high market to book ratio group. This finding is 
also confirmed within a multivariate framework. 
Payout, Deal Characteristics, and Acquirers’ Gains: The literature finds that several 
deal characteristics have a significant impact on acquirers’ abnormal returns during 
                                                          
23
 Tobin’s q and market to book ratio are close substitutes and the latter has been widely used in the 
literature. This study uses industrial adjusted market to book ratio to examine the growth effect.  
24
The positive effect of market to book ratio in Models 3 and 5 could be caused by median paying 
acquirers as the estimation is based on the whole sample. We spot a large divergence of excess return 
for median paying acquirers, and this is caused by a significant variety of corporate and deal features 
among median paying acquirers. As such variety among median paying acquirers could be due to 
different observable and unobservable factors, this study only focus on the payout effect for high-, 
low- and non-paying acquirers. However, such absent of the test among median paying group could be 
a shortfall of present study and future investigation would be required. 




the announcement period. To test whether acquirers’ payout has a consistent effect on 
acquirers’ gains, we investigate the interaction between payout and variant deal 
characteristics. 
Mode of Payment: The mode of payment has been extensively tested and shown to be 
an important deal characteristic with a significant effect on acquirers’ gains. Travlos 
and Papaioannou (1991), Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Draper and Paudyal (1999), 
among others, find that the returns to cash acquirers consistently outperform those to 
acquirers using stock while acquirers using mixed methods of payment experience 
positive abnormal returns. Table 3.4 Panel D represents acquirers’ gains by mode of 
payment and payout. It shows that cash and mixed mode of payment acquirers gain a 
significant abnormal return at around 1.45 per cent (overall sample) while stock 
acquirers experience an insignificant abnormal return. Testing the abnormal return 
based on the acquirers’ payout level for each payment method, the finding that non-
paying acquirers gain more than paying acquirers is seen to be consistent for both 
cash and mixed payment deals. The multivariate analysis, which controls for the 
payout, cash, growth, and other deal characteristics, reveals that cash deals have a 
significant positive effect on acquirers’ gains in the overall sample, but an 
insignificant positive effect for both the paying (Model 3) and non-paying subsamples 
(Model 4). Stock payment is shown to have an insignificant negative effect for the 
overall sample and the non-paying subsample, and an insignificant positive effect for 
paying the subsample. Nevertheless, non-paying acquirers still consistently perform 
better. 
Target Listed Status: Studies such as Chang (1998), Ang and Kohers (2001), and 
Draper and Paudyal (2006), find that acquirers gain significant positive abnormal 
returns when the target is a private firm. Table 3.4 Panel E shows that, on average, 




acquirers of unlisted targets gain an abnormal return of 1.671 per cent, and acquirers 
of listed targets experience an insignificant loss of 0.320 per cent. For the deals of 
unlisted targets, the average abnormal return decreases from 2.724 per cent for the 
non-paying group to 1.279 per cent for the high-paying group. The difference in 
average abnormal return between the non-paying group and the paying group is 1.356 
per cent and this difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Neither 
the paying acquirers nor the non-paying acquirers gain significant abnormal returns 
from the acquisitions of the listed targets. For the multivariate analysis, the target 
listed status has a larger negative effect on the abnormal returns of the non-paying 
acquirers (-0.045) compared to the paying acquirers (-0.0108), yet the non payout 
variables still have a positive effect on the acquirers’ gains when the target listed 
status is controlled. 
Focused deals: Acquisitions across industries have traditionally be seen as value-
destroying corporate activities as corporate diversification may reflect agency issues 
(Denis, et al., 1997). Table 3.4 Panel F suggests that diversification is not necessarily 
destroying acquirers’ value. Among the paying acquirers, diversification enhances the 
acquirers’ abnormal returns more than the focused deals. High paying acquirers, on 
the other hand, gain more from focused deals, and the diversification effect is less 
significant among the non-paying acquirers. More importantly, the result of the 
payout effect is consistent with the finding that non-paying acquirers outperform 
paying acquirers in the short run. The multivariate results also show that 
diversification has an insignificant impact on acquirers’ gains, while the effect of the 
corporate payout is not affected by controlling for diversification. 
Domicile: The impact of domicile of the deal on acquirers’ gains is inconclusive in 
the existing literature. Doukas and Travlos (1988) find that firms benefit from 




international expansion as additional growth opportunities are captured while Denis, 
et al. (2002) find that the cost of global diversification outweighs the benefits it 
generates. As reported in Table 3.4 Panel G, on average, acquirers gain 1.501 per cent 
when the target is a UK domestic company, compared to 1.256 per cent when the 
target is a foreign company. Non-paying acquirers gain more from cross-border 
acquisitions and paying acquirers are better off when the targets are domestic firms. 
The different domicile effects are also reflected in the multivariate framework. The 
domicile dummy is estimated to be insignificant positive in Model 3 and 5 and 
insignificant negative in Model 4. Non-paying acquirers gain significantly higher 
average abnormal return than paying acquirers at 2.165 per cent with a premium of 
0.868 per cent for domestic deals. For cross-border deals, the difference in average 
abnormal returns between non-paying acquirers and paying acquirers is 1.455 per 
cent. The result provides further evidence that non-paying acquirers gain more. 
Firm Size: Research studies, including Roll (1986), Moeller, et al. (2004) and Fuller, 
et al. (2002), suggest that large acquirers underperform. In the short run, the 
univariate results indicate that high market value acquirers gain 0.575 per cent while 
low market value acquirers gain 2.645 per cent. Non-paying high market value 
acquirers make an insignificant loss at -0.032 per cent, and high paying high market 
value acquirers experience an insignificant gain at 0.368 per cent. For low and 
median market value groups, non-paying acquirers consistently outperform paying 
acquirers, although the difference in average abnormal returns is insignificant. 
Multivariate analysis indicates that the size effect is significant among non-paying 
acquirers but has little impact on paying acquirers, and the payout effect still holds 
after controlling for the acquirers’ size effect.  




Deal to market ratio: Anderson, et al. (1994) finds that the market reacts to 
acquisitions differently according to the size of the targets. Draper and Paudyal (2008) 
also suggest that the true profitability of an acquisition is revealed only if they control 
for relative size, and find that acquirers gain higher abnormal return when takeovers 
involve larger targets. Our results support the suggestion that acquirers gain more 
from high deal-to-market-value deals. Low deal-to-market-value deals create 
insignificant wealth effects to acquirers, and a payout effect is not apparent among 
such deals. On the other hand, for high deal-to-market-value deals, non-paying 
acquirers perform better as indicated previously. Both univariate and multivariate 
analysis suggest the deal-to-market value has high explanatory power for the size of 
acquirers’ gains. More importantly, the positive effect of the non-payout variable still 
holds when acquirers experience significant abnormal returns.  
Toehold: Dosoung (1991), among others, suggest that toehold acquisitions are 
beneficial as such acquisitions provide a value enhancing transfer of control. 
However, the positive effect of a toehold is more likely to accrue to target firms than 
to acquirers. In addition, if the acquirer is already a shareholder of the target firm 
prior to the acquisition, the market is unlikely to display a significant reaction to 
announcement of the subsequent transfer of corporate control as it might be predicted 
prior to the announcement. According to Panel J in Table 3.4, only acquirers with no 
prior holdings in target firms gain significant abnormal returns. Others earn 
insignificant abnormal returns. For non-toehold acquirers, the results show a 
significant inverse relation between the acquirers’ paying level and acquirers’ 
abnormal returns. In the multivariate analysis, however, the toehold variable display 
little explanatory power compared to other control variables, such as payout. 




Frequent Acquirer:  Draper and Paudyal (2008) suggests that information asymmetry 
plays an important role in determining acquirers’ gains. Because of the existence of 
asymmetric information, the market reacts significantly to acquirers’ early acquisition 
announcements since they reveal additional information. When the acquirers engage 
in subsequent deals, the excess performance of acquirers is diminished as the level of 
the acquirers’ asymmetric information diminishes. This suggestion may help us to 
explain why non-paying acquirers on average have a lower market to book ratio and 
consistently outperform the paying acquirers over the short run. If the higher 
abnormal normal return during the announcement period is caused by the information 
asymmetry before the announcement, we would expect that the higher abnormal 
return of the non-paying acquirers should only exist among initial bids. We 
investigate the average abnormal return of cumulated bids (Table 3.4 Panel K.1) and 
single bids (Table 3.4 Panel K.2) separately. Table 3.4 Panel K.1 shows that for 
acquirers engaging in multiple bids, the size of average abnormal return decreases as 
the number of bids increases. In Table 3.4 Panel K.2, although the diminishing trend 
does not exist, initial bids gain significantly higher returns than subsequent bids. The 
finding that acquirers gain the most on initial bids is also shown in the multivariate 
analysis. Comparing the gains of the non-paying acquirers to the paying acquirers, we 
find that outperformance by the non-paying acquirers only exists on initial bids, and 
paying acquirers display relatively stable performance and gain more than non-paying 
acquirers from the subsequent bids. This finding confirms our hypothesis that the 
higher abnormal return of the non-paying acquirers is mainly driven by market 
revaluation, and the results of subsequent bids also imply that paying acquirers have a 
lower level of asymmetric information and are more likely to engage in value-
enhancing takeovers. 




The short term event study, of both univariate and multivariate analyses, suggests that 
the non-paying acquirers outperform the paying acquirers, and this effect is consistent 
across various control variables. Our results for the short run investigation have 
several implications. First, acquirers experience positive gains from their acquisitions 
on average, and the gains of the acquirers are affected by different deal and target 
characteristics. Secondly, non-paying acquirers gain more than paying acquirers in 
the short run, and the high abnormal return is caused by market revaluation and only 
exists among the initial bids. Moreover, paying acquirers, especially high paying 
acquirers, experience positive gains from the acquisitions, and the size of the gains is 
relatively stable across both the initial and subsequent bids.  
Although we are able to explain why the non-paying acquirers outperform the paying 
acquirers in the short run, the suggestion that the corporate payout policy enhances 
corporate performance is only implied in the test of frequent acquirers. If corporate 
payout policy has a positive effect on the acquirers’ performance, we would expect 
such an effect not only to be reflected among subsequent deals but also in the stock 
performance in the post-acquisition period.  
3.4.2 Long Run 
We carry out the long term event study using both the mean BHAR and the Fama-
French calendar time portfolio methods to estimate the acquirers’ gains for 1-, 3- and 
5-year post-acquisition periods. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 provide the results and test 
statistics for long term acquirers’ wealth effects. The long run results confirm our 
suggestion that paying acquirers outperform non-paying acquirers in the long run. 
According to Table 3.6 Panel A, the difference in the average abnormal return 
between paying and non-paying acquirers is 4.382 per cent (1.099 per cent), 19.050 


































Table 3.6 Mean Buy and Hold Abnormal return and Payout 
Panel A.1 Total payout (equally weighted) 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Holding Period ALL NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
1 Year -4.210%*** -7.620%*** -4.408%*** 0.841% -3.238%***  -4.382% 0.0274 -8.461% 0.0096 -5.248% 0.0220 
3 Year -20.735%a -35.568%*** -18.584%*** -7.639%*** -16.518%***  -19.050% <.0001 -27.929% <.0001 -10.946% 0.0127 
5 Year -30.851%a -49.206%*** -28.652%*** -11.054%*** -25.633%***  -23.573% <.0001 -38.152% <.0001 -17.598% 0.0044 
             
Panel A.2 Total payout (value weighted) 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Holding Period ALL NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
1 Year -6.753%*** -7.809%* -5.412% -1.508% -6.710%***  -1.099% 0.4271 -6.301% 0.2568 -3.904% 0.3829 
3 Year -18.983%*** -28.139%*** -22.145%*** -12.701%*** -18.611%***  -9.528% 0.0334 -15.438% 0.0897 -9.444% 0.2694 
5 Year -28.283%*** -46.363%*** -30.880%*** -14.922%*** -27.548%***  -18.816% 0.0047 -31.442% 0.0338 -15.958% 0.0930 
 
Panel B.1 Dividend payout (equally weighted) 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Holding Period ALL NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
1 Year -4.210%*** -7.620%*** -3.409%** 0.721% -3.238%***  -4.382% 0.0274 -8.341% 0.0112 -4.130% 0.0795 
3 Year -20.735%*** -35.568%*** -16.690%*** -10.978%*** -16.518%***  -19.050% <.0001 -24.590% <.0001 -5.712% 0.2059 
5 Year -30.851%*** -49.206%*** -24.877%*** -16.638%*** -25.633%***  -23.573% <.0001 -32.568% <.0001 -8.240% 0.1944 





































Panel B.2 Dividend payout (value weighted) 
  Level of Payout  Difference (Pr>|t|) 
Holding Period ALL NP LP HP AP  NP vs. AP NP vs. HP LP vs. HP 
1 Year -6.753%*** -7.809%* -5.526% 1.254% -6.710%***  -1.099% 0.4271 -9.063% 0.0881 -6.780% 0.1405 
3 Year -18.983%*** -28.139%*** -21.507%*** -12.929%*** -18.611%***  -9.528% 0.0334 -15.210% 0.1135 -8.578% 0.3416 
5 Year -28.283%*** -46.363%*** -29.189%*** -18.270%*** -27.548%***  -18.816% 0.0047 -28.094% 0.0689 -10.920% 0.2593 
Note: The table represents the statistics of Buy and Hold Abnormal return for 1-, 3-, 5-year post event period based on the level of acquirers' payout ratio. The method measures 
the “average multiyear return from a strategy of investing in all firms that complete an event and selling at the end of a pre-specified holding period versus a comparable strategy 
using otherwise similar nonevent firms” (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000, p296). The BHAR formula is presented as follow: 
BHARi = ∏        
 
     – ∏        
 
     
where the BHARs are generated by holding long for acquirers’ stock and short for reference portfolio. The mean BHAR is computed based on weighted average individual 
BHARs, 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ∑        
 
   
 
and w is calculated in terms of both equally-weighted and value-weighted. For value-weighted, the market value for each acquirer has been adjusted to 1999-2000 average price. 
The payout variables which are examined are: Total payout is industrial adjusted total payout to total asset ratio; Dividend payout is industrial adjusted cash dividends to total 
asset ratio. The industry of each acquirer is classified based on Fama-French 12 Industries Classification, and the industrial benchmarks are constructed based on the constitute 





quartile in terms of payout ratio in ascending order. If the acquirers did not pay out any cash as dividends or repurchases in past two years prior the announcement, then such 
acquirers are included in Non-Paying (NP) group. Both Low-Paying and High-Paying Acquirers are also classified as All-Paying (AP) group for further investigation. T-test is 
used to test the null hypothesis of abnormal return is equal to zero as well as the null hypothesis of the Difference (Pr>|t|) in abnormal returns between two groups is equal to zero. 





































Table 3.7 Carhart (1997) 4 factors Calendar Time Portfolio Performance and Payout 
Panel A. Total payout 
 Level of Payout 
Portfolio Holding Period All NP LP HP AP 
 EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW 
1 Year -0.337% 0.344% -0.726% 0.614% -0.304% -0.084% 0.236% 0.627% -0.115% 0.318% 
3 Year -0.653%* 0.199% -1.104%** 0.315% -0.690%* -0.145% -0.015% 0.418% -0.440% 0.199% 
5 Year -0.591%* 0.234% -1.026%** 0.411% -0.609%* 0.083% -0.063% 0.467% -0.427% 0.232% 
N 216 216 214 214 215 215 216 216 216 216 
 
Panel B. Dividend payout 
 Level of Payout 
Portfolio Holding Period All NP LP HP AP 
 EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW 
1 Year -0.337% 0.344% -0.726% 0.614% -0.211% 0.014% 0.350% 0.953% -0.115% 0.318% 
3 Year -0.653%* 0.199% -1.104%** 0.315% -0.714%* -0.094% -0.009%** 0.608% -0.440% 0.199% 
5 Year -0.591%* 0.234% -1.026%** 0.411% -0.600%* 0.112% -0.074% 0.617%* -0.427% 0.232% 
N 216 216 214 214 215 215 216 216 216 216 
Note: The table represents the statistics of Carhart (1997) 4 factors calendar time portfolio performance for 1-, 3-, 5-year post event period based on the level of acquirers' payout 
ratio. The constant of each estimation is reported. The figures reported in the table are constant term αi, which is the measure of abnormal performance, estimated based on Carhart 
(1997) 4 Factors model.  
Rpt – Rft = αi + βi(Rmt – Rft) + siSMBi + hiHMLi + uiUMDi  + εi 
where Rpt is portfolio return at time t, Rft is monthly UK Treasury Bill 3 Month mid-rate, Rmt – Rft is market premium, SMBi is size factor, HMLi is value factor, and UMDi is 
momentum factor. Both equally weighted and value weighted portfolio are investigated. The payout variables which are examined are: Total payout is industrial adjusted total 
payout to total asset ratio; Dividend payout is industrial adjusted cash dividends to total asset ratio. The industry of each acquirer is classified based on Fama-French 12 Industries 
Classification, and the industrial benchmarks are constructed based on the constitute firms of DEADUK, FBRIT and FAIM in Datastreams.  The sample of paying firms has been 




 quartile in terms of payout ratio in ascending order. If the acquirers did not pay out any cash as 


































also classified as All-Paying (AP) group for further investigation. T-test is used to test the null hypothesis of the constant term is equal to zero. Heteroskedasticity has been 
















weighted (value weighted) method for 1-, 3-, and 5-year post-event periods, 
respectively. The difference in abnormal returns is substantially increased when we 
compare the high paying acquirers to the non-paying acquirers. 
We also conduct an investigation of long run acquirers’ gains using Carhart’s (1997) 
4 factors in a calendar time portfolio framework in order to control the risk factors. 
For an equally weighted portfolio, the average abnormal return increases with the 
level of payout. For a value weighted portfolio, the high paying acquirers consistently 
show better post acquisition performance.  
The long run excess performance based on univariate analysis reveals an important 
result. When we average the wealth effect across the acquirers in the sample within 
each payout group (equally weighted), the results support our hypothesis that paying 
acquirers perform better through acquisitions. The positive relation between average 
abnormal return and payout level in the long run suggests that high paying acquirers 
that, in theory, are well monitored by investors and have less agency issues and 
information asymmetry, acquire better quality targets. Such an effect, however, is 
only revealed in the long run as other factors, including asymmetric information for 
instance, appear to have a dominant effect on market reactions during short 
announcement windows. As the short run negative effect of the payout factor on the 
acquirers’ abnormal return is reversed in long run, it is important to investigate 
whether corporate and deal characteristics affect acquirers’ gains differently in the 
long run and whether the payout effect is robust using different control variables. 
Table 3.8 provides results based on the acquirers’ long run performance. We find deal 
characteristics, including mode of payment, domicile, deal to market value, and 
frequent acquirers, have a significant and consistent impact on acquirers’ gains 


































Table 3.8 Control variables, Payout and Acquirers’ Gains (Multivariate, Long run) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Explanatory Variables  3 year  3 year  3 year  3 year  3 year 
Constant  -0.2129***  -0.2105***  -0.2663***  -0.5406***  -0.1916** 
High payout  0.0780**        0.0980** 
Low payout  -0.0039        -0.0397 
Non payout  -0.1588***  -0.1609***  -0.1624***     
Payout Ratio  0.6312***        0.3894 
Cash flow    0.2354***  0.2580***  0.2790***  -0.0523 
Cash holding    -0.0010  -0.0008  -0.0008  -0.0667** 
Market to book ratio      0.0014  0.00043  0.0014 
Cash only      0.1279***  0.2447***  0.0930*** 
Stock only      -0.1291*  -0.1970**  -0.0311 
Listed status      -0.0308  -0.0154  -0.0391 
Focused      0.0802***  0.1797**  0.0545* 
Domicile   
   0.0945***  0.1946***  0.0740** 
MV      0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
Deal to market ratio      0.1203***  0.0386  0.1672*** 
Frequent Acquirers      -0.0058**  -0.0464***  -0.0025 
Toehold      -0.1515***  -0.0740  -0.1933*** 
           
R-Squared  1.34%  1.29%  3.51%  5.61%  3.00% 
Adj R-Sq.  1.23%  1.18%  3.07%  3.83%  2.35% 
F-Value  11.93  11.47  7.95  3.16  4.61 
N  3,515  3,515  3,515  816  2,699 
Note: The table represents results of multivariate analysis based on the formula of:   
R = α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
where R is dependent variable of cumulative abnormal returns for 3-year event window. X is set of independent variables. The test is based independent variables of cash (Cash 
flow is calculated as corporate cash flows normalized by book value of the firm; Cash holding is calculated as industrial adjusted cash and cash equivalent to sales ratio), market to 
book ratio (industrial adjusted market to book ratio 30 days before the announcement) and market value (market value of the acquirer 30 days before the announcement, the value 
is adjusted to average of 1999-2000 price). Additional dummy variables include: Cash only (1 if the payment is cash, and 0 otherwise), Stock only (1 if the payment is stock, 0 
otherwise), Listed status (1 if acquired firm is listed firms), Focused deal (1 if the deal is focused deal and 0 if the deal is diversified deal), Domicile (1 if the deal is domestic and 
0 if the deal is cross border), Firm size (the market value of the acquirer 30 days before the announcement), Deal to market ratio (1 if the deal to market value ratio is classified 
into first quartile of the sample and 0 otherwise. Frequent acquirer is the number of bids the acquirer announced in the past three years. Three payout variables are under the test. 


































the acquirer is classified as a low paying acquirer and 0 otherwise; Non payout is a dummy variable takes value of 1 if the acquirer is a non-paying acquirer and 0 if the acquirer is 
a paying acquirer; and Payout ratio is a numerical variable of the payout level of the sample acquirer. Model 1 to 3 estimated based on the overall sample, while Model 4 and 
Model 5 focus on non-paying and all-paying group, respectively. T-test is used to test the null hypothesis of the estimated coefficient for each independent variable is equal to zero. 










acquirers’ gains, especially for non-paying acquirers. If the periodic cash flows reflect 
acquirers’ investment performance in the pre-acquisition period, it could also be a 
reliable factor in indicating acquirers’ post-acquisition performance. The results for 
the cash variables from the long run multivariate analysis for the overall sample 
further reject Jensen’s (1986) agency theory of free cash flows.  
The payout effect is consistent with the long run univariate analysis. Within the 
paying group, the estimated coefficient on high (low) payout dummy, although it is 
insignificant, shows a positive (negative) effect on acquirers’ gains, compared to a 
negative (positive) effect in the short run. Comparing non-paying with paying 
acquirers, the non-paying dummy reveals significant explanatory power in assessing 
acquirers’ acquisition performance in the long run. The coefficient is estimated to be 
significant and consistently around -0.160 across three models (Model 1 to Model 3). 
3.5 Conclusion 
Motived by the recognition of the positive effect of corporate payout policy on the 
firm’s performance, we investigate how corporate payout policy affects acquirers’ 
gains. We test the hypothesis that acquirers with a high payout ratio gain more than 
acquirers with a low payout ratio, and that paying acquirers outperform non-paying 
acquirers.  
For the short run event study, we find that the non-paying acquirers outperform the 
paying acquirers by a significant magnitude, and this outperformance is not affected 
by the deal and target characteristics. We suggest that the larger gain by the non-
paying acquirers is caused by market revaluation. According to our sample of 
acquirers, the non-paying acquirers are featured by low cash flow, high cash holdings 
and low market to book ratio. Denis and Osobov (2008) suggest that non-paying 
firms are generally young firms which are at an early stage of the life cycle. If this is 




the case, asymmetric information is likely to exist between the non-paying acquirer 
and the market, and such information asymmetry may indicate a low market to book 
ratio due to undervaluation. Thus, the takeover announcement by the non-paying 
acquirers can reduce the information asymmetry by revealing, for instance, the reason 
for the large cash holding, and this will trigger the market revaluation. However, such 
market revaluation should only exist in the initial bids as after the information 
asymmetry is reduced, the gains to subsequent bids should be mainly driven by the 
potential synergy. Our results confirm this suggestion. Non-paying acquirers 
outperform paying acquirers for initials bids but such outperformance disappears with 
subsequent bids. In addition, paying acquirers have a stable performance across all 
bids indicating that paying acquirers are more likely to engage in value enhancing 
acquisitions. The long run investigation suggests that paying acquirers outperform 
non-paying acquirers, and the payout ratio has a positive effect on the acquirers’ gains 
in the long run. Our results imply that corporate payout has a positive effect on the 
acquirers’ performance and the effect is more pronounced in the long term post-
acquisition period.  
Our results are robust across different measures of the acquirers’ payout and different 
deal and target characteristics, and support the suggestion of a positive effect from the 









Chapter 4 Factors Affecting an Owner’s Decision to Sell 
4.1 Introduction 
The overwhelming majority of research studies on the effect of takeovers on 
shareholders focus on the gains to shareholders’ of acquiring firms. The results of the 
studies generally suggest that acquiring firms experience small but positive gains over 
the short run but may suffer losses in the long run (Andrade, et al., 2001). It is not 
hard to understand why the investigation of the impact on the wealth of acquiring 
shareholders has preoccupied much of the literature. Acquisitions ought to be value-
enhancing corporate activities and the financial return to acquirers is a key factor to 
assessing acquisition gains. For target firms, studies have typically been limited to the 
significant gains that accrue to the shareholders of targets at announcement (Asquith 
and Kim, 1982). The limited focus on the impact on target shareholders’ wealth may 
be a reflection of the large premium shareholders receive for selling their shares. 
There is no question that on average takeovers are profitable for shareholders of 
acquired firms. However, the lack of detailed analysis specific to target firms 
provides a fertile area for exploration.  
There are many factors that have to be taken into consideration when shareholders 
and managers agree to put their firms up for sale
25
. The likely positive gains to the 
acquired firms’ shareholders provide only a limited explanation of the motivation for 
a sale. Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) suggest that the traditional assumption that an 
acquisition is initiated and dominated by the acquirer could be misleading as a firm’s 
managers can be actively looking for buyers when a sale is decided. Their study 
reframes acquisition as courtship and suggests that timing and emotional factors play 
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 Because it is difficult to identify whether the takeover is initiated by target firm, or the target owners 
simply face takeover bids, this study only concerns whether a firm is involved in takeover as a target. 




a significant role from the beginning of the acquisition process. The study suggests 
that, other than strategic motives such as to overcome a business hurdle, personal 
motives including stress and fear-of-failure, can also trigger the decision to sell. 
Among the directors of their sample firms, half of the directors have an open view 
about a potential sale of the firm and 4 out of 12 directors actively sought potential 
buyers. In addition, 7 out of 12 targets were up for sale for funding reasons, and 10 
out of 12 targets aimed to realize potential growth within a merged entity. However, 
there are several difficulties with the Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) study. Their 
research is based on case studies of 12 entrepreneurial high tech firms. The limited 
range of industries from which their sample is drawn and limited sample size makes 
the results difficult to generalize. Using interviews as the primary research method 
suggests that personal preferences and motives could colour the statements the 
managers provide, and cause possible biases in the results.  
To improve our understanding of acquisitions, this study focuses on the supply side 
of an acquisition. Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify whether the 
takeover is initiated by target firm or acquiring firm based on statistical analysis,  we 
aim to provide quantitative evidence on the determinants of the decision to sell the 
firm as well as of the gains from sale. Study of these determinants can help us 
understand better possible causes of corporate takeovers that have been taken place. 
This study uses logistic and OLS regression analysis. We investigate how three types 
of factors, namely a director and shareholder factor, a corporate factor, and a market 
factor, affect the decision to sell the firm, and how these factors affect the premium 
gained by the target’s shareholders. We find that all three types of factor help to 
explain the sale of the firm. Our results suggest that the director factor has an 
important role in determining both the likelihood of a sale and the potential gains. 




Whether or not to put the firm on sale can be affected by personal incentives that 
affect the directors. Long established (entrenched) directors of a target firm may 
weigh up their welfare in the existing firm against the potential job risk in the merged 
firm, before coming to a final decision. This is illustrated by the results for both the 
years of service and job security factor. The longer the director’s years of service the 
lower the likelihood of sale, whilst job security for the directors of the target firm 
measured by employment in the merged firm in the post-acquisition period has a 
substantial effect on the size of the premium paid by the acquirer.  
From the shareholders’ perspective, we find the percentage of ownership held by the 
largest shareholder has a negative relationship to the likelihood of becoming a target. 
Maximising the potential gain from the sale and measuring and minimising the 
possible risks are major concerns during the decision making process. The results 
suggest that if the major shareholders are individuals they are more likely to receive 
cash (the dominant method of payment) and to gain a higher premium (by 5 per cent). 
When the major shareholders of the target are corporates they are likely to accept a 
lower premium and hope for potential gains from the merged entity by receiving 
stock as the form of payment. The decision to sell the firm can also be driven by 
externalities. Market conditions and changes in the industrial environment give 
advantages to certain firms and weaken the market position of others. Such influences 
can cause the sale of ownership and determine the premium paid by acquirers. We 
also find the size of a firm’s liquid assets has a negative relationship on both the 
likelihood of sale and the gains from sale. The size of a firm’s intangible assets 
enhances the gains to the shareholders of the target. 
The study is structured as follow: following the introduction, we provide detailed 
discussion of how the key hypotheses are developed. Section 3 provides a description 




of the data collected and the methodologies adopted. Section 4 provides the results 
and discussion. The study concludes in section 5. 
4.2 Hypotheses Developed 
The first question that needs to be answered is why the prime decision makers of the 
firm want/agree to sell26. Intuitively, the purpose of selling the firm is likely to be the 
potential gains from such a sale. In other words, if the owner can benefit from selling 
rather than continuing to hold shares in the company, selling the firm becomes a 
natural action. However, the owners of the firm are not the only people involved in 
making a decision. It is important to include anyone with a significant voice in the 
running of a firm. As Berle and Means (1932) and others such as Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Malmendier and Tate (2008) have recognized, directors with 
agency power and/or part ownership can also significantly influence decision making 
with regard to selling the firm. This makes the directors important stakeholders so 
that analysing directors’ incentives can help us to understand why certain firms 
became targets and, among target firms, why some gain more than others. Although 
both directors and shareholders are treated as stakeholders in the firm, their decisions 
with regard to the sale of the firm may be driven by very different considerations. For 
directors, selling the firm may put his/her job at risk (Agrawal and Walkling, 1994). 
The risk to job security also includes the risk of losing executive power in the current 
firm. As job security and executive power directly affect a director’s wealth, securing 
the agreement of the directors to the sale of the firm is likely to be more difficult 
unless such risks can be reduced or resolved. This leads us to the following 
hypothesis: 
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 In the context of this study, we take the decision maker of the firm to include anyone who has a 
significant voice in the decision making process relating to major corporate strategies. Thus, the 
decision maker can refer to the major shareholders of the firm, the directors of the firm, or both. 




Hypothesis 1: Personal factors related to individual directors, including job security 
and entrenchment, significantly affect the sale of the firm and gains from such a sale. 
For shareholders, the decision to sell the firm will mainly depend on whether the 
shareholder is better-off as a result of the sale. Bargeron, et al. (2008) suggest that 
targets with ownership highly concentrated into a few hands receive a higher 
premium from acquirers. If this is the case, we expect the proportion of shares held by 
the largest shareholder to have a significant effect on our results. In other words, if 
highly concentrated ownership can enhance the bargaining power of target firms, it 
may increase the premium received by shareholders in the target firm once agreement 
is reached. Thus, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the degree of concentration in the ownership of the target 
the less likely it is that a sale will take place, or the greater the gains from the sale 
will be. 
If the level of inside ownership increases, the objectives of the directors and 
shareholders are better aligned. In such cases, significant share ownership by the 
directors should show a similar effect as for shareholders. Such an effect is tested as 
part of our factors relating to directors. 
Despite the importance of the personal factors relating to directors and shareholders, a 
firm’s financial status cannot be ignored when investigating the sale of the firm. The 
firms’ financial figures reflect its current financial position as well as its further 
prospects. If a firm has the ability to cover its financial obligations and future 
financing requirement, the decision makers of such firms might be willing to realise 
future gains within the firm rather than put it up for sale. Moreover, if the firm’s 
assets are valued at a figure close to its terminal value, such a firm may be less 
favourable for potential acquirers as the future growth is limited. The possibility of 




growth opportunities and undervalued intangible assets can attract potential buyers 
and such a firm is likely to receive a higher premium if the owners of the firm intend 
to sell.  
Hypothesis 3: Corporate factors reflect a firm’s financial position and affect both the 
likelihood of sale and the gain from the sale. 
Hypotheses 1 to 3 consider the endogenous factors that affect both the likelihood of 
sale and the gain from the sale. The research literature, including Andrade, et al. 
(2001), Antoniou, et al. (2008), and Palepu (1986), suggest market and industrial 
factors can affect takeover activity. Factors that are commonly used to test market 
effects include market valuation and industrial clustering. We argue that although 
market valuation reflects investor sentiment, a high market valuation does not 
necessarily indicate a high probability of sale. High market valuation may indicate an 
overvaluation of a firm’s equity, and such overvaluation discourages potential 
acquirers offering a high premium for the company. Clustering of takeovers within 
industries occurs in reaction to the changing industrial environment. Such changes 
may enhance the competitiveness of certain firms while putting others in a less 
favourable market position. The decision to sell the firm during such a period may 
arise from considerations of survival so that such deals may be associated with lower 
takeover premiums. The market borrowing rate may also help us to understand the 
owner’s decision in selling the firm. High borrowing costs impose additional 
financing difficulties on financially weak firms. These effects reduce the bargaining 
power of the owner of the firm and in turn reduce the premium received by target 
shareholders.  
Hypothesis 4: Market factors can change the firm’s status and affect the decision to 
sell. 




4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
Deal information related to acquisitions is collected from the Thomson One Banker 
database. The time period covered is from the beginning of 2004 to the end of 201027. 
The targets must be domiciled in the UK and listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
As we are interested in the sale of the control of the target firms, we select deals in 
which the percentage owned by the acquirer after the acquisition is over 50 per cent 
and the percentage owned by the acquirer prior to the acquisition is below 50 per cent. 
We also require deals to have information related to deal value, payment structure, 
deal status and a valid ISIN code for the target company. These criteria leave us with 
a sample of 852 deals. To construct the non-target sample, we download all the 
constituent firms listed in the FBRIT, FAIM and DEADUK files from Datastream, 
and use the firms that did not receive any takeover bids during the period28. We also 
filter out non-target firms for which the ISIN codes do not start with “GB”. 4,463 
non-target firms are selected. The director and shareholder data required are collected 
from Fame. Director data includes date of birth, appointment and resignation dates, 
gender, and director function. Shareholder data include the direct and total 
shareholding of recorded shareholders 29. The corporate financial data is collected 
from Fame and Datastream. The market data, such as market returns and LIBOR rate, 
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 The ownership data are collected from Fame in BvD database. Fame keeps archived data in the 
ownership database for the latest 10 years. This limits the beginning point of our sample period.  
28
 A firm is defined as non-target firm if the firm did not receive any takeover bid within the 
announcement year of each target sample firm. The announcement years is controlled as the fixed 
effect in the logistic analysis. 
29
 According to Fame, the shareholder’s ownership is the percentage of voting shares owned by the 
shareholder. The total shareholding includes both direct ownership and indirect ownership. For 
instance, if firm A directly owns 30 per cent of firm B, then direct ownership is 30 per cent. On the 
other hand, if firm A directly owns 100 per cent of firm C, and firm C directly owns firm B 40 per cent, 
then firm A indirectly owns 30 per cent of firm B. 




are also collected from Datastream30. After removing the firms (both target and non-
target) which do not meet the data requirement, the final sample contains 306 target 
firms and 2,645 unique non-target firms.  
4.3.2 Methodology 
4.3.2.1 Logistic Method 
The present study is to determine under what circumstance owners are more likely to 
sell their shareholdings. We adopt discriminant analysis to determine which factors 
have a dominant effect in determining the sale of the firm.  One commonly used type 
of discriminant analysis is logistic regression. Logistic regression has been 
extensively used to analyse the relationship between a categorical dependent variable 
and a variety of independent variables to determine the likelihood of particular 
outcomes. In the corporate takeover literature, studies including Thompson (1997) 
and Powell (2004), adopt a logistic methodology to investigate and predict the 
likelihood of a firm becoming a takeover target. The most commonly used logistic 
model is binary logistic regression: 
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where      is the probability that firm i belong to outcome j (1 if the firm is target, 0 if 
not);    is the vector of measured independent variables of firm i ;    is the vector of 
parameters of distinctive independent variables; (
    
      
)  is the odds ratio. The 
normalization   =0 is imposed in order to estimate the parameters. Although the logit 
scale provides a linear relationship between the dependent variable and independent 
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 We also collect additional deal information from Thomson One Banker to form the industrial 
clustering proxy. 




variables, it is more intuitive to interpret the model in probabilities. Thus, the logit 
model can be transformed as: 
     
         
  ∑         
 
The parameters are estimated using the PROC LOGISTIC function in SAS, and 
interpretation of the results is based on the output produced by maximum likelihood 
estimation within the function. The variables employed for the estimation represent 
three types of factors.  
4.3.2.2 OLS Method 
The multivariate analysis of target gains focuses on the 306 target firms in our sample. 
We use the conventional OLS gains from the sale. The dependent variable is the 
premium received by target shareholders and the premium is computed as deal value 
divided by the market value of the proportion of ownership acquired. 
The OLS regression model is in the form of: 
Premium = α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
Where Premium is calculated as deal value divided by total value of target’s shares 
acquired, and Xi is the set of independent variables that represent three types of 
factors.  




4.4 Tested Factors 
4.4.1 Director and Shareholder Factor 
We collect information on directors for the sample firms from Fame. We focus on 
directors in office immediately before the takeover date31. We examine the following 
factors. Director Age is the biological age of selected directors and is calculated by 
using a takeover date minus the director’s date of birth. Years of Service is the length 
of the time period for which the director holds office. We calculate the years of 
service as the number of years between the appointment of the director and the 
takeover date. Director’s Ownership is the percentage of the firm’s shares owned by 
the director. As director’s ownership is not directly available in Fame, we collect 
shareholder and director information for each sample firm and match shareholders 
and directors. Total shareholding is used as a proxy for ownership. If this information 
is not available, direct percent of shareholding is used32. In addition to director age, 
years of service, and director’s ownership, we use a further two variables for our 
analysis. Gender is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the director is female and 
0 otherwise. Job Security is dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the director still 
holds the position at least one year after the takeover date and 0 otherwise.  
Shareholder information is also collected from Fame. Shareholding is the total 
percent of shares of the reported largest shareholder and is used to measure the level 
of ownership concentration. If information on the total percent of shares is missing, 
the direct percent shareholding is used instead. Controlling Shareholder is an 
interactive variable which captures if the largest shareholder is also a controlling 
shareholder. The value of the interactive variable is equal to the percentage of 
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If the director is appointed within 30 days before the announcement date or resigned from the job 30 
days before the announcement date, the director is excluded from our sample. 
32
 See footnote 27 




shareholding if the largest shareholder is the controlling shareholder and 0 otherwise. 
Controlling Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the controlling 
shareholder is also a director of the firm and 0 otherwise. 
4.4.2 Corporate Factor 
Corporate factors reflect a firm’s financial status and are expected to have a 
significant effect on both the likelihood of sale, and the gains from the sale. There are 
three corporate variables included in our tests. P/E Ratio is the de-trended annual P/E 
ratio of each sample firm 30 days before the takeover date. Liquidity is calculated as 
the difference between current assets and inventory divided by current liabilities. 
Intangibles is the firm’s intangible to total assets ratio 33 . Both liquidity and 
intangibles take the reported annual figure for each sample firm one year before the 
announcement. 
4.4.3 Market Factor 
The market factor captures market conditions and industrial events. We adopt three 
variables to test the market effect. Market valuation is measured by Market P/E Ratio 
which is the de-trended annual FTSE All Share P/E ratio 30 days before the takeover 
date34. LIBOR is the average LIBOR rate 30 days before the event date for each 
sample firm. Industrial Clustering is calculated as the number of takeovers in each 
sample firm’s industry in the same calendar year as the event date of each sample 
firm, and industries are classified using the Fama-French 12 industries classification. 
                                                          
33
 According to Worldscope, intangibles (source code 02649) includes goodwill, patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, formulae, franchises of no specific duration, capitalized software development 
costs/computer programmes, organizational costs, customer lists, licenses of no specific duration, 
capitalized advertising cost, mastheads (newspapers), capitalized servicing rights, and purchased 
servicing right. 
34
 According to Antoniou, et al. (2008), the market P/E ratio has an upward trend over time and can 
cause a systematic bias if the trend is not controlled. 




4.5 Results and Discussion 
4.5.1 Director and shareholder 
To examine whether entrenched managers/directors have a significant impact on the 
likelihood of sale, for each sample firm, we select the director with the longest years 
of service from each sample firm and consider the director’s age, years of service, and 
size of shareholding35. Consistent with our entrenchment hypothesis, as shown in 
Table 4.1 Panel A, the existence of directors with long service with the company 
significantly reduces the chance (log ratio) of the company becoming a target (by 
0.026). The director age and ownership variables also have a negative effect on the 
likelihood of selling the firm, although the coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
These results suggest a strong relationship between the characteristics of the director 
and the firm’s attitude towards its sale. As discussed earlier, a long serving director is 
likely to accumulate power and to see a convergence between corporate objectives 
and personal objectives. This enhanced agency power not only affects a director’s 
wealth but also their welfare. Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest that the possibility of 
losing power, prestige and the value of organization-specific human capital after a 
takeover may cause the directors to oppose the idea of selling the firm. In such a case, 
long serving directors might resist changes of corporate control unless it is in the 
director’s own interest. Agrawal and Walkling (1994) suggest that senior executives, 
especially those with high compensation, do not, on the whole, survive in their 
existing job position following a takeover bid and are unlikely to find another senior 
position in other public firms within three years of the acquisition. If the risk to job 
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 There are 556 types of unique director title reported in FAME. Most of the directors recorded in the 
Fame database do not have any description of job function. Selecting the director with available 
information of the job function greatly reduces our sample size. As this study investigates the effect of 
the executive power of entrenchment director, such effect would be most likely to be captured by the 
director’s years of service. Long served directors are likely to have better knowledge about the firm 
and convert corporate objectives to their personal objectives. We also carried similar analysis based on 
the oldest director of each sample firm but the results are insignificant. 




security and its associated wealth effect influences a director’s actions during 
decision making relating to major corporate activities, this effect ought to be captured 
by the takeover premium received by the target firm. In addition, although logistic 
analysis suggests that the percentage of shares held by directors has little effect on the 
likelihood of sale, it is expected to have a significant effect on the premium paid for 
the target.  
 Table 4.1 Panel B shows how factors related to directors affect the size of premium 
received by the target’s shareholders. The results suggest that, once the firm is for 
sale, a director’s age and tenure has no significant effect on the size of the premium 
paid by an acquirer. The ownership interest and job security of directors, on the other 
hand, has a significant effect on the gains. Because the holding of shares by directors 
better aligns the directors’ interests with the shareholders’ interests, director’s 
holdings enhance the director’s motivation to bargain for a better price during the 
negotiation process. This is confirmed by a statistically significant coefficient for the 
director’s ownership variable. Securing a position in the merged firm gives a director 
an incentive to cooperate with the acquirer. Such job security enhances the director’s 
own interest over that of the shareholders’ and leads to a lower takeover premium. 
According to our results, securing a job position in the merged firm reduces the 
premium paid by the acquirers by 18 per cent. This result strongly suggests that 
directors may pursue personal benefit at the cost of shareholders. Studies, such as 
Olsen and Cox (2001) and Martin, et al. (2009), find that females put greater weight 
on risk control compared to male counterparts when making financial decisions. The 
gender effect may determine the risk preference relating to the trade-off between 
possible withdrawal from a takeover when bargaining over a higher price and 
acceptance of a lower selling price to secure the success of the sale. The results show  




Table 4.1 Director Factor, Likelihood of Sale, and Gains from Sale 
Panel A Logistic Analysis 
  Director Factor 
  Director with longest tenure 
(Pr>|χ|) 
Intercept -3.6564*** -3.8018*** -4.0366*** -3.5665*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Director Age  -0.0065   -0.0041 
0.3001   0.5185 
Years of Service   -0.0264**  -0.0243** 
 0.0311  0.0517 
Director’s Ownership    -0.1166 -0.1136 
  0.3577 0.3631 
     
Likelihood Ratio 39.16 42.84 42.33 47.24 
Pr> χ <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Wald Test 36.96 40.42 37.01 41.74 
Pr> χ <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
N 306/10,743 306/10,743 306/10,743 306/10,743 
Note: The sample includes 306 target firms and 2,645 unique non-target firms. The logistic analysis is 
based on logit regression model which as: 
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The dependent variable is log of odd ratio of firm i belong to event j which is equal to 1 if the firm is 
target and 0 otherwise. The significance of the model is tested by maximize likelihood method and the 
likelihood ratio is reported. Xi is the set of independent variables. By selecting the director with the 
longest years of service of each target firm, there are three factors tested. Director Age is the biological 
age of selected directors for sample firm; Years of Service as a Director is the years of which the 
selected director has been in director position till the event date; Director’s Ownership is the 
percentage of shares held by selected director. Year is set as categorical variable of logistic analysis in 
order to control the fixed effect. The significance of the coefficient is tested by using Chi-statistics for 










Table 4.1 cont. 
Panel B Multivariate Analysis 
  Director Factor 
  Director with longest tenure 
(Pr>|t|) 
Intercept 1.1348*** 1.4568*** 1.3954*** 1.4665*** 1.3961*** 1.3403*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Director Age 0.0044     0.0029 
0.2228     0.4122 
Years of  
     Service  
 -0.0073    -0.0058 
 0.2589    0.3767 
Director’s  
     Ownership 
  0.5195***   0.5425*** 
  <.0001   <.0001 
Job Security    -0.1953***  -0.1845*** 
   0.0004  0.0006 
Gender     -0.0259 0.0168 
    0.8503 0.8988 
       
F Value 1.71 1.12 35.02 10.46 0.02 9.57 
Pr>F 0.1917 0.2914 <.0001 0.0014 0.8944 <.0001 
R-Square 0.58% 0.38% 10.58% 3.43% 0.01% 14.08% 
Adj R-Sq 0.24% 0.04% 10.28% 3.10% -0.33% 12.61% 
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 
Note: The sample includes 306 target firms (the number of observations for each regression may vary 
according to the available data of control variables). The multivariate analysis of target gains is 
estimated by using the OLS regression model as: 
Premium= α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
The dependent variable Premium is calculated as deal value divided by the market value of acquired 
shares 30 days before the announcement. The significance of model is reported based on F-statistics, 
and both R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported. Xi is the set of independent variables. By selecting the 
director who has the longest years of service of each target firm, there are five factors tested. Director 
Age is the biological age of selected directors for sample firm; Years of Service as a Director is the 
years of which the selected director has been in director position till the event date; Director’s 
Ownership is the percentage of shares held by selected director; Job Security is a dummy variable 
which equals to 1 if the director continue to work in merged entity for at least one year after the 
effective date; and Gender is the gender of selected director. The outliers are controlled by studentized 
residual method and the significance of the coefficient is tested by using t-statistics. “***”, “**”, and 











Table 4.1 cont. 
Panel C Logistic Analysis 
  Director Factor 
  Shareholding director 
(Pr>|χ|) 
Intercept -3.7858*** -3.9903*** -4.1418*** -3.6920*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Director Age  -0.0076   -0.0047 
0.5411   0.7186 
Years of Service   -0.0291  -0.0246 
 0.2292  0.3305 
Director’s Ownership    -0.0092 -0.0087 
  0.3079 0.3373 
     
Likelihood Ratio 8.54 9.73 9.37 10.84 
Pr> χ 0.2869 0.2044 0.2271 0.2862 
Wald Test 6.53 7.61 7.24 8.66 
Pr> χ 0.4793 0.3674 0.4035 0.4687 
N 64/4,498 64/4,498 64/4,498 64/4,498 
Note: The sample includes 306 target firms and 2,645 unique non-target firms. The logistic analysis is 
based on logit regression model which as: 
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The dependent variable is log of odd ratio of firm i belong to event j which is equal to 1 if the firm is 
target and 0 otherwise. The significance of the model is tested by maximize likelihood method and the 
likelihood ratio is reported. Xi is the set of independent variables. By selecting the director who is also 
a shareholder of each target firm, there are three factors tested. Director Age is the biological age of 
selected directors for sample firm; Years of Service as a Director is the years of which the selected 
director has been in director position till the event date; Director’s Ownership is the percentage of 
shares held by selected director. Year is set as categorical variable of logistic analysis in order to 
control the fixed effect. The significance of the coefficient is tested by using Chi-statistics for logistic 













Table 4.1 cont. 
Panel D Multivariate Analysis 
  Director Factor 
  Shareholding director 
(Pr>|t|) 
Intercept 0.9204*** 1.3475*** 1.4134*** 1.5714*** 1.4671*** 1.0578*** 
0.0024 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0007 
Director Age 0.0099*     0.0078 
0.0707     0.1063 
Years of 
     Service  
 0.0162    0.0051 
 0.1665    0.5947 
Director’s 
     Ownership 
  0.0059   0.0034 
  0.2109   0.4760 
Job Security    -0.2423**  -0.1943** 
   0.0127  0.0279 
Gender     -0.0891 -0.0125 
    0.1608 0.9008 
       
F Value 3.75 2.14 2.28 5.94 0.09 1.99 
Pr>F 0.0577 0.1490 0.1363 0.0179 0.7602 0.0949 
R-Square 5.97% 3.50% 3.72% 9.14% 0.16% 15.30% 
Adj R-Sq 4.38% 1.86% 2.09% 7.60% -1.53% 7.60% 
N 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Note: The sample includes 306 target firms (the number of observations for each regression may vary 
according to the available data of control variables). The multivariate analysis of target gains is 
estimated by using the OLS regression model as: 
Premium= α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
The dependent variable Premium is calculated as deal value divided by the market value of acquired 
shares 30 days before the announcement. The significance of model is reported based on F-statistics, 
and both R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported. Xi is the set of independent variables. By selecting the 
director who is also a shareholder of each target firm, there are five factors tested. Director Age is the 
biological age of selected directors for sample firm; Years of Service as a Director is the years of 
which the selected director has been in director position till the event date; Director’s Ownership is the 
percentage of shares held by selected director; Job Security is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if 
the director continue to work in merged entity for at least one year after the effective date; and Gender 
is the gender of selected director. The outliers are controlled by studentized residual method and the 
significance of the coefficient is tested by using t-statistics. “***”, “**”, and “*” represents significant 
level of 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 
 




a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient for the gender factor 36 . Both 
logistic analysis and multivariate OLS analysis are used to analyse the impact on 
takeovers of directors with shareholdings. The results are shown in Table 4.1 Panel C 
and D. The age of a director who is also a shareholder has a negative relationship to 
the likelihood of sale, and a significant positive relationship to the takeover premium 
when the factor is tested independently under each model. This finding suggests that 
aging owners place greater weight on the risks generated from selling their future 
income stream (i.e. the shares of the firm) and require a higher premium to 
compensate them for such risks. However, this effect is dominated by job security 
when the interactions among independent factors are tested. Logistic analysis reveals 
insignificant results. 
Whilst our analysis of the impact of directors’ personal interests focuses on how they 
affect the likelihood of a sale and the potential gains from such an event our analysis 
of shareholders examines the impact of concentration of ownership. Table 4.2 Panel 
A suggests a negative relationship between the largest shareholder’s holding and the 
likelihood of sale. Specifically, a 1 per cent increase in the largest shareholder’s 
holding reduces the log ratio of the probability of sell over the probability of not sell 
by 0.023. If the ownership of the firm is highly concentrated with a major single 
shareholder, such ownership may represent a significant amount of the shareholder’s 
wealth. The potential opportunity cost of losing income by selling the shares may be 
one determinant of the negative relationship. The shareholding factor shows an 
insignificant relationship to the takeover premium in multivariate analysis. To capture 
the effect of a controlling shareholder, we add an interactive variable of a controlling 
shareholder into our analysis. Our results show that once the target firm is controlled 
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 Job security and gender variable are not tested under the logistic analysis. This is because the job 
security can only be identified in the target firm and the quasi-complete separation is identified by SAS 
when add gender into logistic regression. 




Table 4.2 Shareholder Factor, Likelihood of Sale, and Gains from Sale 
Panel A logistic Analysis 
  Shareholder Factor 
  Largest Shareholder 
(Pr>|χ|) 
Intercept -3.4226*** -4.0384*** -3.4202*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Shareholding -0.0233***  -0.0233*** 
<.0001  <.0001 
Controlling Director 
     (1 if director is also the controlling 
      shareholder) 
 -0.2024 -0.0963 
 0.6014 0.8046 
    
Likelihood Ratio 140.38 38.38 140.45 
Pr> χ <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Wald Test 98.18 36.15 98.37 
Pr> χ <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
N 306/10,743 306/10,743 306/10,743 
Note: The sample includes 306 target firms and 2,645 unique non-target firms. The logistic analysis is 
based on logit regression model which as: 
     (    )     (
    
      
)  ∑  
   
   
The dependent variable is log of odd ratio of firm i belong to event j which is equal to 1 if the firm is 
target and 0 otherwise. The significance of the model is tested by maximize likelihood method and the 
likelihood ratio is reported. Xi is the set of independent variables. By selecting the largest shareholder 
of each target firm, there are three factors tested. Shareholding the percentage of ownership held by the 
largest shareholder; Controlling Director is the dummy which equals to 1 if the controlling shareholder 
is also a director, 0 otherwise. Year is set as categorical variable of logistic analysis in order to control 
the fixed effect. The significance of the coefficient is tested by using Chi-statistics for logistic analysis. 




















Table 4.2 cont. 
Panel B Multivariate Analysis 
  Shareholder Factor 
  Largest shareholder 
(Pr>|t|) 
Intercept 1.4069*** 1.3879*** 1.3359*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Shareholding -0.0006  0.0040 
0.7800  0.2388 
Controlling Shareholder 
     (Interactive variable which equals to the  
      percentage of shareholding  if top  
      shareholder is also the controlling  
      shareholder, 0 otherwise)  
  -0.0066* 
  0.0643 
Controlling Director 
     (1 if director is also the controlling  
      shareholder) 
 0.3257 0.3000 
 0.1088 0.1308 
    
F Value 0.10 2.82 2.58 
Pr>F 0.7503 0.0940 0.0537 
R-Square 0.03% 0.95% 2.57% 
Adj R-Sq -0.30% 0.61% 1.58% 
N 297 297 297 
Note: The sample includes 306 target firms (the number of observations for each regression may vary 
according to the available data of control variables). The multivariate analysis of target gains is 
estimated by using the OLS regression model as: 
Premium= α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
The dependent variable Premium is calculated as deal value divided by the market value of acquired 
shares 30 days before the announcement. The significance of model is reported based on F-statistics, 
and both R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported. Xi is the set of independent variables. By selecting the 
largest shareholder of each target firm, there are three factors tested. Shareholding the percentage of 
ownership held by the largest shareholder; Controlling Shareholder is an Interactive variable which 
equals to the percentage of shareholding if top shareholder is also the controlling shareholder, 0 
otherwise; Controlling Director is the dummy which equals to 1 if the controlling shareholder is also a 
director, 0 otherwise. The outliers are controlled by studentized residual method and the significance of 
the coefficient is tested by using t-statistics. “***”, “**”, and “*” represents significant level of 1, 5, 








by a single shareholder, the higher the level of ownership the lower the premium on 
takeover. This is contrary to our previous suggestion that the potential opportunity 
cost of losing further returns from selling the ownership should be compensated by a 
higher premium. To understand why this relationship is negative, we identify whether 
the largest shareholder is a corporate shareholder or an individual shareholder, and 
test the relationship between the shareholder’s status and the mode of payment. A 
large corporate shareholder significantly reduces the proportion of takeovers made for 
cash (by 17.45 per cent). This finding is consistent with Davidson III and Cheng 
(1997) who indicate that target shareholders receive lower premiums when a deal is 
financed by stock. We suggest that this finding reflects the difference between the 
risk preference of corporate and individual shareholders. Corporate shareholder’s 
behaviour is mainly driven by strategic considerations. In addition, corporate 
shareholder may have a higher risk tolerance when dealing with financial decisions as 
consequence of their greater diversification. A higher proportion of payment with 
stock indicates a willingness to share the risk as well as future returns relating to the 
merged enterprise in the post takeover period. Individual shareholders are likely to 
place more weight on the certainty of current wealth and avoid the volatility of future 
returns. This can be achieved by requiring cash as the payment mode and setting a 
higher sale price.  
The results for the director’s and shareholder’s factors suggest that the trade-off 
between current wealth and the uncertainty of further return significantly influences  
both decision making relating to a firm’s sale, and the gains from the sale. 
Shareholders consider the size of the gain from the sale, the potential risk of losing 
their capital, and the ability to bear the risk relating to potential returns in the future, 
while directors focus more on the benefits of their current position and wealth effects 




from possible loss of job security. Both shareholders and directors find a way that 
best serves their own interests. 
4.5.2 Corporate Factor 
The analysis of possible corporate factors is carried out from a strategic point of view. 
Table 4.3 Panel A and B provides the results of the logistic analysis relating to the 
likelihood of sale and multivariate analysis of the gains from the sale, respectively. Of 
three corporate variables, only the liquidity ratio has a statistically significantly 
negative effect on the likelihood of sale. Regardless of the director’s and 
shareholder’s preferences, if M&A activity is motivated by growth opportunities, a 
high liquidity ratio is not in the acquirer’s favour since liquid assets are likely to be 
valued at a fair value making it difficult to enhance growth. This is also suggested in 
Table 4.3 Panel B; higher liquidity decreases the takeover premium by 2.3 per cent37. 
Following this argument, we would expect a high P/E ratio and a high proportion of 
intangibles to increase the probability of sale. However, our logistic analysis suggests 
that neither factor has a significant effect on the probability of sale. This generates the 
question that if the P/E ratio and the relative size of intangible assets are the key 
determinant of potential growth, why should the owner of a firm with high P/E ratio 
and high intangible assets be reluctant to sell? A possible explanation is whether the 
firm has the ability to realize the potential growth within the firm, or needs to share 
such growth with an outside acquirer. The average solvency ratio, computed as the 
percentage of shareholders’ funds over total assets, of non-target firms is over 9 per 
cent higher than the solvency ratio of target firms. Together with the liquidity effect, 
this suggests that if the firm has the ability to meet its liabilities and to grow, the 
owner of such a firm may be unwilling to sell. Although the P/E ratio and intangibles 
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 A similar effect is also found from a test of the current ratio of the sample firms. 




Table 4.3 Corporate Factor, Likelihood of Sale, and Gains from Sale 
Panel A Logistic Analysis 
  Corporate Factor 
  (Pr>|χ|) 
Intercept -4.0063*** -3.7782*** -4.0086*** -3.7750*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
P/E ratio -0.0001   -0.0001 
0.6611   0.7321 
Liquidity   -0.1030***  -0.1028*** 
 0.0005  0.0006 
Intangibles   -0.0014 -0.0015 
  0.7589 0.7541 
     
Likelihood Ratio 43.78 72.17 43.70 72.65 
Pr> χ <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Wald Test 40.22 51.00 40.14 51.18 
Pr> χ <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
N 261/7,213 261/7,213 261/7,213 261/7,213 
Note: The sample includes 306 target firms and 2,645 unique non-target firms. The logistic analysis is 
based on logit regression model which as: 
     (    )     (
    
      
)  ∑  
   
   
The dependent variable is log of odd ratio of firm i belong to event j which is equal to 1 if the firm is 
target and 0 otherwise. The significance of the model is tested by maximize likelihood method and the 
likelihood ratio is reported. Xi is the set of independent variables. There are three factors tested. P/E 
ratio is the de-trended annual P/E ratio of sample firm 30 days before the announcement; Liquidity is 
the liquidity ratio of the sample firm before the announcement, and is calculated as the difference 
between current asset and inventory divided by current liability; Intangibles is the intangible assets to 
total assets of the sample firm before the announcement. Year is set as categorical variable of logistic 
analysis in order to control the fixed effect. The significance of the coefficient is tested by using Chi-



















Table 4.3 cont. 
Panel B Multivariate Analysis 
  Corporate Factor 
  (Pr>|t|) 
Intercept 1.3745*** 1.4158*** 1.3067*** 1.3415*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
P/E ratio 0.0001***   0.0001*** 
0.0027   0.0004 
Liquidity   -0.0234**  -0.0220** 
 0.0110  0.0122 
Intangibles   0.2907** 0.2650** 
  0.0102 0.0185 
     
F Value 1.40 4.01 5.82 3.52 
Pr>F 0.2381 0.0464 0.0166 0.0157 
R-Square 0.55% 1.55% 2.24% 4.02% 
Adj R-Sq 0.16% 1.17% 1.85% 2.88% 
N 256 256 256 256 
Note: The sample includes 306 target firms (the number of observations for each regression may vary 
according to the available data of control variables). The multivariate analysis of target gains is 
estimated by using the OLS regression model as: 
Premium= α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
The dependent variable Premium is calculated as deal value divided by the market value of acquired 
shares 30 days before the announcement. The significance of model is reported based on F-statistics, 
and both R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported. Xi is the set of independent variables. There are three factors 
tested. P/E ratio is the de-trended annual P/E ratio of sample firm 30 days before the announcement; 
Liquidity is the liquidity ratio of the sample firm before the announcement, and is calculated as the 
difference between current asset and inventory divided by current liability; Intangibles is the intangible 
assets to total assets of the sample firm before the announcement. The outliers are controlled by 
studentized residual method and the significance of the coefficient is tested by using t-statistics. “***”, 
“**”, and “*” represents significant level of 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 




have a less dominant effect on the likelihood of sale compared to the liquidity ratio, 
these two factors have a significant effect on the premium received by the 
shareholders once the firm became a target. According to Table 4.3 Panel B, both P/E 
ratio and intangibles significantly enhance the size of premium received by the target. 
The analysis of corporate factors is consistent with our hypothesis that the valuation 
of the firm’s assets and future growth significantly affect takeover activity. The effect 
is more pronounced in determining the selling price. Such results suggest that the 
owners of targets will choose the best corporate strategy to maximize their return. 
4.5.3 Market Factor 
The impact of market factors is displayed in Tables 4.4 Panel A and B. Consistent 
with our hypothesis, the clustering of takeovers within industries has a significant 
effect on the likelihood of selling the firm. Previous literature, including Andrade, et 
al. (2001) and Powell (2004), suggest that industrial shocks, including introducing 
new technology and changes in the regulatory environment, often trigger an increase 
in acquisition activities. Our results suggest that within the same industries, an 
increase in the volume of acquisitions significantly increases the probability of sale. 
Yet, neither the market P/E ratio nor LIBOR has a significant effect on the likelihood 
of sale, which further implies that industrial clustering is the main determinant of 
selling the firm. Nevertheless, the results of our multivariate analysis are consistent 
with our hypothesis. Each of our three variables has a negative relationship to the size 
of premium, and the coefficients of market P/E ratio and industrial clustering are 
statistically significant. A high market P/E ratio indicates an optimistic view about 
market performance. However, if the market value of the target is high only because 
of overall investors’ sentiment, such an increase in value may make the potential 
synergy gains more expensive to acquire. An acquiring firm would be more cautious  




 Table 4.4 Market Factor, Likelihood of Sale, and Gains from Sale 
Panel A Logistic Analysis 
  Market Factor 
  (Pr>|χ|) 
Intercept -3.4357*** -3.8267*** -4.6219*** -4.4218*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Market P/E ratio -0.0085   -0.0210 
0.4623   0.1012 
LIBOR   0.0574  0.0093 
 0.1390  0.8259 
Industrial Clustering   0.0065*** 0.0070*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 
     
Likelihood Ratio 150.02 151.74 166.30 169.66 
Pr> χ <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Wald Test 147.70 149.25 160.45 163.83 
Pr> χ <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
N 306/10,743 306/10,743 306/10,743 306/10,743 
Note: The sample includes 306 target firms and 2,645 unique non-target firms. The logistic analysis is 
based on logit regression model which as: 
     (    )     (
    
      
)  ∑  
   
   
The dependent variable is log of odd ratio of firm i belong to event j which is equal to 1 if the firm is 
target and 0 otherwise. The significance of the model is tested by maximize likelihood method and the 
likelihood ratio is reported. Xi is the set of independent variables. There are three factors tested. Market 
P/E ratio is the de-trended annual P/E ratio of FTSE ALL SHARE 30 days before the announcement; 
LIBOR is the annual LIBOR 30 days before the announcement; Industrial Clustering is the number of 
deal of listed target in sample firm’s industrial same year as the sample firm’s announcement year. 
Industry, which is classified based on Fama French 12 Industries Classification, is set as categorical 
variable of logistic analysis in order to control the fixed effect. The significance of the coefficient is 
tested by using Chi-statistics for logistic analysis. “***”, “**”, and “*” represents significant level of 1, 


















Table 4.4 cont. 
Panel B Multivariate Analysis 
  Market Factor 
  (Pr>|t|) 
Intercept 1.6933*** 1.4321*** 1.4617*** 1.8408*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Market P/E ratio -0.0186***   -0.0193*** 
0.0021   0.0012 
LIBOR   -0.0081  -0.0161 
 0.7168  0.4885 
Industrial Clustering   -0.0114* -0.0109* 
  0.0676 0.0871 
     
F Value 8.24 0.13 1.93 3.58 
Pr>F 0.0044 0.7168 0.1655 0.0143 
R-Square 2.72% 0.04% 0.65% 3.53% 
Adj R-Sq 2.39% -0.29% 0.31% 2.55% 
N 297 297 297 297 
Note: The sample includes 306 target firms (the number of observations for each regression may vary 
according to the available data of control variables). The multivariate analysis of target gains is 
estimated by using the OLS regression model as: 
Premium= α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
The dependent variable Premium is calculated as deal value divided by the market value of acquired 
shares 30 days before the announcement. The significance of model is reported based on F-statistics, 
and both R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported. Xi is the set of independent variables. There are three factors 
tested. Market P/E ratio is the de-trended annual P/E ratio of FTSE ALLSHARE 30 days before the 
announcement; LIBOR is the annual LIBOR 30 days before the announcement; Industrial Clustering is 
the number of deal of listed target in sample firm’s industrial same year as the sample firm’s 
announcement year. The outliers are controlled by studentized residual method and the significance of 
the coefficient is tested by using t-statistics. “***”, “**”, and “*” represents significant level of 1, 5, 










in the size of the premium that it offers for a target firm. For the industrial clustering 
variable, the increase in acquisition activity is a logical response to changes in the 
industrial environment. Such changes create growth opportunities that favour 
particular types of firms, and these firms are most likely to become acquirers or 
acquired. Changes in the environment may also put some firms in a less favourable 
position. Changes in the industrial environment shift bargaining power from target 
firms to acquiring firms and the deals during industrial clustering are result in lower 
premiums. 
To test how different types of factors interact with each other, and to find out the 
most significant variables, we use all our control variables38. The results are shown in 
Tables 4.5 Panel A and B. For the analysis of the likelihood of sale, we find that 
director age, years of service, shareholding, and firm liquidity all have significant 
coefficients. For the OLS analysis, job security, shareholding, firm liquidity, market 
P/E ratio, and industrial clustering are important dominant effect. Except for director 
age in the logistic analysis and shareholding in the OLS analysis, all other variables 
have significant effects, consistent with our earlier investigation. The results indicate 
that the same variable does not necessarily have a dominant effect on both the 
likelihood of sale and the gains from sale. For instance, years of service influences a 
director’s incentive on whether to agree to sell the firm, and this factor has a 
significant effect during the decision making process. Once the decision to sell is 
made, other factors, job security for example, start to reveal a dominant effect on the 
selling price. Looking at the overall results, we find that shareholding, firm liquidity, 
and industrial clustering have a significant influence on both the decision making and 
the valuation process. This finding suggests that concentration of ownership, financial  
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 Because the market factor analysis is used as the categorical variable to control the fixed effect for 
logistic analysis, the market variables are not included in Table 5 Panel A. 




Table 4.5 All Factors, Likelihood of Sale, and Gains from Sale 
Panel A Logistic Analysis 
  All Factors (excl. Market) 
  (Pr>|t|) 
Intercept  -1.0336** 
 0.0404 
Director Age  -0.0233*** 
 0.0016 
Years of Service   -0.0798*** 
 <.0001 
Director’s Ownership  -3.2267 
 0.7658 
Shareholding  -0.0238*** 
 <.0001 
Controlling Director 
     (1 if director is also the controlling  
      shareholder) 
 0.0571 
 0.9029 
P/E ratio  -0.0001 
 0.6972 
Liquidity  -0.0866*** 
 0.0029 
Intangibles  -0.0019 
 0.7803 
   
Likelihood Ratio  184.81 
Pr> χ  <.0001 
Wald Test  130.45 
Pr> χ  <.0001 
N  261/7,213 
Note: The sample includes 306 target firms and 2,645 unique non-target firms. The logistic analysis is 
based on logit regression model which as: 
     (    )     (
    
      
)  ∑  
   
   
The dependent variable is log of odd ratio of firm i belong to event j which is equal to 1 if the firm is 
target and 0 otherwise. The significance of the model is tested by maximize likelihood method and the 
likelihood ratio is reported. Xi is the set of independent variables. Director Age is the biological age of 
selected directors for sample firm; Years of Service as a Director is the years of which the selected 
director has been in director position till the event date; Director’s Ownership is the percentage of 
shares held by selected director; Shareholding the percentage of ownership held by the largest 
shareholder; Controlling Director is the dummy which equals to 1 if the controlling shareholder is also 
a director, 0 otherwise; P/E ratio is the de-trended annual P/E ratio of sample firm 30 days before the 
announcement; Liquidity is the liquidity ratio of the sample firm before the announcement, and is 
calculated as the difference between current asset and inventory divided by current liability; 
Intangibles is the intangible assets to total assets of the sample firm before the announcement. Year is 
set as categorical variable of logistic analysis in order to control the fixed effect. The significance of 
the coefficient is tested by using Chi-statistics for logistic analysis. “***”, “**”, and “*” represents 
significant level of 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. Due to the different categorical variable which is 










Table 4.5 cont. 
Panel B Multivariate Analysis  
  All Factors 
 (Pr>|t|) 
Intercept  1.7347*** 
 <.0001 
Director Age  0.0005 
 0.8820 
Years of Service   -0.0023 
 0.7366 
Director’s Ownership  1.0762 
 0.4562 
Job Security  -0.1518*** 
 0.0059 
Gender  -0.1631 
 0.2015 
Shareholding  0.0062* 
 0.0968 
Controlling Shareholder 
(Interactive variable which equals to the percentage of shareholding  if top 




(1 if director is also the controlling shareholder) 
 0.0884 
 0.7199 
P/E ratio  0.0001 
 0.1628 
Liquidity  -0.0279*** 
 0.0002 
Intangibles  0.1591 
 0.1612 
Market P/E ratio  -0.0154*** 
 0.0086 
LIBOR   -0.0129 
 0.6075 
Industrial Clustering  -0.0161** 
 0.0170 
   
F Value  2.37 
Pr>F  0.0043 
R-Square  12.08% 
Adj R-Sq  6.98% 
N  256 
Note: The sample includes 306 target firms (the number of observations for each regression may vary 
according to the available data of control variables). The multivariate analysis of target gains is 
estimated by using the OLS regression model as: 
Premium= α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
The dependent variable Premium is calculated as deal value divided by the market value of acquired 
shares 30 days before the announcement. The significance of model is reported based on F-statistics, 
and both R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported. Xi is the set of independent variables; Director Age is the 
biological age of selected directors for sample firm; Years of Service as a Director is the years of 
which the selected director has been in director position till the event date; Director’s Ownership is the 
percentage of shares held by selected director; Job Security is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if 
the director continue to work in merged entity for at least one year after the effective date; and Gender 
is the gender of selected director; Shareholding the percentage of ownership held by the largest 
shareholder; Controlling Shareholder is an Interactive variable which equals to the percentage of 
shareholding if top shareholder is also the controlling shareholder, 0 otherwise; Controlling Director is 
the dummy which equals to 1 if the controlling shareholder is also a director, 0 otherwise; P/E ratio is 
the de-trended annual P/E ratio of sample firm 30 days before the announcement; Liquidity is the 
liquidity ratio of the sample firm before the announcement, and is calculated as the difference between 
current asset and inventory divided by current liability; Intangibles is the intangible assets to total 
assets of the sample firm before the announcement; Market P/E ratio is the de-trended annual P/E ratio 




of FTSE ALLSHARE 30 days before the announcement; LIBOR is the annual LIBOR 30 days before 
the announcement; Industrial Clustering is the number of deal of listed target in sample firm’s 
industrial same year as the sample firm’s announcement year. The outliers are controlled by 
studentized residual method and the significance of the coefficient is tested by using t-statistics. “***”, 























ability to cover the firm’s liabilities, and industrial change are three important aspects 
in understanding the intention to, and outcome from, the sale of the firm.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This study investigates on owners’ decision to sell their firm, and how the gains 
received by the shareholders of the target company are affected. We analyse why the 
decision makers want/agree to sell the firm and how they can benefit from such a sale. 
We find that three types of factors, director and shareholder factor, corporate factor 
and market factor have a significant effect on the likelihood of the sale and the 
premium received from the sale. A director’s years of service, percentage of 
ownership held by the largest shareholder and the corporate liquidity ratio all 
significantly reduce the likelihood of the sale of the firm. The extent to which other 
firms in the same industry are taken over also affects the chance of a sale. For gains 
from the sale, the director’s job security, the controlling shareholder’s shareholding, 
the corporate liquidity ratio, the market P/E ratio and industrial clustering all have a 
negative relationship with the size of the premium received by the target. The extent 
of director’s ownership and size of intangible assets also affect the premium.  
Our finding has several implications. First, agency issues exist in target firms and 
have a significant effect on the decision to sell the firm as well as the size of the 
premium paid by the acquirer. The directors of the firm are affected by their 
executive power accumulated over the years and the potential job risk in the merged 
firm in the post-takeover period. If such issues can be reduced or resolved, the 
directors may be willing to cooperate with the acquirers by accepting a lower 
premium. Secondly, the shareholders of the firm will choose the best option in 
maximizing their wealth by considering the related risk and returns. As our results 
show, the shareholders of the firm require a higher premium to compensate for the 




possible lost income and may accept a lower premium if future growth of the merged 
firm can be shared. Individual shareholders may reveal high risk aversion and prefer 
certainty by accepting cash as the dominant payment mode, while corporate 
shareholders are looking from a more strategic point of view and accept the stock as 
payment with a view to sharing potential synergies. Moreover, the acquisition activity 
is largely determined by the market environment. Changes in the market environment 
reflect changes in investors’ sentiment and industrial structure, and such changes 
result in corporate restructuring.  
 




Chapter 5  Acquisitions of Private Acquirers 
5.1 Introduction 
M&A activity involving listed companies has been widely examined. However, 
relatively little work has related to private acquirers. The Thomson One Banker 
M&As database reveals that for the UK over the past two decades, private acquirers 
participated in around 34 per cent of all acquisitions. To our knowledge, the only 
empirical study that investigates the effect of an acquirer’s listed status is Bargeron, et 
al. (2008). Bargeron, et al. (2008) investigate the difference in the size of premium 
paid by public and private acquirers and find that private firm acquirers pay less than 
public firm acquirers. Their study suggests that the main determinant of the lower 
premium paid by private acquirers is the ownership structure of both the acquiring 
and target firm. According to Bargeron, et al. (2008), concentrated ownership in the 
acquiring firm is related to a lower premium, whilst dispersion of ownership of the 
target firm reduces the selling premium. The managers may be more willing to 
cooperate, and such firms become targets of the private acquirer. Bargeron, et al. 
(2008) study examines the U.S. market, there appears to be no evidence available for 
the UK. In addition to concentrated ownership, private acquirers also feature low 
liquidity (Antoniou, et al., 2007). The low liquidity of private acquirers can impose 
financial constraints and limit their ability to finance deals. In our sample, over 93 per 
cent of the private acquirers engage in cash only deals compared to around 45 per 
cent of public acquirers. Whether this financing constraint leads private acquirers to 
take over specific type of targets, and the type of target that attracts private acquirers 
is of interest and may enhance our understanding of overall takeover activity. 
Antoniou, et al. (2008), suggest that market valuation affects takeover behaviour. The 
previous chapter found that a market factor affects the takeover premium. Together 




with the possible financial constraints, private acquirers may engage in takeovers 
under particular market conditions, and this may also help us to answer the question 
of why private acquirers behave differently from public acquirers.  
We construct a sample of 127 UK domestic takeover deals from 2004 to 2011 with 51 
deals involving private acquirers and 76 deals involving public acquirers. Among our 
sample deals, we find that private acquirers pay less for a target than public acquirers. 
The targets of private acquirers are offered 15 per cent less than the targets of public 
acquirers and the difference in premium offered by acquirers is greatest for cash only 
deals. We suggest that deal, target and market characteristics have substantial effects 
on the size of the premium offered by acquirers as well as on the likelihood of 
involvement of private acquirers. Private acquirers may engage in acquisitions for 
different purposes than public acquirers. Private acquirers, for example, may take 
over a shell public firm in order to acquire listed status at lower costs than for an IPO. 
Private acquirers in reverse takeovers offer a lower (average) premium (0.9) than all 
other acquirers (1.3). Private acquirers are also more likely to walk away from deals 
than public acquirers. In our sample, deals involving withdrawal of one party are 
more likely to be associated with demands for a higher premium and the targets in 
these deals are more likely to receive competing offers. Private acquirers are more 
cautious with regard to cost control and do not face a negative reaction from outside 
investors if the deals are withdraw. Additionally, the absence of market pressure 
implies that private acquirers are less likely to encounter the winner’s curse (Giliberto 
and Varaiya, 1989). This enables private acquirers to avoid overpaying for a target. 
Furthermore, private acquirers are more likely to secure a job for the directors of the 
target in the merged entity in the post-acquisition period. The direct effect of offering 
job security to the directors of the target is to reduce the purchasing premium. Job 
security enhances the target director’s personal interests and the possible conflict of 




interest between the directors’ and the shareholders’ in the listed targets makes the 
directors willing to cooperate and facilitate the acquisition, and accept a lower 
premium. Finally, although we find that market factors including the market P/E ratio, 
the borrowing rate and the industrial clustering affect the premium offered by 
acquirers, the market factors have no significant differentiable effect on the 
involvement of private acquirers. This suggests that the involvement of private 
acquirers and the difference in premium paid by private and public acquirers are 
mainly driven by the deal and target characteristics. 
This study is structured as follow. Following the introduction, we discuss how our 
hypotheses are developed. Section 3 describes the data collected, the methodology 
adopted, and the control variables we use for our analysis. The results and the 
discussion of our findings are in section 4. Section 5 is the conclusion. 
5.2 Hypotheses Developed 
A well-recognized corporate characteristic that distinguishes the private firm from the 
public firm is the concentration of ownership in a few hands (Bargeron, et al., 2008; 
Boot, et al., 2006; Draper and Paudyal, 2006). Research studies, including Jensen 
(1986) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), suggest that managers may use the firm’s 
resource to finance acquisitions in order to achieve personal objectives. Boot, et al. 
(2006) find that even though disagreements exist in private firms, such disagreements 
are not caused by a divergence of objectives. In this case, we would expect that 
private ownership can reduce agency costs below those of the public firms and 
enhance the bargaining power of private acquirers during the negotiations involved in 
a takeover. Thus, we suggest the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Private acquirers offer less than public acquirers. 




One question raised by Bargeron, et al. (2008) is why targets accept offers from 
private acquirers rather than selling out to public acquirers in order to gain a higher 
premium. We suggest that the private acquirers may engage in different type of 
takeovers and may acquire different type of targets from those of public listed 
acquirers. Investment in private firms is characterised by less liquid ownership (Boot, 
et al., 2006). More liquid ownership and a lower cost of raising capital are advantages 
of public listed firms. Such advantages can encourage the owners of private firms to 
move from private to public ownership. Although the most common approach to 
going public is through an initial public offering (IPO), a reverse takeover provides an 
alternative with a similar outcome. Adjei, et al. (2008) suggests that a reverse 
takeover is a cheaper and faster process for the private firm which does not meet 
listing requirements to go public, and one tenth of private firms chose a reverse 
takeover as a way of accessing the capital market, according to their sample. In 
addition, Gleason, et al. (2005) finds that reverse takeovers involve poorly performing 
public firms. This result supports the cost saving argument. If cost saving is a major 
consideration for the private firm causing them to engage in a reverse takeover, 
poorly performing public firms are ideal “Shell” candidates which can be acquired 
cheaply.  
Private acquirers also have limitations on the method of payment. Bargeron, et al. 
(2008) find that private acquirers pay less than public acquirers based on an 
investigation of cash only deals. Bargeron, et al. (2008) suggest the use of 
comparisons based on the same method of payment because private firm are not 
publicly traded. However, the mode of payment not only reflects the acquirer’s 
financial status but also reflects possible asymmetric information between the 
acquirer and the target. Hansen (1987) suggests that acquirers would prefer offering 
stock if the target is likely to have proprietary information.  Because the option of 




using stock to finance a takeover in which the target has asymmetric information, is 
not available for the private acquirer, private acquirers may only acquire targets with 
less uncertainty as to their value. Additionally, Davidson III and Cheng (1997), 
among others, find that target firms experience higher gains when shareholders 
receive cash and earn less when shareholders receive stock. Thus, Bargeron, et al.’s 
(2008) finding that private acquirers pay less than public acquirers may not be 
generalised to overall acquisition activities.  
If cost control is a major consideration when private acquirers make bids, private 
acquirers may be more likely to drop the bid if the price becomes too high. This is 
also suggested by Bargeron, et al. (2008) but not well investigated. Furthermore, 
Bargeron, et al. (2008) find that private acquirers choose targets where the managers 
are willing to cooperate. Our previous chapter finds that job security has a significant 
negative relationship with the premium paid by the acquirers. In this case, we expect 
private acquirers to be more likely to offer job security to the directors of the target 
firm. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Private acquirers act differently from public acquirers. The deal and 
characteristics of the target affect the premium offered by the acquirer and the 
likelihood of involvement of private acquirers.  
We also suggest that the takeover activities of private acquirers can be affected by 
market conditions. Market valuation and industrial clustering can significantly affect 
the value of the target and the premium paid by the acquirer. Private acquirers may 
choose to engage in the acquisition market in particular market condition in order to 
control costs. Another important market factor is the borrowing rate. Private firms 
have limited options with regard to finance. The absence of publicly traded shares 
means that private firms are likely to rely on debt financing. In such a case, the 




market borrowing rate directly affects the private acquirers financing ability, and can 
also affect the timing of their involvement.  
Hypothesis 3: Market conditions affect both the timing of the involvement of private 
acquirers and the premium offered. 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
5.3.1 Data 
Deal information is collected from Thomson One Banker. Date covers the period 
from the beginning of 2004 to the end of 2011. The targets are listed firms and the 
acquirers are both listed and unlisted. Both acquiring and target firms are UK 
domiciled firms. Completed and unsuccessful bids are included. We remove the deals 
without information on either the effective date or withdrawal date. If the deal does 
not have completed information as to the payment mode, the deal is removed from 
our sample. We also require the percentage owned by the acquirer after the takeover 
to be over 50 per cent and the percentage owned by the acquirer prior to the takeover 
to be less than 50. This leaves us 609 deals. Target firms are required to have a valid 
ISIN code and available stock information, including stock price and trading volume 
available from Datastream for at least one year before the announcement date. Date 
information, including date of incorporation, IPO date and/or delisted date, and 
director and ownership information, are collected from Fame. Financial information 
relating to the target is collected from Worldscope. If the target firm does not have the 
required information, the deal is not included in our sample. The final sample 
includes 127 deals of which 76 are made by the public acquirers and 51 by the private 
acquirers. Among 95 completed deals, private acquirers are engaged in 33 deals and 
public acquirers are engaged in 62 deals. 





This study investigates why private acquirers pay less (on average) than public 
acquirers. The analysis is carried out in two stages. The first stage investigates the 
factors that affect the size of the premium paid by acquirers, regardless of the listing 
status of the acquirers. To estimate the relationship between the control factors and 
the target premium, we adopt a regression model of the form: 
Premium = α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
where Xi is the set of independent variables and the dependent variable, Premium, is 
calculated as the deal value divided by the market value of the total target’s shares 
acquired.  
The second stage of the analysis is the use of discriminant analysis to investigate how 
the control factors relate to the likelihood of involvement of the private acquirers. We 
use binary logistic regression for the likelihood estimation: 
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where      is the probability that firm i belong to outcome j (1 if the acquirer is a 
public acquirer, and 0 otherwise);    is the vector of measured independent variables 
of firm i ;    is the vector of parameters of distinctive independent variables; (
    
      
) 
is the odds ratio. The normalization   =0 is imposed in order to estimate the 
parameters. The parameters are estimated using the Proc Logistic function in SAS, 
and interpretation of the results is based on the output produced by maximum 
likelihood estimation within the function.  




We suggest that private acquirers pay less than public acquirers and that different 
types of factors, namely the deal characteristics, target characteristics and market 
characteristics, can help explain why the difference in premium paid by private and 
public acquirers exists. 12 control variables are used and each control variable is 
classified as belonging to one of three types of characteristics. 
Draper and Paudyal (1999) and Davidson III and Cheng (1997), amongst others, find 
that the deal characteristics have a significant effect on the gains accruing to takeover 
participants. Investigation of the deal characteristics can help us understand whether 
the difference in the premium, if any, paid by the private and public acquirers is due 
to private acquirers engaging in different type of takeovers, or behaving differently 
during the acquisition process. Four deal variables are used in our analysis. The mode 
of payment includes cash and stock. Cash Only is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
if the deal is 100 per cent financed by cash and 0 otherwise, and Stock Only is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal is 100 per cent financed by stock 
and 0 otherwise. Reverse is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is a reverse 
takeover and 0 otherwise. A reverse takeover is taken to occur if the acquirer is a 
private firm and the target is not delisted within 3 months of the effective date of the 
deal. Withdrawal is a dummy variable relating to deal status. If the deal is eventually 
withdrawn, then Withdrawal is equal to 1 and 0 otherwise.  
In addition to the deal characteristics, we argue that private acquirers pay differently 
from public acquirers because the two groups take over different type of targets, and 
these effects should be captured by the characteristics of the target. We classify target 
characteristics into two: Uncertainty and ownership factors. For the uncertainty factor, 
we test how the volume of turnover and the value of the intangible assets of the target 
affect the premium offered by the acquirers and the likelihood of involvement by 




private acquirers. Volume is the annual average share volume turnover calculated as 
the annual average of the daily value of the target shares traded divided by the daily 
market value of the target. Intangibles is the ratio of the value of the target’s 
intangible assets divided by the value of total assets of the target, one year before 
announcement39. Ownership information on the target is collected from BvD Fame. 
Largest Shareholder is the percentage ownership held by the largest shareholder of 
the target firm. Director Ownership is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
director is also a shareholder of the target and 0 otherwise. Job Security is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the director still holds the position at least one year 
after the takeover effective date and 0 otherwise40. 
Three market variables are used. Market P/E ratio is a proxy for the market valuation 
and is the de-trended annual FTSE All Share P/E ratio 30 days before the takeover 
date. LIBOR is the proxy for the market borrowing rate and is the annual average 
LIBOR rate 30 days before the announcement date of each takeover. Industrial 
Clustering is calculated as the number of takeovers in each sample firm’s industry in 
the same year as the takeover date of each deal, and industries are classified 
according to the Fama-French 12 industries classification. 
5.4 Results and Discussions 
To find whether there is a difference in the premium offered between private and 
public acquirers, we compare the mean of the premium offered by each type of 
acquirer. As the majority of the deals made by private acquirers are fully financed by 
                                                          
39
 According to Worldscope, intangibles (source code 02649) includes goodwill, patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, formulae, franchises of no specific duration, capitalized software development 
costs/computer programmes, organizational costs, customer lists, licenses of no specific duration, 
capitalized advertising cost, mastheads (newspapers), capitalized servicing rights, and purchased 
servicing right. 
40
 We select the director with the longest years of service in each target firm. For more discussion 
about this selection criteria please refer to the previous chapter. 




cash, and the findings of Bargeron, et al. (2008) is based on cash only deals, we first 
of all compare the target premium of the cash only deals made by private and public 
acquirers. Table 5.1 Panel A, reveals that private acquirers offer 16 per cent less than 
public acquirers. In case the difference only exists when the deal is financed by cash, 
we also compare the premium between private acquirers of cash deals and public 
acquirers of stock deals. Although the difference is smaller, public stock acquirers 
still offer more. Overall, private acquirers offer 15 per cent less than public acquirers. 
However, although there is an observable difference in the premium offered by 
private and public acquirers, the difference is insignificant according to our t-statistics 
and multivariate analysis. We carry out the same test on the sample of all completed 
deals (Table 5.1 Panel B).  We find that the difference in the premium is larger than 
suggested by the results based on all sample deals, but the t-test fails to suggest any 
statistical significance at conventional levels. The multivariate analysis (Table 5.2) 
reveals a significant coefficient according to the acquirers listed status. For cash only 
deals, the private acquirer reduces the premium offered by 24 per cent, and 17 per 
cent for all deals. Both figures are significant at the 5 per cent level. The results for 
the multivariate analysis are insignificant41. To find out why private acquirers offer 
less than public acquirers, we investigate how different deal, target and market 
characteristics affect the premium paid by the acquirer and how these characteristics 
affect the likelihood of receiving an offer from a private acquirer.  
                                                          
41
 We also carried out a similar test based on cash dominated deals and stock dominated deals, which 
are defined as if the proportion of cash is over 50 per cent of the payment and if the proportion of the 
stock is over 50 per cent. The results are consistent with the findings reported. 




Table 5.1 Takeover Premium by Public Acquirers and Private Acquirers 
(Univariate Analysis) 
Panel A All sample deals 
  Premium  
 Public cash acquirer Private cash acquirer Difference 
Mean 1.4154 1.2526 0.1628 
Pr>|t|   0.2037 
N 34 47  
 Public stock acquirer Private cash acquirer difference 
Mean 1.3016 1.2526 0.0490 
Pr>|t|   0.7306 
N 24 47  
 All public acquirer All private acquirer Difference 
Mean 1.4030 1.2495 0.1534 
Pr>|t|   0.1390 
N 76 51  
    
Panel B Completed sample deals 
  Premium  
 Public cash acquirer Private cash acquirer Difference 
Mean 1.4267 1.2075 0.2192 
Pr>|t|   0.1735 
N 29 30  
 Public stock acquirer Private cash acquirer difference 
Mean 1.3191 1.2075 0.1116 
Pr>|t|   0.5482 
N 19 30  
 All public acquirer All private acquirer Difference 
Mean 1.4237 1.2062 0.2175 
Pr>|t|   0.1091 
N 62 33  
Note: The full sample includes 127 deals of which 76 are made by the public acquirers and 51 are 
made by the private acquirers. Among 95 completed deals, 62 deals are made by the public acquirers 
and 33 deals are made by the private acquirers. The results represented in this table are the comparison 
of the premium paid by different type of acquirers. Public cash acquirers are the public acquirers of 
cash only deals; public stock acquirers are the public acquirers of stock only deals; private cash 
acquirers are the private acquirers of cash only deals; Premium is calculated as the deal value divided 
by the target market value 30 days before the announcement date. The significance of the different is 
calculated by the t-test and the equality of variance is tested. If the variances are significant different, 
the significance of the difference is reported based on Satterthwaite method, otherwise Pooled method 










Table 5.2 Takeover Premium by Public Acquirers and Private Acquirers 
(Multivariate Analysis) 
Panel A All sample deals 
  Premium  
  (Pr>|t|)  
 Cash acquirer Public stock acquirer 
& private cash acquirer 
All acquirer 
Intercept 1.3571*** 1.2232*** 1.2971*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Acquirer dummy 
(1 if private, 0 otherwise) 
-0.0844 0.0496 -0.0293 
0.3174 0.5400 0.6354 
    
F Value 1.01 0.34 0.22 
Pr>F 0.3179 0.5646 0.6368 
R-Square 1.35% 0.52% 0.19% 
Adj R-Sq 0.01% -1.03% -0.66% 
N 76 66 118 
    
Panel B Completed deals 
  Premium  
  (Pr>|t|)  
 Cash acquirer Public stock acquirer 
& private cash acquirer 
All acquirer 
Intercept 1.3584*** 1.2198*** 1.2937*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Acquirer dummy 
(1 if private, 0 otherwise) 
-0.2458** -0.1073 -0.1735** 
0.0276 0.3384 0.0490 
    
F Value 4.92 0.78 4.41 
Pr>F 0.0307 0.3830 0.0387 
R-Square 8.21% 1.70% 4.77% 
Adj R-Sq 6.54% -0.49% 3.69% 
N 57 47 89 
Note: The full sample includes 127 deals of which 76 are made by the public acquirers and 51 are 
made by the private acquirers. Among 95 completed deals, 62 deals are made by the public acquirers 
and 33 deals are made by the private acquirers. The multivariate analysis is based on the OLS 
estimation: 
Premium= α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
where Xi is the set of independent variables and the dependent variable, Premium, is calculated as the 
deal value divided by the market value of the total target’s shares acquired. Acquirer dummy is a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the acquirer is a private acquirer and 0 otherwise. Cash acquirers 
are the acquirers of cash only deals; public stock acquirers are the public acquirers of stock only deals; 
private cash acquirers are the private acquirers of cash only deals. The significance of model is 
reported based on F-statistics, and both R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported. The outliers are controlled by 
studentized residual method (<2) and the significance of the coefficient is tested by using t-statistics. 
“***”, “**”, and “*” represents significant level of 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. 




5.4.1 Deal Characteristics 
Mode of payment is an important factor in determining the premium offered to a 
target. Our hypothesis suggests that the acquirers may choose different financing 
methods related to uncertainty as to the potential synergy. Davidson III and Cheng 
(1997) and Draper and Paudyal (1999), among others, find that targets gain more 
when deals are financed with cash. According to Table 5.3 Panel A, the premium 
received by the target is improved when the deal is fully financed with cash. The 
increase in the premium is over 5 per cent across all sample deals (Table 5.3 Panel A) 
and over 2 per cent for the sample of completed deals (Table 5.3 Panel B). The stock 
payment is negatively related to the premium, which is consistent with the previous 
argument that the target receives a low price when the deal is financed with shares. 
The reverse takeover factor is only tested on completed deals as it can only be 
identified with information of the target’s listed status after the effective date. Our 
results show that private acquirers in reverse takeovers offer a significantly lower 
premium than others regardless of the public status of the acquiring firm. We carry 
out an additional test to compare the premium offered to targets where the private 
acquirers are involved in reverse takeovers with public firms, and between private 
acquirers involved in reverse takeovers with other private acquirers. We find (Table 
5.4) that private acquirers involved in reverse takeovers offer significantly less than 
public acquirers. On average, private acquirers in reverse takeovers offer about 50 per 
























Table 5.3 Factors Affecting Takeover Premium (Multivariate Analysis) 
Panel A All sample deals 
 Control variables 
  (Pr>|t|) 




Reverse Withdrawal Volume  
(%) 













Intercept 1.2432*** 1.2878*** n.a. 1.2443*** 1.3717*** 1.2588*** 1.2257*** 1.2592*** n.a. 1.3592*** 1.4312*** 1.3659*** 
<.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Premium 0.0503 -0.0646  0.1174* -0.2312** 0.0638 0.0007 0.0496  -0.0045 -0.3608 -0.0010 
0.3622 0.3513  0.0522 0.0182 0.5323 0.6008 0.4392  0.3449 0.0368 0.0077 
             
F Value 0.71 0.80  3.32 5.27 0.31 0.38 0.65  0.93 2.87 6.24 
Pr>F 0.4002 0.3735  0.0709 0.0235 0.5788 0.5386 0.4203  0.3361 0.0927 0.0139 
R-Square 0.61% 0.68%  2.79% 4.38% 0.27% 0.33% 0.56%  0.80% 2.42% 5.14% 
Adj R-Sq -0.25% -0.17%  1.95% 3.55% -0.59% -0.54% -0.30%  -0.06% 1.58% 4.32% 
N 118 118  118 118 118 118 118  118 118 118 
Note: The full sample includes 127 deals of which 76 are made by the public acquirers and 51 are made by the private acquirers. The multivariate analysis is based on the OLS 
estimation: 
Premium= α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
where Xi is the set of independent variables and the dependent variable, Premium, is calculated as the deal value divided by the market value of the total target’s shares acquired. 
Cash Only is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the deal is 100 per cent financed by cash and 0 otherwise; Stock Only is a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is 100 
per cent financed by stock and 0 otherwise; Reverse is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is a reverse takeover and 0 otherwise. The deal is defined as a reverse takeover if 
the acquirer is a private acquirer and the target is not delisted within 3 months after the effective date of the deal; Withdrawal is equal to 1 if the deal is withdrawn and 0 otherwise; 
Volume is the annual average volume turnover which is calculated as the annual average of the daily value of the target shares traded divided by the daily market value of the 
target; Intangibles is the ratio of the value of the target intangibles divided by the value of total assets of the target one year before the announcement; Largest Shareholder is the 
percentage ownership held by the largest shareholder of the target firm; Director Ownership is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the director is also a shareholder of the target 
and 0 otherwise; Job Security is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the director still holds the position at least one year after the takeover effective date and 0 otherwise; 
Market P/E ratio is the de-trended annual FTSE All Share P/E ratio 30 days before the takeover date; LIBOR is the annual average LIBOR rate 30 days before the announcement 
date of each takeover; Industrial Clustering is calculated as the number of takeovers in each sample firm’s industry in the same year as the takeover date of each deal, and 
industries are classified based on Fama-French 12 Industries Classification. Reverse and Job Security are not tested here as they can only be tested in the sample of completed 
deals. The significance of model is reported based on F-statistics, and both R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported. The outliers are controlled by studentized residual method (<2) and 

























Table 5.3 cont. 
 Panel B Completed sample deals 
  Control variables 
 (Pr>|t|) 




Reverse Withdrawal Volume  
(%) 












Intercept 1.2297*** 1.2686*** 1.2801*** n.a. 1.2979*** 1.2319*** 0.7631*** 1.2220*** 1.3272*** 1.2954*** 1.3764*** 1.3244*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0008 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Premium 0.0252 -0.0487 -0.3782**  -0.1513 0.1054 0.0052** 0.0911 -0.1677** -0.0027 -0.2717 -0.0008* 
0.7276 0.5715 0.0203  0.2841 0.4259 0.0238 0.3191 0.0170 0.6675 0.1574 0.0904 
             
F Value 0.10 0.29 6.08  1.08 0.54 5.50 1.08 5.35 0.18 1.01 2.28 
Pr>F 0.7534 0.5933 0.0156  0.3011 0.4661 0.0213 0.3016 0.0231 0.6702 0.3188 0.1348 
R-Square 0.11% 0.33% 6.61%  1.24% 0.62% 6.02% 1.23% 5.86% 0.21% 1.16% 2.58% 
Adj R-Sq -1.03% -0.83% 5.52%  0.09% -0.54% 4.92% 0.09% 4.76% -0.94% 0.01% 1.45% 
N 89 89 89  89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
Note: Among 95 completed deals, 62 deals are made by the public acquirers and 33 deals are made by the private acquirers. The multivariate analysis is based on the OLS 
estimation: 
Premium= α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
where Xi is the set of independent variables and the dependent variable, Premium, is calculated as the deal value divided by the market value of the total target’s shares acquired. 
Cash Only is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the deal is 100 per cent financed by cash and 0 otherwise; Stock Only is a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is 100 
per cent financed by stock and 0 otherwise; Reverse is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is a reverse takeover and 0 otherwise. The deal is defined as a reverse takeover if 
the acquirer is a private acquirer and the target is not delisted within 3 months after the effective date of the deal; Withdrawal is equal to 1 if the deal is withdrawn and 0 otherwise; 
Volume is the annual average volume turnover which is calculated as the annual average of the daily value of the target shares traded divided by the daily market value of the 
target; Intangibles is the ratio of the value of the target intangibles divided by the value of total assets of the target one year before the announcement; Largest Shareholder is the 
percentage ownership held by the largest shareholder of the target firm; Director Ownership is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the director is also a shareholder of the target 
and 0 otherwise; Job Security is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the director still holds the position at least one year after the takeover effective date and 0 otherwise; 
Market P/E ratio is the de-trended annual FTSE All Share P/E ratio 30 days before the takeover date; LIBOR is the annual average LIBOR rate 30 days before the announcement 
date of each takeover; Industrial Clustering is calculated as the number of takeovers in each sample firm’s industry in the same year as the takeover date of each deal, and 
industries are classified based on Fama-French 12 Industries Classification. Withdrawal is not tested here as it can only be tested among all sample deals. The significance of 
model is reported based on F-statistics, and both R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported. The outliers are controlled by studentized residual method (<2) and the significance of the 
coefficient is tested by using t-statistics. “***”, “**”, and “*” represents significant level of 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. 





















Table 5.4 Takeover Premium and Reverse Takeovers 
Panel A Univariate analysis 
 Premium 
 Public acquirer Reverse acquirer Difference 
Mean 1.4237 0.9019 0.5219* 
Pr>t   0.0653 
N 62 5  
 Non-reverse private acquirer Reverse acquirer Difference 
Mean 1.2606 0.9019 0.3587 
Pr>t   0.2621 
N 28 5  
 Non-reverse acquirer Reverse acquirer Difference 
Mean 1.3730 0.9019 0.4711 
Pr>t   0.1036 
N 90 5  
Note: Among 95 completed deals, 62 deals are made by the public acquirers and 33 deals are made by 
the private acquirers. The results represented in this table are the comparison of the premium paid by 
different type of acquirers. Reverse acquirers are the acquirers of reverse takeovers. The deal is defined 
as a reverse takeover if the acquirer is a private acquirer and the target is not delisted within 3 months 
after the effective date of the deal. Premium is calculated as the deal value divided by the target market 
value 30 days before the announcement date. The significance of the different is calculated by the t-test 
and the equality of variance is tested. If the variances are significant different, the significance of the 
difference is reported based on Satterthwaite method, otherwise Pooled method is used. “***”, “**”, 
and “*” represents significant level of 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5.4 cont. 
Panel B Multivariate analysis 
  Premium  
  (Pr>|t|)  
 Public acquirer 
& Reverse acquirer 
Private acquirer All acquirer 
Intercept 1.2937*** 1.1606*** 1.2801*** 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Reverse  
(1 if reverse takeover, 0 otherwise) 
-0.3918** -0.2587 -0.3782** 
0.0187 0.1514 0.0203 
    
F Value 5.90 1.57 6.08 
Pr>F 0.0181 0.2205 0.0156 
R-Square 8.82% 4.96% 6.61% 
Adj R-Sq 7.32% 1.79% 5.52% 
N 63 31 89 
Note: Among 95 completed deals, 62 deals are made by the public acquirers and 33 deals are made by 
the private acquirers. The multivariate analysis is based on the OLS estimation: 
Premium= α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
where Xi is the set of independent variables and the dependent variable, Premium, is calculated as the 
deal value divided by the market value of the total target’s shares acquired. Reverse is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the deal is a reverse takeover and 0 otherwise. The deal is defined as a reverse 
takeover if the acquirer is a private acquirer and the target is not delisted within 3 months after the 





 are reported. The outliers are controlled by studentized residual method (<2) and the 
significance of the coefficient is tested by using t-statistics. “***”, “**”, and “*” represents significant 
level of 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. 
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cent according to the multivariate analysis. The comparison between the private 
acquirers involved in reverse takeovers and other private acquirers reveals that 
although the difference in the premium is reduced, the private acquirers in reverse 
takeovers still offer 35 per cent and 25 per cent less according to the univariate 
analysis and multivariate analysis, respectively42.  
Bargeron, et al. (2008) suggests that one possible reason for private acquirers paying 
less than public acquirers is because private acquirers find it easier to walk away from 
a deal without the negative market response that public acquirers may suffer. Our 
result confirms Bargeron, et al. (2008)’s presumption. According to Table 5.3 Panel 
A and Table 5.5 Panel A, withdrawal deals are associated with a higher offered 
premium and private acquirers have a higher probability of withdrawing their bids. 
The finding on the withdrawal factor is consistent with our earlier univariate analysis. 
The difference in the average premium paid between private and public acquirers 
(Table 5.1) is enlarged when we move from examining all sample deals to examining 
completed deals. These results imply that the private acquirer is more likely to avoid 
overpayment than the public acquirer. One possible explanation for this phenomenon 
is that private firms have less issue with regard to the separation of ownership from 
control compared to public firms. The concentrated ownership and/or the closer 
alignment of objectives between the owners and managers can reduce the possible 
costs which are generated from agency incentives and/or hubris effects (Roll, 1986).
                                                          
42
 The average premium paid by the private acquirers of a reverse takeover is just over 90 per cent of 























Table 5.5 Factors affecting the likelihood of the Involvement of Private Acquirers 
Panel A All sample deals 
  Control variables 
 (Pr> |χ|) 




Reverse Withdrawal Volume  
(%) 














Intercept n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.6418*** -0.6490** -0.1060 0.9584 -0.4055* n.a. 0.0763 -0.7939 -0.5378* 
   0.0044 0.0218 0.6907 0.1683 0.0756  0.8996 0.2264 0.0725 
             
Acquirer dummy 
(1 if private, 0 
otherwise) 
   0.8360** 0.5992 -1.2382 -0.0157** -0.0220  -0.0261 0.8785 0.0013 
   0.0495 0.3865 0.1148 0.0365 0.9565  0.3975 0.5423 0.6526 
             
Likelihood Ratio    3.89 0.74 2.58 4.60 0.01  0.72 0.37 0.20 
Pr> χ    0.0484 0.3873 0.1078 0.0319 0.9565  0.3942 0.5387 0.6534 
Wald Test    3.85 0.75 2.48 4.37 0.01  0.71 0.37 0.20 
Pr> χ    0.0495 0.3865 0.1148 0.0365 0.9565  0.3975 0.5423 0.6526 
N    47/118 47/118 47/118 47/118 47/118  47/118 47/118 47/118 
Note: The full sample includes 127 deals of which 76 are made by the public acquirers and 51 are made by the private acquirers. The logistic analysis is based on logit regression 
model which as: 
     (    )     (
    
      
)  ∑  
   
   
where      is the probability that firm i belong to outcome j (1 if the acquirer is a private acquirer, and 0 otherwise);    is the vector of measured independent variables of firm i ; 
   is the vector of parameters of distinctive independent variables; (
    
      
) is the odds ratio; Cash Only is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the deal is 100 per cent financed 
by cash and 0 otherwise; Stock Only is a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is 100 per cent financed by stock and 0 otherwise; Reverse is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the deal is a reverse takeover and 0 otherwise. The deal is defined as a reverse takeover if the acquirer is a private acquirer and the target is not delisted within 3 months 
after the effective date of the deal; Withdrawal is equal to 1 if the deal is withdrawn and 0 otherwise; Volume is the annual average volume turnover which is calculated as the 
annual average of the daily value of the target shares traded divided by the daily market value of the target; Intangibles is the ratio of the value of the target intangibles divided by 
the value of total assets of the target one year before the announcement; Largest Shareholder is the percentage ownership held by the largest shareholder of the target firm; 
Director Ownership is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the director is also a shareholder of the target and 0 otherwise; Job Security is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if 























before the takeover date; LIBOR is the annual average LIBOR rate 30 days before the announcement date of each takeover; Industrial Clustering is calculated as the number of 
takeovers in each sample firm’s industry in the same year as the takeover date of each deal, and industries are classified based on Fama-French 12 Industries Classification. 
Reverse and Job Security are not tested here as they can only be tested in the sample of completed deals. Cash Only and Stock Only are not tested here because of the quasi-
complete separation of data points are detected by SAS. . The significance of the coefficient is tested by using Chi-statistics for logistic analysis. “***”, “**”, and “*” represents 







































Table 5.5 cont. 
Panel B Completed sample deals  
  Control variables 
 (Pr> |χ|) 




Reverse Withdrawal Volume  
(%) 












Intercept n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.5841* -0.4911 0.2634 -0.6257** -1.2040*** -0.4605 -0.9579 -0.9157** 
    0.0717 0.1165 0.8379 0.0154 0.0003 0.5158 0.2206 0.0104 
             
Acquirer dummy 
(1 if private, 0 otherwise) 
    -0.2923 -0.6833 -0.0097 -0.0029 1.2040** -0.0089 0.6859 0.0031 
    0.7507 0.4519 0.4675 0.9954 0.0102 0.8057 0.6885 0.3439 
             
Likelihood Ratio     0.10 0.57 0.51 0.00 6.84 0.06 0.16 0.88 
Pr> χ     0.7484 0.4471 0.4711 0.9954 0.0089 0.8053 0.6859 0.3460 
Wald Test     0.10 0.56 0.52 0.00 6.60 0.06 0.16 0.89 
Pr> χ     0.7507 0.4519 0.4675 0.9954 0.0102 0.8057 0.6885 0.3439 
N     31/89 31/89 31/89 31/89 31/89 31/89 31/89 31/89 
Note: Among 95 completed deals, 62 deals are made by the public acquirers and 33 deals are made by the private acquirers. The logistic analysis is based on logit regression 
model which as: 
     (    )     (
    
      
)  ∑  
   
   
where      is the probability that firm i belong to outcome j (1 if the acquirer is a private acquirer, and 0 otherwise);    is the vector of measured independent variables of firm i ; 
   is the vector of parameters of distinctive independent variables; (
    
      
) is the odds ratio; Cash Only is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the deal is 100 per cent financed 
by cash and 0 otherwise; Stock Only is a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is 100 per cent financed by stock and 0 otherwise; Reverse is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the deal is a reverse takeover and 0 otherwise. The deal is defined as a reverse takeover if the acquirer is a private acquirer and the target is not delisted within 3 months 
after the effective date of the deal; Withdrawal is equal to 1 if the deal is withdrawn and 0 otherwise; Volume is the annual average volume turnover which is calculated as the 
annual average of the daily value of the target shares traded divided by the daily market value of the target; Intangibles is the ratio of the value of the target intangibles divided by 
the value of total assets of the target one year before the announcement; Largest Shareholder is the percentage ownership held by the largest shareholder of the target firm; 
Director Ownership is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the director is also a shareholder of the target and 0 otherwise; Job Security is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if 
the director still holds the position at least one year after the takeover effective date and 0 otherwise; Market P/E ratio is the de-trended annual FTSE All Share P/E ratio 30 days 























takeovers in each sample firm’s industry in the same year as the takeover date of each deal, and industries are classified based on Fama-French 12 Industries Classification. 
Withdrawal is not tested here as it can only be tested in the sample of completed deals. Cash Only, Stock Only and Reverse are not tested here because of the quasi-complete 
separation of data points are detected by SAS. The significance of the coefficient is tested by using Chi-statistics for logistic analysis. “***”, “**”, and “*” represents significant 
level of 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. 





















Table 5.6 Competition, Withdrawal, Intangibles and Stock Payment 
Panel A Withdrawal and competition   
  Control Variable 
 (Pr> |χ|) 
  Competea 
Intercept  -1.5261 
 <.0001 
Withdrawal 
(1 if the deal is withdrawal, 0 otherwise) 
 1.7920*** 
 0.0001 
   
Likelihood Ratio  19.55 
Pr> χ  <.0001 
Wald Test  14.54 
Pr> χ  0.0001 
N  31/118 
 
Panel B Stock payment and intangibles 
 Control Variable 
 (Pr> |χ|) 
 Intangiblesa Intangiblesa Intangiblesb Intangiblesb 
Intercept -1.9393*** -1.9027*** -1.7504*** -1.6630*** 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Stock Only 1.8200** 1.7384** 1.4009 1.2335 
 0.0431 0.0462 0.1629 0.2044 
     
Likelihood Ratio 4.10 3.96 1.92 1.58 
Pr> χ 0.0428 0.0466 0.1649 0.2075 
Wald Test 4.09 3.97 1.94 1.61 
Pr> χ 0.0431 0.0462 0.1629 0.2044 
N 23/118 23/123 18/89 18/91 
 Note: The full sample includes 127 deals of which 76 are made by the public acquirers and 51 are 
made by the private acquirers. Among 95 completed deals, 62 deals are made by the public acquirers 
and 33 deals are made by the private acquirers. The logistic analysis is based on logit regression model 
which as: 
     (    )     (
    
      
)  ∑  
   
   
where      is the probability that firm i belong to outcome j;    is the vector of measured independent 
variables of firm i ;    is the vector of parameters of distinctive independent variables; (
    
      
) is the 
odds ratio. In Panel A, the dependent variable of Withdrawal takes value of 1 if the deal is withdrawn 
and 0 otherwise; the independent variable Compete is number of competing offers for each sample 
target. In Panel B, the dependent variable is Stock Only which equals 1 if the deal is fully financed by 
stock and 0 otherwise; the independent variable is the target Intangibles. The significance of the 
coefficient is tested by using Chi-statistics for logistic analysis. “***”, “**”, and “*” represents 
significant level of 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. 
a
 The estimation is based on all sample deals; 
b









Another explanation is that private acquirers are less likely to experience the winner’s 
curse. Giliberto and Varaiya (1989) suggest that there is a positive relationship 
between the number of competitors and the size of winning bids. If the target receives 
competing offers from other acquirers, the private acquirer can drop out of the 
competition to avoid overpaying. This may not be so easy for public acquirers. 
Studies, such as Dodd and Ruback (1977), find that the acquirer experiences large 
negative abnormal returns in the post-announcement period if the deal is withdrawn. 
The negative effect of withdrawal on the acquirer’s stock value is not applicable to 
private acquirers as they do not have publicly traded stocks. Thus, public acquirers 
may stay in the competition and pay a price that is higher than the target’s real value. 
To test whether withdrawal from a deal is caused by bidding competition, we use 
logistic analysis to estimate the likelihood of a deal being withdrawn given a number 
of competing offers. We find (Table 5.6 Panel A) that an increase in the number of 
competing offers significantly increases the log ratio of withdrawal by 1.8. Since 
withdrawal is more likely with private acquirers, this result confirms our argument 
that the private acquirer is more likely to walk away if the price is too high due to 
bidding competition. 
5.4.2 Target Characteristics 
Private acquirers may offer less than public acquirers simply because they are 
acquiring different type of target firms. To test this, we examine the characteristics of 
targets. According to our hypothesis, private acquirers mainly use cash as the mode of 
payment and may seek targets with lower asymmetric information. If this is the case, 
the premium offered by the private acquirer would be lower as the target can be 
valued more accurately. Table 5.3 Panel A and Table 5.5 Panel A reveals that the 
turnover by volume is negatively related to the target premium among all sample 




deals and has no significant effect on the likelihood of the involvement of private 
acquirers. No significant relationships are found for completed deals (Table 5.3 Panel 
B and Table 5.5 Panel B). For the value of intangible assets, we suggest that the effect 
of target intangibles is caused by their risk and return characteristics. A high value for 
intangibles implies future growth once the value of the intangibles can be realised. 
However, intangibles are also an uncertain feature of the target’s valuation. These 
characteristics of intangible assets explain why private and public acquirers behave 
differently. To deal with the uncertainty associated with the valuation of intangible 
assets, public acquirers can choose to use stock as the mode of payment (Hansen, 
1987). In addition, Roll (1986) suggests that overconfident managers may 
overestimate their ability and overpay the target’s shareholders. The value of 
intangible assets requires more analysis and judgement than valuing tangible assets. If 
the managers of the acquiring firm are overconfident or overvalue the intangible 
assets of the target, they are likely to offer a higher premium than to targets with a 
lower level of intangible assets. For private acquirers, using tradable stocks to finance 
the deal is simply not an option. Moreover, private acquirers may also have fewer 
agency issues because of the limited financing options available and the concentrated 
ownership. We find that the intangible assets of the target positively relate to the size 
of the premium offered by the acquirers. More importantly, the likelihood of 
involvement of private acquirers is reduced when the value of intangibles of the target 
is high. Table 5.6 Panel B shows that the value of the target’s intangible assets is 
significantly positively related to the likelihood of using the stock to finance the deal. 
These findings confirm our suggestion that private acquirers give greater 
consideration to certainty as to the target’s value when making bids. 
As the previous chapter has suggested, an increase in the proportion of shares held by 
the largest shareholder of the target should enhance the premium offered by acquirers 




when various characteristics are controlled. Bargeron, et al. (2008) also suggest that 
an increase in the concentration of ownership of the target leads to a higher premium 
being paid by public acquirers, whilst private acquirers are more involved in 
acquisitions in which the managers of the target are willing to cooperate. Our analysis 
arrives at a similar conclusion: as shown in Table 5.3, an increase in the level of the 
largest shareholder’s ownership in the target improves the premium received by the 
target. Table 5.5 also suggests that an increase in the level of the largest shareholder’s 
ownership in the target significantly decreases the probability of involvement of 
private acquirers. We also test the effect of director’s ownership of the target firm and 
find a similar result 43  (Table 5.3 and Table 5.5). These results imply that the 
concentration of ownership and the alignment of objectives between directors and 
shareholders may enhance the bargaining power of the target. This enhanced 
bargaining power can improve the selling price but private acquirers may avoid 
issuing bids for such targets or, if necessary, withdraw bids in order to control costs. 
To test whether private acquirers are more likely to engage in takeovers with the 
cooperation of the target directors, we investigate how the target director’s job 
security affects the premium received by the target and the likelihood of involvement 
of the private acquirer. Consistent with the finding in the previous chapter, in Table 
5.3 Panel B, job security of the target directors significantly reduces the premium 
paid by the acquirer. This suggests that the director of the target overrides the 
shareholders’ interests with his/her personal interests when a conflict of interest exists. 
The logistic analysis on the likelihood of involvement of private acquirers also 
confirms Bargeron, et al.’s (2008) suggestion of that private acquirers seek the target 
                                                          
43
 The target director’s ownership effect is based on the estimation of a director’s ownership dummy 
variable, which is equal to 1 if the target director is the longest served director and holds shares of the 
target firm, and 0 otherwise. We also test the percentage of the director’s shareholdings. The effect the 
likelihood of the engagement of private acquirer is consistent with the finding of the director’s 
ownership dummy but the effect on the premium received by the target is insignificant and inconsistent.  




director’s cooperation to facilitate the takeover. According to Table 5.5 Panel B, job 
security significantly increases the log ratio of involvement of the private acquirer by 
1.2 and this figure is statistically significant at a 5 per cent significance level. We 
suggest that the incentive of the private acquirer to offer a job to a target’s director 
may not be limited to considerations of cost control. As the corporate structure of a 
public firm is quite different from that of a private firm, offering a job to a target 
director in the merged firm may enhance the integration of the two firms in the post-
takeover period.  
5.4.3 Market Characteristics 
In addition to the deal and target characteristics, we suggest that market conditions 
can also influence the size of target gains and the involvement of private acquirers. 
Market factors are an important determinant of the value of the firm, its financing 
ability, and changes in industrial structure. As discussed previously, private acquirers 
are more cautious about cost control. If the overall market is potentially overvalued, 
this is not a desirable time for a private acquirer to enter the takeover market. The 
borrowing rate (LIBOR) is expected to have a negative relationship with the premium 
paid by the acquirer as expensive financing may cause acquirers to be reluctant to pay 
high prices, and may reduce the bargaining power of the target if the decision to sell 
is due to the requirement for additional funds. This negative relationship is expected 
to be more significant for private acquirers suggesting that private acquirers may be 
discouraged from engaging in the takeover market during periods when LIBOR is 
high as private acquirers rely heavily on debt financing. Moreover, industrial 
clustering creates an opportunity for acquirers to exploit additional growth. During a 
period of industrial clustering, the premium paid by the acquirer is expected to be low 
as the shift in market power may weaken the bargaining power of the target firm. For 




private acquirers, engaging in the takeover market during a period of industrial 
clustering may lead to benefits from the potential growth arising from the assets of 
the acquired firms. Although we found earlier that private acquirers are more likely to 
walk away if there are competing bids, and that the number of acquirers is likely to 
increase during period of industrial clustering, the increase in the number of target 
candidates may imply that private acquirers are not necessarily facing severe 
competition. Except for the estimation of the borrowing rate, the economic value of 
the coefficient of the market P/E ratio and the industrial clustering is consistent with 
our argument, although most of the estimations are statistically insignificant (Table 
5.3 and 5.5). 
Tables 5.7 Panel A and B represents the results of both multivariate and logistic 
analysis when we include all our control variables in the model. Among all the 
control variables, we find that cash payment, deal status (withdrawal), reverse 
takeover, and largest shareholder’s shareholding all have a consistent and dominant 
effect on the premium paid by the acquirers, and only job security has significant 
effect on the likelihood of involvement of the private acquirers.  




Table 5.7 All Factors and Takeover Premium 
 All sample deals  Completed sample deals 
 Premium  Premium 
 (Pr>|t|)  (Pr>|t|) 
Intercept 1.1988***  0.9768*** 
 <.0001  0.0005 
Cash Only 0.0807  0.1199* 
 0.1826  0.0998 
Stock Only 0.0100  0.0171 
 0.8949  0.8342 
Reverse n.a.  -0.4055* 
   0.0587 
Withdrawal 0.1841***  n.a. 
 0.0029   
Volume (%) -0.2472**  -0.1439 
 0.0167  0.3089 
Intangibles -0.0374  0.1550 
 0.7221  0.3118 
Largest Shareholder (%) 0.0030**  0.0049* 
 0.0275  0.0673 
Director Ownership 0.0241  0.0552 
 0.7000  0.4949 
Job Security n.a.  -0.0823 
   0.2137 
Market P/E ratio -0.0036  -0.0045 
 0.4604  0.4284 
LIBOR (%) -0.0788  -0.1153 
 0.7191  0.6415 
Industrial Clustering -0.0011**  -0.0010* 
 0.0156  0.0678 
    
F Value 2.13  2.17 
Pr>F 0.0281  0.0248 
R-Square 16.60%  23.90% 
Adj R-Sq 8.80%  12.89% 
N 118  89 
Note: The full sample includes 127 deals of which 76 are made by the public acquirers and 51 are 
made by the private acquirers. Among 95 completed deals, 62 deals are made by the public acquirers 
and 33 deals are made by the private acquirers. The multivariate analysis is based on the OLS 
estimation: 
Premium= α + ∑   
 
      + εi 
where Xi is the set of independent variables and the dependent variable, Premium, is calculated as the 
deal value divided by the market value of the total target’s shares acquired. Cash Only is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the deal is 100 per cent financed by cash and 0 otherwise; Stock Only is a 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the deal is 100 per cent financed by stock and 0 otherwise; 
Reverse is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is a reverse takeover and 0 otherwise. The deal is 
defined as a reverse takeover if the acquirer is a private acquirer and the target is not delisted within 3 
months after the effective date of the deal; Withdrawal is equal to 1 if the deal is withdrawn and 0 
otherwise; Volume is the annual average volume turnover which is calculated as the annual average of 
the daily value of the target shares traded divided by the daily market value of the target; Intangibles is 
the ratio of the value of the target intangibles divided by the value of total assets of the target one year 
before the announcement; Largest Shareholder is the percentage ownership held by the largest 
shareholder of the target firm; Director Ownership is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the director 
is also a shareholder of the target and 0 otherwise; Job Security is a dummy variable that takes value of 
1 if the director still holds the position at least one year after the takeover effective date and 0 
otherwise; Market P/E ratio is the de-trended annual FTSE All Share P/E ratio 30 days before the 




takeover date; LIBOR is the annual average LIBOR rate 30 days before the announcement date of each 
takeover; Industrial Clustering is calculated as the number of takeovers in each sample firm’s industry 
in the same year as the takeover date of each deal, and industries are classified based on Fama-French 
12 Industries Classification. Withdrawal is only tested among all sample deals and Reverse and Job 
Security are only tested among completed deals. The significance of model is reported based on F-
statistics, and both R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported. The outliers are controlled by studentized residual 
method (<2) and the significance of the coefficient is tested by using t-statistics. “***”, “**”, and “*” 























































Table 5.8 All Factors and the Involvement of Private Acquirers 
 All sample deals  Completed sample deals 
 Private acquirer  Private acquirer 
 (Pr> |χ|)  (Pr> |χ|) 
Intercept 1.0261  -0.9360 
 0.3705  0.5755 
Cash Only n.a.  n.a. 
    
Stock Only n.a.  n.a. 
    
Reverse n.a.  n.a. 
    
Withdrawal 0.6762  n.a. 
 0.1748   
Volume (%) 0.2372  -0.5551 
 0.7540  0.5785 
Intangibles -1.1578  -0.5975 
 0.1738  0.5661 
Largest Shareholder (%) -0.0132  -0.0017 
 0.1252  0.9068 
Director Ownership -0.3692  0.0725 
 0.1252  0.8986 
Job Security n.a.  1.2747** 
   0.0105 
Market P/E ratio -0.0383  -0.0057 
 0.2930  0.8969 
LIBOR (%) 0.9693  -0.1845 
 0.5723  0.9298 
Industrial Clustering 0.0017  0.0033 
 0.5970  0.3838 
    
Likelihood Ratio 10.94  9.11 
Pr> χ 0.2046  0.3329 
Wald Test 9.52  8.40 
Pr> χ 0.3002  0.3949 
N 47/118  31/89 
Note: The full sample includes 127 deals of which 76 are made by the public acquirers and 51 are 
made by the private acquirers. Among 95 completed deals, 62 deals are made by the public acquirers 
and 33 deals are made by the private acquirers. The logistic analysis is based on logit regression model 
which as: 
     (    )     (
    
      
)  ∑  
   
   
where      is the probability that firm i belong to outcome j (1 if the acquirer is a private acquirer, and 0 
otherwise);    is the vector of measured independent variables of firm i ;    is the vector of parameters 
of distinctive independent variables; (
    
      
) is the odds ratio; Cash Only is equal to 1 if the deal is 100 
per cent financed by cash and 0 otherwise; Stock Only takes the value of 1 if the deal is 100 per cent 
financed by stock and 0 otherwise; Reverse equals 1 if the deal is a reverse takeover and 0 otherwise. 
The deal is defined as a reverse takeover if the acquirer is a private acquirer and the target is not 
delisted within 3 months after the effective date; Withdrawal is equal to 1 if the deal is withdrawn and 
0 otherwise; Volume is calculated as the annual average of the daily value of the target shares traded 
divided by the daily market value of the target; Intangibles is the ratio of the value of the target 
intangibles divided by the value of total assets of the target one year before the announcement; Largest 
Shareholder is the percentage ownership held by the largest shareholder of the target firm; Director 
Ownership is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the director is also a shareholder of the target and 0 
otherwise; Job Security takes value of 1 if the target director holds the position at least one year after 




the effective date and 0 otherwise; Market P/E ratio is the de-trended annual FTSE All Share P/E ratio 
30 days before the takeover date; LIBOR is the annual average LIBOR rate 30 days before the 
announcement date; Industrial Clustering is the number of takeovers in each sample firm’s industry in 
the same year as the takeover date, and industries are classified based on Fama-French 12 Industries 
Classification. Withdrawal is only tested among all sample deals and Job Security are only tested 
among completed deals. Cash Only, Stock Only and Reverse are not tested here because of the quasi-
complete separation of data points are detected by SAS.  The significance of the coefficient is tested by 
using Chi-statistics for logistic analysis. “***”, “**”, and “*” represents significant level of 1, 5, and 
10 per cent, respectively. 





We investigate the difference in the premium paid by private and public acquirers and 
possible causes of this difference. We find that, on average, private acquirers pay 
around 15 per cent less than public acquirers. To explain why such a difference exists, 
we test how deal characteristics, target characteristics and market characteristics 
affect the size of the premium paid by acquirers and the likelihood of involvement of 
private acquirers, and find that deal and target characteristics have the dominant 
effects.  
We find that private acquirers behave differently from public acquirers. Private 
acquirers may engage in a reverse takeover of a public target with the aim of attaining 
listed status and access to the traded capital markets. Reverse takeovers provide an 
alternative route for private firms to go public involving lower cost and faster 
processing time than for IPOs44. Because cost is a prior concern when engage in a 
reverse takeover, the premium paid by the private acquirer of a reverse takeover is 
likely to be low or even at a discount. Our investigation also reveals that, consistent 
with Bargeron, et al. (2008), private acquirers find it easier to walk away from a deal. 
We find that non-completed deals are on average associated with a higher deal value 
and the number of competing bids increases the likelihood of a deal not being 
completed. Although such effect of bidding contest on the premium offered to the 
targets is indirect, it implies that private acquirers carefully control the costs of 
takeover by avoiding bidding competition and only progress if the price is right. We 
also find that private acquirers are more likely to acquire a target for which 
uncertainty as to the value of the assets is lower. The effect of the value of intangible 
assets of a target suggests a negative relationship between the size of intangibles and 
                                                          
44
 Although a reverse takeover can be financed with a lower cost for acquirers, Adjei, et al. (2008) find 
that long term outcome may not be desirable. 




the likelihood of involvement of private acquirers. Although intangibles can reflect 
potential growth, private acquirers may weigh the inherent risk of intangibles higher 
than public acquirers. Moreover, private acquirers may also attempt to minimize the 
purchase price by seeking to cooperate with the directors of the target firm. Taking 
advantage of a possible conflict of the interest between the directors and shareholders 
of the target enables private acquirers to secure the deal at the lowest possible price. 
Another possible advantage of securing a job for a target director is that it enhances 
the integration of the businesses in the post-takeover. 
Although our results confirm our proposed hypotheses, the findings raise questions 
that are worthy of further investigation. Our results suggest that the main reason that 
private acquirers can manage the cost of takeovers is due to their concentrated 
ownership, less pronounced agency issues, less risk taking, and avoidance of the 
winner’s curse of overpayment. If this is the case, then we would expect private 
acquisitions to be more successful than public acquisitions. Thus, the question we 
should ask is why public acquirers pay so much rather than, as Bargeron, et al. (2008) 
proposed, why do private acquirers pay so little. Although the winner’s curse and/or 
the hubris hypothesis may help to answer this question, if public acquirers are well 
aware of overpayment and still progress with a deal to avoid the negative market 
reaction if they withdraw, this may cast doubt on the assumption of market rationality. 
Another issue which is not captured by this study is whether private acquirers, in 
general, have similar intentions when engaged in mergers and acquisitions as public 
acquirers. Healy, et al. (1992) and Heron and Lie (2002), find that operating synergy 
can be realised in the post-takeover period. Whether this is also the case for private 
acquirers require an investigation of changes in the operating performance in the post-
takeover period. Further research should help to answer these questions and enhance 
our understanding of takeover activities. 




Chapter 6  Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
The development of research in M&A in recent three decades enhances our 
understanding about acquisitions activity from different aspects. Early studies, 
including Manne (1965), suggest that the existence of the market for corporate 
control enhances efficiency of the managerial performance and the allocation of 
resource. Lintner (1971) and Mandelker (1974), among others, find that acquirers 
gain a normal return from acquisitions and an abnormal stock performance of target 
firms can be observed around the completion of the takeover. Additional evidence 
provided by Asquith, et al. (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Andrade, et al. 
(2001) all suggest that acquirers gain an insignificant abnormal return during the 
announcement period, and Asquith, et al. (1983) and Andrade, et al. (2001) also find 
acquirers experience losses in the long run in the post-acquisition period. Research 
studies identify different deal and target characteristics, including mode of payment 
(Wansley, et al., 1983; Travlos, 1987; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Draper and Paudyal, 
1999), the size of the target (Fuller, et al., 2002; Moeller, et al., 2004), diversification 
(Graham, et al., 2002; Ueng and Wells, 2001), cross-border (Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005), target listed status (Chang, 1998; Ang and Kohers, 2001; Fuller, 
et al., 2002; Draper and Paudyal, 2006) have a significant effect on acquirers’ gains. 
Jensen (1986) and Harford (1999), among others, also find that managerial incentives 
can also explain acquisitions activity and its effect on shareholders’ wealth. 
Based on the review of existing literature, we identify three empirical issues in M&As. 
First of all, corporate cash has been suggested as the main conflict of interest between 
shareholders and managers, and managers are motived to waste corporate cash on 




non-value-enhancing acquisitions for their own interest at costs of shareholders 
(Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999). Research studies in corporate payout provide evidence 
which suggest that corporate payout policy enhances shareholders’ wealth by 
efficiently monitoring the managerial behaviour (La Porta, et al., 2000; DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008). In such a case, we would expect 
corporate payout to reduce the possible agency costs and enhance acquirers’ 
performance. However, how the corporate payout affect acquirers’ gains are unclear. 
Secondly, investigations that are carried out by the majority of M&A research studies 
are based on the assumption that acquisitions are initiated and dominated by acquirers. 
Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) argue that acquisitions can also be initiated from 
target side. Their study shows that corporate strategic considerations and personal 
factors affect managers/owners’ decision to sell their firms. However, because their 
findings are difficult to generalise since the small sample size and the primary 
research method, factors that affect owners’ decision of sell and their gains from the 
sale are still need to be identified. Thirdly, although how the target listing status 
affects shareholders’ gains has been widely investigated, the effect of acquirer’s 
listing status on acquisition outcomes is still lack of evidence. Even though Bargeron, 
et al. (2008) find that private acquirers pay less than public acquirers, additional 
investigation is still worthy to carry out to understand how and why private acquirers 
behave differently than public acquirers.  
In this thesis, we carry out three empirical investigations in order to answer these 
questions. The result of each of our empirical chapters reveals important implications. 
This chapter provides the conclusion we arrived at from each of our three empirical 
studies. Constraints of the present studies and suggestions of possible future research 
directions are also discussed. 




6.2 Main Findings 
6.2.1 Corporate Payout and Gains from Acquisitions 
The monitoring effect of corporate payout has been recognised in corporate finance 
literature (La Porta, et al., 2000). We test the hypothesis that corporate payout 
enhances acquirers’ gains. There are 4,465 acquisitions under the test. We find that 
the 5-day cumulative abnormal return earned by non-paying acquirers (acquirers do 
not distribute any cash within two years proceeding to acquisition) is 1.06 per cent 
higher than paying acquirers (acquirers distribute cash through either dividend, or 
repurchase or both within two years proceeding to acquisition). The difference in 5-
days acquirers’ abnormal returns increases to 1.167 per cent when compares non-
paying acquirers to high-paying acquirers (acquirers of which payout level is in the 
4
th
 quartile when the sample is sorted based on the payout level in descending order). 
The higher abnormal return gained by non-paying acquirers is significant across 
different deal and target characteristics, and consistent in both the univariate and 
multivariate analysis.  
We suggest that such difference in the abnormal return gained by non-paying 
acquirers and paying acquirers can be explained by the life cycle stage which is 
indicated by corporate payout level (Denis and Osobov, 2008). We find that non-
paying acquirers are smaller firms with an average market capitalization of £391 
million, which is around 1/5 of the average market capitalization of paying acquirers 
and 1/7 of high paying acquirers. In addition, non-paying acquirers in our sample are 
more likely to use stock or mixed payment method to finance deals, having higher 
cash holdings, more likely to engage in focused deals and on average having a low 
market to book ratio. All these features imply that, consistent with literature, non-
paying acquirers are young firms that at early stage of corporate life cycle, and the 




abnormal return gained by non-paying acquirers are likely to be caused by reduction 
in information asymmetry. Following Draper and Paudyal (2008), we test the 
announcement performance of acquirers’ stock if acquirers engage in multiple bids. 
Consistent with our suggestion and Draper and Paudyal’s (2008) evidence, we find 
that non-paying acquirers gain the most with initial bids. Among initial bids, the 
difference in the abnormal return gained by non-paying acquirers and paying 
acquirers is significantly positive at 2.12 per cent and 2.37 per cent when comparing 
to high paying acquirers. However, with subsequent bids, the average abnormal return 
gained by non-paying acquirers is around 1 per cent lower than paying acquirers. This 
result suggests that paying acquirers have a better and stable performance in an 
acquisition programme, whilst the large gain accruing to non-paying acquirers with 
initial bids is mainly caused by the market revaluation. 
To investigate the long run performance, we use both calendar time portfolio and 
BHAR methods. We find that paying acquirers significant outperform non-paying 
acquirers. The multivariate analysis of the long run performance also shows that 
payout ratio significantly improves acquirers’ performance in the post-acquisition 
period.  
Our results have several implications. First of all, our findings for both the short and 
long run analysis suggest that the corporate payout enhances the corporate 
performance. Secondly, non-paying firms are likely to be small firms that at early 
phrase of the corporate life cycle, and such firms are likely to gain from the market 
revaluation due to previous information asymmetry. Finally, our investigation does 
not generate any supporting evidence for the agency argument on corporate cash.  




6.2.2 Factors Affecting an Owner’s Decision to Sell 
Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) argue that acquisitions can be dominated by targets, 
and find evidence that target managers are motivated by strategic and personal factors 
and are actively looking for buyers. In order to provide additional and more 
generalizable evidence, in Chapter 4, we use both the logistic and multivariate 
regression analysis and test the hypothesis that a director and shareholder factor, a 
corporate factor and a market factor has an effect on the owner’s decision to sell the 
firm and their gains from the sale. We find that director’s years of service has a 
dominant effect on the likelihood of sale. Increases in director’s years of service 
significantly decrease the log ratio of sale (the log ratio of the probability of sale over 
the probability of not sale). For gains from the sale, job security of target managers 
significantly reduces the premium received by target shareholders. In addition, 
percentage of ownership held by the largest shareholder and the corporate liquidity 
ratio are also negatively related to the likelihood of sale, whilst variables such as P/E 
ratio and industrial clustering all reduce the size of the premium paid by acquirers.  
Our results confirm Graebner and Eisenhardt’s (2004) suggestion that the decision of 
sale and the premium paid by acquirers can be determined from target side. First of 
all, the agency incentive of target managers significantly affects the decision of sale 
and gains from the sale. Managers of target firms highly value their executive power 
accumulated over years and evaluate the potential risk of job loss if their firms are 
taken over. If concerns of the job security and the future personal welfare can be 
resolved, managers would not oppose a sale of the firm and may be willing to engage 
in talk with potential buyers. Secondly, shareholders’ decision to sell the firm is 
determined by the consideration of the related risk and return. In other words, 
shareholders would sell their firm only if such a sale can maximize their wealth. In 




addition, our results imply that individual and institutional shareholders have different 
preference for the mode of payment. Individual shareholders are likely to request cash 
to enhance the certainty of their wealth whilst institutional shareholders are willing to 
accept stock to share any potential synergy and bear related risks. Finally, our results 
also show that the market environment reflects time-varying investors’ sentiment and 
significantly affect the acquisition activity and shareholders’ gains.  
6.2.3 Acquisitions of Private Acquirers 
The investigation of the involvement of private acquirers is first carried out by 
Bargeron, et al. (2008). They find private acquirers pay less than public acquirers. 
Following Bargeron, et al. (2008), we carry out a further study to investigate whether 
and why private acquirers pay differently than public acquirers. The main hypothesis 
of our test is that private acquirers pay less than public acquirers and the difference in 
the premium paid by private acquires and public acquirers are due to the fact that 
private acquirers takeover different types of targets. We find that the average 
premium paid by private acquirers is 15 per cent less than public acquirers. The 
lowest takeover premium is observed when private acquirers engage in reverse 
takeovers. In addition, we find that private acquirers are more likely to withdraw bids 
than public acquirers, and the number of competing bids has a significant positive 
relationship to the likelihood of withdrawal. Moreover, our results show that private 
acquirers are more likely to provide a job position to the target manager in merged 
entity after the takeover, and such job security is found to be related to a lower 
takeover premium.  
Our findings suggest that private acquirers behave different than public acquirers. 
Private acquirers may engage in reverse takeovers which is an alternative way access 
public fund. As cost is a prior concern for engaging in reverse takeover, private 




acquirers will only proceed in reverse takeovers if cost is minimized. In addition, 
private acquirers suffer less from market pressure than public acquirers. This enables 
private acquirers to avoid winner’s curse and have a better control over costs for 
acquisitions. Moreover, private acquirers are more likely to seek cooperation from 
target managers by offering a job position. Having target managers in merged entity 
enables private acquirers to acquire target firms at a lower possible cost and may 
enhance the efficiency of the post-acquisition integration.  
6.3 Constraints and Future Research Direction 
We notice that there are several constraints with our studies and further research may 
be carried out to enhance our understanding about related issues.  
First of all, our results show that non-paying acquirers experience insignificant losses 
with subsequent deals and paying acquirers gain a significant positive abnormal 
return across deals in an acquisition programme. If the positive gains for paying 
acquirers are from expected synergy, the cause of non-paying acquirers to engage in 
subsequent deals is less clear. Doukas and Petmezas’ (2007) self-attribution can be an 
explanation, and further research in the difference in the managerial behaviour 
between non-paying and paying firms may help to answer this question. Secondly, 
our control variables are highly focused on deal and target characteristics, market 
variables, such as investors’ sentiment, may also explain the size of gains for different 
acquirers. Finally, it is possible that managers carefully control the payout level to 
accumulate cash. Investigating the relationship between corporate payout and cash 
and its effect on acquirers’ gains can provide direct test on Jensen’s (1986) free cash 
flow hypothesis. However, low frequent accounting data for UK firms makes it 
difficult for us to perform the test. Thus, future research studies may investigate the 




relationship between the corporate cash level and payout level by extending the tested 
period proceeding to acquisitions.  
For the investigation of the seller’s side of story, our study uses a director’s years of 
service, shareholdings and job security as proxies to test a director’s wealth effect. 
Future research may use additional variables such as changes in a director’s salary, 
annual compensation and pension scheme to test acquisition effect on a director’s 
wealth. In addition, our analysis does not capture firms of which 
managers/shareholders are willing to sell but do not receive any takeover bid during 
our sample period. The question of why owners of firms want to sell but fail to secure 
an offer could be explained by some personal, corporate and market characteristics 
which are not observable in our sample, and future research may help to resolve this 
issue.  
Finally, our study of the involvement of private acquirers reveals that private 
acquirers pay less than public acquirers and such underpayment is because that 
private acquirers take over different type of targets. If this is the case, we would 
expect acquisitions by private acquirers are more successful than by public acquirers. 
However, this suggestion is based on the investigation of takeover premium received 
by targets, whether acquisitions by private acquirers are more successful in the long 
run is still unclear. Thus, investigation on the operating performance of merged entity 
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